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ABSTRACT

An important question has pervaded the field of labor-management
relations for over fifty years: Is political bias present in the
decisions rendered by National Labor Relations Board members in unfair
labor practice cases?
This study develops and tests a model of Board member decisions in
selected unfair labor practice cases over the period 1962-1983.

By

studying 2147 decisions made by seventeen individual members, a
relationship was found among the decisions and several variables of
political party affiliations, personal background factors of members,
and conditions within the procedure by which allegations of unfair labor
practice violations are processed for decision.

Political congruency

between Republican members originally appointed by Republican presidents
was found to exert a pro-management bias on decisions.

Procedural

process variables found significant included employers as the party
initiating the charges of ULP violations; support of the administrative
law judge of the allegations irrespective of whether the filing party
was a union or an employer, and dismissal by ALJs of charges filed by
unions.

Personal background factors found to be significant included

the age of the member at the time of the decision, with older members
more likely to decide favoring unions over employers than younger
members, and the type of undergraduate degree possessed, with members
having been awarded degrees in business/economics less likely to make
decisions in favoring unions over employers than members with
non-business/economics degrees.

vii
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Results were analyzed using the logit technique.

Logit is a

non-linear probability model particularly suited to analyzing
dichotomous variables ‘(e.g., pro-union/pro-management decisions,
Democratic/Republican member). Logit provides insights (where
categorized data are involved) that are not available from more commonly
used techniques (e.g., regression analysis and analysis of variance)
which are based on assumptions (e.g., that the dependent variable is
continuous or at least ordinal) and were therefore not appropriate to
this study.
Practical implications of the results of this study are described
and thoughts are offered for future research concerning the roles of the
regional director and the administrative law judges in decisions.

viii
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is a federal agency
created in 1935 by Congress to administer the basic law governing
relationships between employers in the private business sector and labor
organizations.

The NLRB was established by the National labor Relations

Act and is the agency that administers the act.*

Congress established

the NLRB for the purposes of ensuring that employees could exercise the
rights provided them under the act and to protect them, as well as the
2

general public, from certain unfair labor practices.

Administration of National Labor Relations Act
The NLRA is administered by a five-member Board and a General
Counsel, which is largely independent of the Board.

3

The Regional

Director is responsible for issuance and prosecution of formal
complaints concerning violations of the Act, and supervises the agency's
regional, sub-regional and resident offices.

4

The five-member Board

acts as a judicial body in deciding cases submitted to it.

The Board

primarily resolves contested cases which have been appealed on some

* The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935 (Wagner Act) as
amended by the Acts of 1947 (To£ t:-Kartley Act), 1959 (Landrum-Griffin
Act), and 1974, Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).
2

Unfair labor practices are defined in Section 8 of the act and
the rights of employees are primarily set forth in Section 7.
3

Duties and functions of the NLRB are described in Appendix A.

4

A listing of each of these three types of offices as well as a
map indicating the territorial boundaries of regional and sub-regional
offices is included as Appendix B.

1
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basis such as an allegation that the facts have been improperly
interpreted.^
Presidential Appointments
Section 3 of the Act provides that members of the five member Board
be appointed "by the President by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate."

Each member

is appointed for a term of five years, except that

any individual chosen

to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for the

unexpired term of the member being succeeded.
with the term of one member expiring each year.

The terms are staggered,
Any member of the Board

may be removed by the President, upon notice and hearing, for neglect of
duty or malfeasance in office, and for no other cause.

Historically,

however, none of the members appointed to the Board since its creation
in 1935 has ever been

so removed.

shall serve as chairman.

The President also designates who

A member or a chairman may be re-appointed to
A

serve additional five year terms.The General Counsel of the Board is appointed, in a procedure
essentially the same as that of Board members, by the President for a
term of four years.
four-year terms.

A General Counsel may be reappointed for additional

Historically, of all the General Counsels or Acting

General Counsels, only the original General Counsel and three others
have served longer than forty-eight months.^

This process is discussed in Chapter 3 and the basic procedures
are illustrated in Appendix C.
^The frequency with which reappointments has occurred is provided
in footnote 9.
^ The First General Counsel, Charles Fahy, served five years
(Sept. 1935-Sept. 1940). Additionally, the tenures of George J. Bott
(Sept. 1950-Dec. 1954), Arnold Ordman (May 1963-June 1971), and William
A. Lubbers (Dec. 1979-April 1984) exceeded four years. A list of
General Counsels is provided in Appendix F.
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3

Transient Nature of the Board
During the five decades since enactment of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board has included forty-one members appointed during
the administration of nine presidents, from Franklin D. Roosevelt to

g
Ronald Reagan.

During the most recent ten years, under presidents

Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, eleven individuals have been appointed
as members of the five-member Board.

This level of member turnover,

coupled with the Act's provision for the term of one member to expire
each year, underscores the fragile and transient nature of the Board.

9

Presidents have an opportunity, therefore, to appoint a majority of the
members to the Board by no later than the completion of the third year
of their administrations.
Changing Interpretations by Changing Boards
As administrations change, and as new appointments to the Board are
made, both labor and management have contended that the philosophy of
the Board shifts.

When a given Board renders decisions reflecting its

interpretations of the Act in conjunction with the facts of cases, its

Names and dates of service of these appointees are shown in
Appendix E.
9

A member may be renominated for additional terms. This
renomination potentially could reduce the rate of turnover. In reality,
however, since 1947, when the size of the Board was increased from three
to five, only eight of the thirty-one appointees have served at least
five years (Abe Murdoch, Aug. 1947 - Dec. 1957; Phillip Ray Rodgers,
Aug. 1953 - Aug. 1963; Boyd S. Leedom, April 1955 - Dec. 1964; John H.
Fanning, Dec. 1957 - Dec. 1982; Frank A. McCulloch, Mar. 1961 - Aug. .
1970; Gerald Brown, April 1961 - Aug. 1971, Howard Jenkins, Aug. 1963 Aug. 1983 and John A. Penello, Feb. 1976 - Jan. 1981). Of the nine
members appointed within the most recent five years (1981-1986), only
five are still members (Donald Dotson, Mar. 1983; Wilford Johanson, May
1985; Marshall Babson, July 1985; James Stephens, Nov. 1985; and Mary
Cracroft, Nov. 1986). Members John Van de Water, John Miller and
Patricia Diaz Dennis served fourteen months (Aug. 1981 - Dec. 1982),
three months (Dec. 1982 - Mar. 1983), and thirty-nine months (May 1983 August 1986) , respectively.
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decisions frequently are disputed.
Boards, is controversial.

The current Board, as were prior

Consistent with the observations of Sloane

and Witney,^ organized labor leaders decry the "Reagan" Board as
pro-management, whereas, management, in a similar manner, viewed the
Carter Board as pro-union.
Accusations from both sides abound that the Board is politically
biased in its ULP case decisions.
The Question of Political Bias
An important question, therefore, pervades the field of
labor-management relations:

Is political bias present in decisions

rendered by the Board in Unfair Labor Practice cases?
Sloane and Witney state that what the Act does is to establish
broad guidelines, but it is up to the agency to apply the law to
particular situations.
authority.

In this application, the agency has considerable

In the vast majority of the cases, however, the courts have

sustained the decisions on the grounds that the agency possesses
expertise that should be given full faith and credit by the judiciary.
It logically follows, the authors add, that how the law will be applied
depends to a great extent on who sits on the Board because members are
chosen who generally represent the socio-economic philosophy of the
President.

Sloane and Witney observe that, in general, unions have

criticized the policies of Republican-appointed Board members, whereas
employers have displayed the same attitude toward members appointed by
Democratic chief executives.

^ Arthur A. Sloane and Fred Witney, Labor Relations Law, Fifth
edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1985) pp. 127-128.
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Assessment of Political Bias in Board Decisions
The question of political bias has been the topic of considerable
study.

Ross^ pointed out, however, that the methodology used in much

of the scholarly work on this topic might be characterized as judgmental
assessments based on case analysis.

Delaney, Lewin and Sockell

12

,

noting this same pattern, recommend that researchers support their
arguments with more facts and place less reliance on non-quantitative
analysis.

They also recommend that researchers might examine whether

inconsistencies in Board decisions due to its composition (i.e.
political bias) are ^.rci.ally offset by stability in lower-level Board
policies.

This study, therefore, empirically assesses the political

nature of the NLRB and extends existing research to investigate whether
bias is present in decisions made in Unfair Labor Practice cases.

^ Philip Ross, The Government as a Source of Union Power.
Providence, RI: Brown University Press, 1965.
12

John T. Delaney, David Lewin and Donna Sockell, "The NLRA at
Fifty: A Research Appraisal and Agenda", Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, Vol. 39, No. 1 (October, 1985), 46-75.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH
This chapter outlines some of the research that has been carried
out in political appointments, judicial decision-making, voting
behavior, and political bias in regulatory agencies.

The works selected

are illustrative rather than exhaustive, with emphasis placed on major
works, on seminal and more recent studies, and on research in which
quantitative techniques have been applied.

In some instances, the

findings cited were not the primary focus of the research.

13

The

studies cited represent various theoretical orientations, methodological
specifications and degrees of rigor.

Studies range, for example, from

impressionistic viewpoints by "Board watchers", to simple percentage
calculations of votes for management or labor, to more intricate
statistical treatments involving such calculations as coefficients of
determination and correlation with levels of significance.

Irrespective

of the range of study approaches and developmental techniques, a number
of inferences, interpretations and conclusions emerge.
The format of this chapter includes a brief historical overview of
the circumstances surrounding the first change of the Board from a
majority membership of Democratic-appointed members to Republicanappointed members.

This historical overview is followed by a review of

the empirical findings of studies and the methods used in those studies.
The chapter closes with a summary of the findings of studies reviewed
and discussions of the purposes and significance of the study.

For example, Gormley (discussed later in this Chapter) set out
to test his "revolving door" hypothesis and serendipitously found that
the voting behavior of FCC Commissioners was much more sensitive to
political party affiliation than to broadcast-related employment ties.

6
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Historical Overview
During the earliest years following the Board's inception, there
was no doubt in the minds of many observers that the indications of
political bias in NLRB decision were irrefutable.

Until Board members

in fact, however, had been appointed by an opposing (non-Democratic)
administration, any contention of political bias could only be pure
speculation.

The following historical overview, therefore, is included

for the specific purpose of establishing a locus from which much of the
literature of the past four decades has emanated.
First Republican Members
Albert C. Beeson was nominated in 1954 by Republican President
Dwight D. Eisenhower to fill one of three Board vacancies.

In July and

September of 1953, two prior vacancies had been filled by President
Eisenhower's appointments of Guy Farmer, both as Member and as Chairman,
and of Philip Ray Rodgers.

14

The appointment of Beeson, if confirmed by

the Senate, would mark the first time in the history of the Board that a
majority of its Members would have been appointed by a Republican
President.

From 1935 through 1952, the 14 Members who had served on the

Board had been appointed by Democratic Presidents Roosevelt and Truman.
Opposing Viewpoints
Organizations generally regarded as pro-management, such as the
national Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of
Manufacturers (NAM), at that time were vocal concerning the Eisenhower
appointments as well as the past performance of the National Labor

Guy Farmer was appointed to fill two years of Chairman Paul
Herzog's unexpired term at the time of his resignation. Phillip Ray
Rodgers was confirmed for a full five year term replacing John M.
Houston.
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Relations Board.

Organizations such as NAM and the Chamber were

conveying the discontent from within the ranks of management with the
overall manner in which the NLRB had been applying the provisions of the
Act under Democratic Presidential appointments of Board Members.
The Chamber of Commerce, for example in 1953, expressed the
following sentiment during Senate Labor Hearings:
Certainly, management has cause to doubt seriously whether the
Board as presently constituted, is able with intellectual honesty to
administer the Taft-Hartley Act as Congress wrote it and intended it to
be. As long as any Board members and key staff members apply the
one-sided philosophy of the Wagner Act, we cannot have the balanced
labor-relations policy sought by the Congress in that act.
A dispassionate review of the decision of the Board seems to
disclose a studied attempt to evade the clear-cut intent of Congress, as
expressed in the Taft-Hartley Act^and to revert to the principles
established under the Wagner Act.
During those same Hearings, the Chamber went on to say:
Now, we think that there should be a clean sweep and an opportunity
for the new administration; if there are any present members of the
Board or their staff that are good, they can be reappointed, but if they
are not good then they can be eliminated as they should have been if
they are no good. This new administration should have an opportunity
for a clean sweep and to appoint^ghe type of men,..Lhat should have been
appointed in the first instance.
The first two appointments by President Eisenhower, Guy Farmer and
Phillip Rodgers, were confirmed by the Senate with iitcie fanfare.
Neither Farmer nor Rodgers had had extensive professional association
with management.

Farmer had been an NLRB trial examiner and Associate

General Counsel who, however, left the agency to practice labor law,

iJ In U.S. Senate, Labor Act Revisions; Hearings before the
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 83rd Congress, 1st Session
(Washington, D.C. 1953).
16

Ibid., pp. 157,159.
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primarily with management clientele.^

This career pattern was and

continues to be a not uncommon occurrence.

Phillip Rodgers had taught

political science at the university level and immediately prior to his
appointment had been a staff member of the Senate labor committee.

18

Scrutiny by Senate
Such near-perfunctory Senate approval as had occurred with nominees
Farmer and Rodgers was not to be the case with nominee Albert Beeson.
Beeson had been a director of industrial relations in industry.

In that

position he had a strong management orientation, including representing
employers in contract negotiations with unions, authoring policies
concerning personnel matters which were central issues in strike
situations, and representing management in cases before the NLRB.
Furthermore, if his nomination were to be confirmed, Beeson would
represent the third Eisenhower appointment, thereby tipping the balance
to a Republican-appointed majority.

19

The two carryover members, Abe

Murdock and Ivan Peterson, had been appointed by Democratic President
Truman.
In contrast to the review received by Farmer and Rodgers, the
review of Beeson's background was extensive.

Beeson's experience in

U.S. Senate, Nomination of Guy Farmer to be a Member of the
National Labor Relations Board, Hearings before the Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare, 83rd Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1953).

18

U.S. Senate, Nomination of Phillip Ray Rodgers to be a Member
of the National Labor Relations Board, Hearings before the Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare, 83rd Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1953).
19

U.S. Senate, Nomination of Albert Cummins Beeson to be a Member
of the National Labor Relations Board, Hearings before the Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, 1954;
hereafter cited as Beeson Nomination Hearings, 1954.
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management was assailed by Democratic members of the Senate.

Beeson

was characterized as ill-suited for the position of impartial
adjudicator of cases in which the parties were unions and employees.
Democratic Senators expressed alarm over Beeson's views that he would
join the two prior Eisenhower appointees (Farmer and Rodgers) in
redressing what he referred to as an imbalance in which labor was
favored by the old Board.

Allegations were made that Beeson still

maintained ties with his former employers, and that such unsevered ties
would adversely affect Beeson's ability to make impartial judicial
determinations in administering the Act.
Although the confirmations of Guy Farmer and Philip Rodgers had
been met with ambivalence by Democratic members of the Senate, these
same Senators now viewed the Beeson nomination quite differently.
Senate Democrats viewed the nomination as smacking of the NAM - Chamber
of Commerce urgings that a Republican President make a "clean sweep" of
the allegedly pre-union propensities of the National Labor Relations
Board, as expressed in the Senate Labor Hearings previously discussed.
Democratic Impression of Board Posture
The debate over the nomination of Beeson which ensued saw Democrats
arguing that the independence of the NLRB must be assured, and that
unlike governmental posts in executive departments, the Board must be
free of the direct influence of Presidential philosophies.

This

argument is one which had not received much Democratic push during the
pre-1953 years under the administrations of Democratic Presidents Truman
and Roosevelt.

The question of whether motivation for this distinction

See Beeson Nomination Hearings, 1954; and 100 Congressional
Record, 1970-2005(1954).
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(independent agency vs. executive position) lay in party strategy to
retain the "old" Board's pro-labor leanings or in genuine concern for
freedom from Presidential influence went unanswered.

Irrespective of

motivation, the impression which the Democratics intended to convey
clearly was the latter.

This impression was succinctly expressed by

Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy:

21

Members of the Senate, regardless of party, recognize that
their responsibility with respect to Presidental nominations is a
unique one. The President is entitled to have his policies carried
out by those whom he feels represent his philosophy. The President
is entitled to appoint to the various posts in his administration
those whose capabilities meet the standards he demands. But today
we are speaking of a nomination to the National Labor Relations
Board. It is not a policymaking branch of the administration which
should be filled by one whose philosophy of labor relations is in
keeping with the views of the political party in power. It is not
a tripartite body, to which representatives of labor and management
should be appointed. Its members do not serve at the pleasure of
the President, nor for
a term of
years concurrent withthe
Presidential tenure. . . .
The National Labor Relations Board is instead a quasi-judicial
agency, whose primary function is to interpret and apply the basic
labor relations law of the land. . . Board members are, in effect,
judges; and their decisions are of tremendous importance in the
determination of the legal rights of labor and management.
Thus, Members of Congress have a special obligatio^Jjo review
with care the nominations to this quasi-judicial agency.
In a vote, the ratio of which would be a harbinger of the
persistence into the 1980's of contentions
decisions, Beeson won confirmation
forty-two, nearly identical
distribution in the Senate.

of political bias in NLRB

by a count of forty-five to

to the existing Republican-Democratic member
The debate battle lines thus were drawn;

the question would persist for decades to follow:

Does political bias

exist in decisions made bythe National Labor Relations Board?

Senator Kennedy in 1961 would succeed Eisenhower as President.
In 100 Congressional Record, 2004 (1954).
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Investigative Methods and Empirical Findings
There have been many articles written and studies conducted dealing
with the National Labor Relations Board and its role in the labor
relations of the United States.
would be overwhelming.

Any attempt to analyze these in toto

A more productive approach is to analyze

relevant literature by certain categories which should facilitate
accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of this study as set forth
in Chapter 1.

In this section, therefore, four categories of the

literature will be discussed:

1) political appointments, 2) judicial

decision-making, 3) voting behavior, and 4) political bias in regulatory
agencies.
Political appointments encompass more than merely the process or
mechanics per se in filling positions in decision-making bodies.
Invariably, underlying agendas are suspected to exist that can affect
the outcomes which result from the decisions made by those appointees.
How those outcomes are affected, be it by design or intent on the part
of the appointing authority or not, is crucial.

If legislation is to

achieve the objectives envisioned by the legislators that conceived and
enacted it, the individual members of the boards and commissions created
to adjudicate disputes must be free to make objective decisions
insulated from biasing influences.
A vote cast in a dispute is the output of (to borrow a term from
general systems theory) "transformational activities" which meld the
intricacies of judicial decision making with the behavioral aspects of
the individuals.

The quality of that output is gauged against the

measure of the extent to which the vote is based exclusively on the
facts of the dispute, relative to the provisions of the legislation.
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the regulatory body system - either through behavior of its voting
members or through its judicial decision-making process - is permitted
to be contaminated by political influences introduced through the
appointment process, the output will be of poor quality.
An examination of these four categories of literature, therefore,
provides guidance for the design of this study to determine the presence
of political bias in NLRB unfair labor practice decisions.
Several points concerning these categories are appropriate here.
First, because the quasi-judicial nature of the Board and its role as
adjudicator is not unique to labor-management relations

23

, much of the

relevant literature is to be found outside of the field of business,
particularly within the legal and political science fields.

Second,

while these categories provide a useful basis of analysis to underpin
this study, they are neither all-inclusive nor mutually exclusive.
Indeed, they are some what overlapping.

Separation into the four

topical categories, therefore, has been made with a recognized degree of
arbitrariness.

This arbitrariness, however, is compatible with the

overlapping nature of the material.

Finally, the studies chosen are

important for both their content in conceptual development as well as
their methodology.

The content and methodology are intermeshed and to

separate them in the review would be an unduly artificial exercise.
Separation of matters of conceptual issues and methodology will be
reserved for the Summary section of this Chapter.

Dichotomies other than labor-management would include
creditor-debtor, producer-consumer, vendor-purchaser, injurer-injured
party, landlord-tenant.
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Political Appointment
Four early research endeavors between 1937-1971 concerning members of
regulatory agencies focused on the appointment process itself.

Those

research efforts stemmed from more pragmatic questions, such as the
identification and analysis of major regulatory problems.

The federal

government was the prime mover in the conduct of such studies

24

and

justified their financing on the basis of intending to institute changes
for improvement.
In making appointments of justices to the U.S. Supreme Court,
Hanberg

25

concludes that presidents have an opportunity to affect future

policy long after their administrations have ended.

The tenure of Justice

Douglas, for example, extended from his appointment by President Roosevelt
until the appointment of his successor by President Ford, some thirty-six
years later.

In making appointments, therefore, Presidents stress their

need to choose a person who will hold policy views compatible with their
own.

Hanberg classifies four presidents as liberals (Democrats Roosevelt,

President's Committee on Administrative Management,
Administrative Management in Government of the United States;
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1937). Budget
Bureau, President of United States, Digest of recommendations of
Commission on Organization of Executive branch of Government, classified
by possible method of effectuation; prepared by Division of
Administrative Management; (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1949). Organization of Executive Branch of Government
Commission [1953-1955], Final Report to Congress; (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955). Judiciary Committee, U.S.
Senate, Report on regulatory agencies to Pres.-elect [by James M.
Laudis] submitted by Chairman of subcommittee on Administrative
Practices & Procedures; (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1960). President of the United States, New regulatory
framework, report on selected independent agencies (President's Advisory
Council on Executive Organization); (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1971).
25

Roger Hanberg, "Presidential Predictions of Supreme Court
Justices: Behavior", Journal of Political Science, 1975, pp. 146-149.
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Truman, Kennedy and Johnson), and two presidents (Republicans Eisenhower
and Nixon), as conservatives, and uses those classifications as
independent variables to predict judicial performance , General ability
of these variables to predict behavior was good.

Behavior which was

different from expectation was explained via case analyses of individual
justices, concluding that the intervention of personal friendship and
historical change were c'ne most prominent reasons for sucb^differences.
Justice Jackson, for example, is described by Hanberg as having
undergone dramatic change in behavior following his experience at the
Nuremberg (World War II crimes) Trials.

Justices Reed and Frankfurter

also are given as illustrations of justices whose ideologies were
overtaken by events.

Hanberg further concludes that future behavior

over the short run can accurately be predicted on the basis of
presidential party of the appointee.

Inability to predict such behavior

is a function of two principal non-history variables:

friendship ties

or political expediencies.
Subsequently, the results of two ambitious government-financed
studies were released.

One of these was a longitudinal study of two

commissions extending over five presidential administrations
(1949-1974), and the other was a cross-sectional study of seventeen
agencies (e.g. boards and commissions).

The major conclusions and

methodologies of these two studies are reviewed here.
Two years after the results of these two studies were published,
the longitudinal study of Graham and Kramer

26

concluded that a nominee's

performance as a commissioner can best be predicted by three variables:

James M. Graham and Victor H. Kramer, Appointments to the
Regulatory Agencies: The Federal Communication Commission and the
Federal Trade Commission, 1949-1974 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, April 1976)
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the individual's background, experience and philosophy.

Performance

depends first and foremost on independence in his or her actions, guided
solely by the recognitions that actions must be in the public interest,
and nothing else.

Fortitude to reach their own reasoned judgments and

courage to stand by them are essential.

The authors further conclude

that, contrary to other research conclusions and widespread cynicism
notwithstanding, the regulated industry itself is a prime source of
commissioners capable of being and having been outstanding performers.
This study was conducted principally via oral interviews and by
using published and unpublished data.
interviews were held.

Approximately 150 structured

Thirty-nine of these interviews were conducted

with former commissioners themselves, and the remainder with individuals
who had been directly or indirectly involved with the process.

The

chief sources of published and unpublished data were presidential
libraries (e.g. those of presidents Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy) and
collections ul papers of others (e.g. the Senator Kefauver collection at
the University of Tennessee). Analysis was highly interpretive,
subjective and judgmental, with conclusions by the authors conditioned
upon their analysis within acknowledged limitations of the study methods
and information.
The authors give no indication of any evidence or information that
would indicate that performance by a commission is politically swayed.
Such results, however, could result from the collection technique of
self-appraisal and the judgmental analysis.

Attribution theory suggests

that in self evaluations, individuals will credit their action to
"internal" factors such as judgment and expertise, rather than to
"external" factors such as political pressure.
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In its eighteen-month comprehensive study of seventeen federal
regulatory agencies, the Committee on Government Operations
in part:

27

concluded,

(1) that a comparatively large number of regulators appointed

come directly from the ranks of their regulated industries and areas of
activity, (2) that regardless of the administrations involved
(Democratic and Republican, alike) the Senate seems willing to confirm
virtually all appointments, (3) that agencies tend not to be "balanced"
according to viewpoints and backgrounds, (4) that frequent charges of
conflicts of interest stem from former relationships of appointees, (5)
that Congressional oversight to assure that Congressional mandate is
carried out by the agencies occurs frequently only on an ad hoc basis,
and (6) that administrative proceedings (e.g. case resolutions) take too
long, with delays (intentional or otherwise) unnecessarily too frequent.
The primary methodology of this study was a questionnaire completed
by more than 1500 respondents (e.g. attorneys practicing before the
agencies).

Questionnaire data were supplemented with interviews (e.g.

in hearings and symposia) with involved individuals such as
administrators, administrative law judges, practicing laywers and public
interest representatives.

The questionnaire included items (answered on

Likert-type scales) concerning matters such as the commissions'
integrity, legal ability and technical knowledge.

The primary method of

analysis was calculation of percentages and cross-tabulations.

Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate,
Study on Federal Regulation Vol I: The Regulatory Appointment Process;
Vol II Congressional Oversight of Regulatory Agencies; Vol III
Public Participation in the Regulatory Process; Vol IV Undue Delay in
Regulatory Administration; Vol V Regulatory Organizations and
Coordination; Vol. VI; Framework For Regulations, and Case Studies in
Federal Regulation; 6 Vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1977).
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Those conclusions by the Committee are important to this study of
bias in NLRB decisions.

If regulators tend to come from within their

own ranks (e.g. management and labor), and presidents represent
political parties with pro-labor and pro-management ideologies, there is
an exposure to bias which must be considered.

Since the Senate cannot

be looked to as a dependable filtering agent, the need to understand the
nature of political bias is underscored.

If biased decisions can be

eliminated, or controlled, fair decisions based on fact will be
forthcoming.

As a result, fewer decisions should be appealed and the

usage of delaying tactics diminished.

The time consumed by

administrative proceedings, therefore, could be reduced.
A later study by Schott and Hamilton

28

represents a still different

approach. This study focuses on one administration - that of Lyndon
Johnson - yet does not consider that administration in vacuo, but
includes contrasts and examples to the appointment processes of other
administrations.

The study draws a sample from among an estimated 433

PAS (Presidential Appointment with Senate Confirmation) Johnson cabinet
and agency appointments.

Data were collected from primary recorded

sources, from a questionnaire survey of appointees and from interviews.
Many of the conclusions were consistent with those of the 1970*s studies
of Graham and Kramer and the Committee, but from the specific
perspective and mode of the Johnson administration.

The consensus of

those surveyed and interviewed, for example, was that the criterion of
shared views was an especially salient feature of the Johnson selection

28

Richard L. Schott, and Dagmar S. Hamilton, People, Positions and
Power. The Political Appointments of Lyndon Johnson. An Administrative
History of the Johnson Presidency, No. 2 (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1983).
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process.

The only quantitative element of the study is a brief

statistical description of the appointees based on returns from the
questionnaires.

President Johnson's admitted criterion of shared views

adds credence to the concept of political bias.

Whether or not this

potential bias is indeed transmitted to the member vote requires testing
objectively.
Judicial Decision-Making
The institutional setting of a Board member is a five-year
appointment that can accurately be described as a quasi-judicial
tribunal.

The Board sits in the executive branch of government

Appointment is by the President, with approval by the Senate.
duties of the Board, however, are essentially judicial.

29
The

Federal judges,

too, are appointed by the President with approval of the Senate.

There

is a parallel, therefore, in the institutional setting of federal judges
and Board members.
The studies selected for inclusion in this section, therefore, have
been chosen because they explore matters of judicial decision making,
both in the truly judicial setting of federal judges and the
quasi-judicial setting of the NLRB.
Peck

30

examined the accuracy of the Board's self-assessment that it

is a quasi-judicial agency that does not engage in rule-making
activities, but limits its activities to the ad hoc resolutions of
issues in particular cases which come before it.

29

Peck concludes that

If not by law, by fact and by history.

30

Cornelius J. Peck, "The Atrophied Rule-Making Power of the
National Labor Relations Board," The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 70:729
(1961) pp. 729-761.
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the Board is demonstrably wrong in its self-assessment, and rule-making
is exactly what it has engaged in.

This conclusion is reached through a

review of actions by the Board in a number of areas (e.g. contract-bar,
unit determination, hiring halls, economic strikes).

Peck's evaluation

is that the Board clearly has abandoned the quasi-judicial approach, and
has engaged in substantive rule-making with respect to the standards
governing the exercise of its jurisdiction.

Except for the use of 1959

fiscal year statistics comparing the caseload of the NLRB to that of the
U.S. Supreme Court (as support of the impossibility of an ad hoc
approach) Peck's analysis is judgmental, relying on interpretation of
cases and other actions such as press releases by the Board.
The Board's function, according to Petro,

31

is to adjudicate

disputes in accordance with national law and constitutional due process
concepts.

Based on his observations of a cross-section of selected

decisions, however, he concluded that the Board was and had for many
years been substituting its own policies for those declared by Congress
in the National Labor Relations Act.

He suggests that one of the

characteristic defects of the NLRB is that it is continually forcing the
facts to fit its predetermined policies - instead of fitting Congress'
law to the facts as they exist.
32
Using Rivers Manufacturing Co.
as an illustration, Petro states
that the Board frequently adapts and tailors the facts so they will
produce the results it wants.

The key point, Petro states, is that

31

Sylvester Petro, "Expertise, The NLRB, and the Constitution:
Things Abused and Things Forgotten," Wayne Law Review, Vol. 14 (1968)
pp. 1126-1163.
^

Rivers Mfg. Corp. v. NLRB, 376 F. 2nd 511,515 (6th Cir., 1967).
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short-term political appointees of

the NLRBsimply cannot help adjusting

their practices

in accordance with the policies of the administration in

power.

administration has no basis for its appointments to the

A given

NLRB other than

furtherance of its policies and political ambitions or

payment of its political debts.

If a Board member wishes

re-appointment, he must satisfy the administration then in power that he
can be relied upon to act in accordance with that administration's
labor-policy views.

Hence, Petro says that it was no surprise that

President Kennedy, with large unions as his principal political
supporters, quickly achieved a blatantly pro-union majority of members
displacing the pro-management "Eisenhower" Board.
Later, three significant conclusions were drawn by Cook

33

in an

investigation of sentencing behavior of federal judges in draft cases.
First, that where law and precedent provide weak guidelines rather than
mandates, the choices of decision-makers are affected strongly by his or
her political association and personal history.
treat sentencing as policy decisions.

Second, that judges

Their decisions can either

support or impede policies, and they clearly perceive the relationship
between their decisions and public policy.

Third, that associations

with "policy specific" groups (e.g. political party affiliation) bias
decisions in the direction of the commitment or philosophy of that
group.

The investigation also suggested that Democratic judges 1) are

more liberal (i.e. milder sentences) than Republican judges, but 2) that
their liberalism tends to be dampened (i.e harsher sentences) under
incongruent circumstance (Republican environment in the locale of the

33

Beverly Blair Cook, "Sentencing Behavior of Federal Judges:
Draft Cases - 1972," Cincinnati Law Review, vol. 42 (1973), pp. 597-633.

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

22

decision) as opposed to congruent circumstances (i.e. Democratic judge
in a Democratic environment).

Republican judges, however, demonstrated

no appreciable difference in sentencing behavior in congruent or
incongruent environments.
The Cook study examined 1852 draft cases by 304 federal district
judges in 1972.

Regression was used to develop a model.

The predictive

capability of the model was tested using the sentences of a district
judge in the 7th Circuit during fiscal year 1973.

Predictive capability

was analyzed with differences (actual severity lower than predicted)
explained on the basis of a trend toward lighter sentences.
In the development of a representation model of judicial decisionmaking, the basic finding of Gibson

34

is that the sentencing behavior of

criminal court judges is influenced by representational role
orientations and environmental attributes.

The approach used and the

results achieved by Gibson essentially track those of Cook.

Gibson uses

twenty-six judges of district court in twenty-five counties in Iowa.

A

sample of 2,715 cases initiated during the two-year period 1972 and 1973
(and concluded by 1974) which resulted in convictions were used since
this study focuses on sentencing behavior.
used:

Three control variables were

1) Nine characteristics of cases and defendants (e.g. defendant’s

sex, age, previous convictions, plea), 2) attitudes and value of
criminal justice officials, and 3) policies and practices of pre-trial
decision makers.

Using path analysis, Gibson's findings include the

suggestion that judges are responsive to the environment in which they

James L. Gibson, "Environmental Constraints on the Behavior of
Judges: A Representation Model of Judicial Decision Making," Law and
Society, Vol. 14 (Winter, 1980), pp. 343-370.
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work (e.g. incidence of crime accounts for one-sixth of the variance in
sentencing behavior).

Representative role orientations (e.g. "trustee",

"delegate") measured using Likert response sets, were strong.
In one investigation, Irving, Taylor and Wallace

35

contend that the

decisions by members of the Board frequently are inconsistent with the
facts in a case.

They purport that the Board often ignores, misuses or

assumes facts in order to reach a preconceived result.

The authors add

that the Board does this more out of purpose than as the result of
ignorance, because it is bent upon establishing its preconception.

From

a review of ten case decisions, they suggest that the Board is
stubbornly inattentive to the individualized facts of the particular
cases under review.

The problem, as the authors see it, is one of

attitude, not of administrative procedure.

No matter what procedural

changes may be instituted, the Board's decision, they conclude, would
still be controlled by attitude.

The only solution to the Board's lack

of realism, the authors recommend, is to look for greater realism
through future Board appointments.

They suggest that reliance by the

Board on "empirical" studies in making decisions (as was done in support
of their decision in Shopping Kart Food Markets

36

) creates more problems

than it solves.
If the findings of Peck, Petro, Cook, Gibson and Irving et al are
accurate, we may speculate that the judicial decision-making may not
adhere wholly to the provisions of the Act.

We may suspect that

35

John S. Irving, Jr., Carl. L. Taylor and Barbara Childs Wallace,
"General Empirical Studies: Not a Substitute for Proof in Individual
NLRB Proceedings," University of Illinois Law Review, Vol. 1981, No. 2.
pp. 99-113.
36 28 NLRB 1311 (1977).
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influences such as congruencies and incongruencies of their ideologies
and the ideologies of their appointees may have some effects on their
decisions.
Voting Behavior
The field of decision-making or "voting" behavior, with its focus
on the individual as the voter (e.g. judge, commissioner, Board member)
rather than on the structure within which the decision is made (e.g. the
court as an institution or the law, as rationally developed, being
administered by an agency) is relatively new.

An underlying question -

how do attitudes and belief systems of the decision-maker, as an
individual, affect his or her choices? - has led to examinations of an
array of variables.
included:

Among the more prominent variables examined have

1) influence of appointing authority, 2) personal make up,

and 3) environmental conditions.
Influence of Appointing Authority
Disclosures brought to light in the course of the investigation of
the National Labor Relations Board by the Special Congressional
Committee

37

were analyzed by Smith

Board members' voting behavior.

38

in one of the earliest studies of

The author asserts that NLRB behavior

is a sole result of the type of persons in whom administration of the
Act has been entrusted.

The prejudices of the members are directly

related to the authority responsible for their appointment.

Smith

relies on case histories to support contention of partiality in its
employer-union decisions.

37

Authorized by H.R. 258, 76th Congress, 2nd Session (July 20,

1939).
38

Howard W. Smith, "NLRA - Abuses in Administrative Procedures,"
Virginia Law Review, Vol. 27 (1941) pp. 625-32.
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Most important decisions by commissioners of regulatory agencies
inherently involve value judgments which are correlated with the party
affiliation of the appointing authority.
Lubin

39

This conclusion by Nagel and

was derived from their analysis of decisions by twenty groups of

commissioners:

seven agencies (Civil Aviation Board, Federal

Communications Commission, Federal Power Commission, Federal Trade
Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission, National Labor Relations
Board and Securities and Exchange Commission) for three time period
years (1936, 1946 and 1956) - there was no Civil Aviation Board in 1936.
The twenty groups included 100 individuals as decision-makers.

Only

non-unanimous decisions were considered (based on their rationale that
these were more controversial with more differences to be accounted for)
which represented five percent of total decisions.

The assignment of

Democratic-Republican labels of liberal-conservative was based on
history, urbanism, working class and ethnic-group orientation of
Democratic party relative to Republican Party.

Tendencies (pro-liberal,

pro-conservative) in decisions were found to be dampened, but not
reversed, in cases of re-appointments of commissioners by an authority
of an opposing party.

This dampening affect is explained on the basis

that reappointments are motivated more on inertia and less on
ideological considerations than are initial appointments.

Some

conclusions concerning background characteristics are interesting.
Alumni of high-tuition schools tended to be more liberal, as were
non-lawyers.

Whether an individual had been a former professor or a

Stuart Nagel and Martin Lubin, "Regulatory Commissioners and
Party Politics," Administrative Law Review, Vol 17 (Fall 1964) pp.
39-47.
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corporate executive did not make a difference.

Liberal commissioners

tended to be more likely to dissent than conservative commissioners,
regardless of which party dominated the agency (reasoned as liberals
being more innovative and non-conforming).
DeLorme

40

raised two questions generated from perceptions of

partisan observers which he sought to answer by an analysis of voting
records of Boards consisting of a majority of members nominated under
the Eisenhower, Kennedy-Johnson, and Nixon-Ford administrations:

(1) To

what extent does the voting behavior of NLRB members reflect the labor
relations philosophy of the Presidents who appointed them?; and (2) Is
there any observed tendency of individual Board members to vote pro
union or promanagement affected by the election of a new administration
whose labor relations philosophy is different from the President who
appointed these Board members?
DeLorme analyzed 1250 unfair labor practice decisions which
"involved novel questions or set precedents that may be of substantial
importance in the future administration of the Act."
individual Board members
Boards

43

were inspected.

42

41

Votes by

on the three aforementioned Presidents'
A decision was classified as either

40

Charles D. DeLorme, Jr. and Norman J. Wood, "NLRB Voting on
Important Unfair Labor Practice Decisions: 1955-1975." American
Business Law Journal vol. 16 (1978) pp. 223-229.
41

This classification of decisions is found in each Annual Report.

42

These were obtained from the Decisions and Orders of the NLRB of
each year included in the study period.
43

A "President's Board" was defined as beginning during the fiscal
year wherein his designated Board Chairman served in that capacity for a
twelve month period.
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promanagement if the Board dismissed a union's unfair labor practice
complaint or upheld a management complaint, and as prounion if the Board
upheld a union unfair labor practice complaint or dismissed a management
complaint.

Sample percentage calculations were made showing that voting

by the two Republican Presidents' Boards (Eisenhower and Nixon) were
preponderantly promanagement, whereas the Democratic Kennedy-Johnson
Board was prolabor.

No statistical test of significance, however, was

performed.
A comparable analysis was made of percentages of prolabor and
promanagement votes cast by individual Board Members.

Inspection of the

voting record of individual members who were carryovers from one
President's Board to another indicated that his voting pattern was
apparently not materially affected by the election of a new President of
a different political party.
DeLorme concluded that the voting behavior of NLRB members reflects
the labor relations philosophies of the President who appointed them
because each President appointed an NLRB majority which was
promanagement (Eisenhower, Nixon) or prounion (Kennedy-Johnson).

Once

appointed, however, a member of the NLRB did not alter his promanagement
or prounion voting tendencies if the other major political party won the
Presidency.
Personal Makeup
Personal makeup has focused on education; background
characteristics of achieved attributes and ascribed attributes
(particularly age, religion, place of birth and ethnicity); career
experiences (both prior and prospective); reference groups (including
religious affiliations and political party affiliations), and
decision-making values and attitudes.
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Many of these suspected predictors of voting essentially are
nominal and therefore less useful in parametric statistical techniques
than are ratio and interval variables.

Notable exceptions here are age

and education, while others have been transformed into interval
measures, such as calculating the number of miles between the birthplace
and the decision site of the decision-maker.

44

Political party affiliation has been found to be a relatively good
predictor of a judge's vote in both criminal cases and in civil cases
involving economic issues.
Ulmer

45

, Goldman

46

, Feeley

Such has been the consistent conclusion by
47

and Nagel

48

more prolific researchers in this area.

, the latter being one of the
Nagel has investigated a

variety of facets of judicial backgrounds to establish specific
decisional propensities of judges.

Two of Nagel's studies are

particularly noteworthy because of the relevancy of their content and
their methodology to this study.

In a study of multiple correlations of

judicial backgrounds and decisions, Nagel investigated eight background

44

Kenneth M. Dolbeare, "The Federal District Courts and Urban
Policy: An Exploratory Study (1960-1967)", No. 12, Frontiers of
Judicial Research, edited by Joel B. Grossman and Joseph Tanenhaus (New
York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968) 373-404.
45

E. Ulmer, "The Political Party Variables in the Michigan Supreme
Court," Journal of Public Law, Vol. 11 (1964) pp. 352-370.
46

F. Goldman, "Voting Behavior on the United States Court of
Appeals, 1961-64," American Political Science Review, Vol. 60 (1966) pp.
374-392.

^ M. Feeley, "Another Look at the 'Party Variable' in Judicial
Decision-Making: An Analysis of the Michigan Supreme Court," Polity,
Vo. 4 (1971) pp. 91-107.
48

Stuart S. Nagel, "Multiple Correlation of Judicial Backgrounds
and Decision," Florida State University Law Review, Vol 2, No. 2
(Spring, 1974) pp. 258-270.
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variables (political party affiliation, pressure group affiliation,
ethnic affiliation, pre-judicial occupation, education, attitudes, age
and size of hometown) and two decision tendencies:

to decide for the

defense (in criminal cases) and to decide more "liberally," in economic
cases (e.g. for tenant in landlord-tenant cases or for labor in
union-management cases).
All of the background variables were scaled by Nagel to assume only
one of two values, as were the two dependent variables.

In both

criminal-case and economic-case decisions the political party
affiliation had the highest correlation coefficients with coefficients
relating to occupation, education and age much lower.
earlier study Nagel

49

had comparable findings.

however, did not involve correlation.

In a similar

That earlier study,

Percentages were calculated for

each of the two groups and the differences between group percentages
were evaluated on the basis of the probability that the differences were
attributable to chance.

Significant differences were found for

political party affiliation, religion (protestant, Catholic) and
attitudes (high liberalism, low liberalism).
Environmental Conditions
Booker and Trafford^ examined seven environmental conditions as
potential predictors of prolabor or promanagement NLRB decisions:

size

of union population; percent change (from prior year) of union

49

Stuart S. Nagel, "Judicial Backgrounds and Criminal Cases ,
Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, Vol. 53 (1962)
333-339.
Gene S. Booker and Cris L. Trafford, "Environment and NLRB Bias:
A Quantitative Study", Labor Law Journal, Vol. 17, No. 4 (April, 1966)
pp. 202-210.
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population; unemployment percentage rate; number of work stoppages
(current year and one-year earlier); Board member age (when initially
appointed), and board service tenure of Board member. The years covered
were 1937-1963, separated into three periods:

Pre-Taft-Hartley

(1937-1947); Post-Taft-Hartley (1948-1963); overall (1937-1963), and
additionally into six-year moving periods.

Based on a series of

correlations, the authors' major conclusions were that higher
pro-union/pro-management decision ratios were engendered by fewer work
stoppages and by increased unemployment, whereas increased union
membership is accompanied by lower pro-union/pro-management decision
ratios.

Younger members appeared to display a pro-union bias.

Board

service was deemed ineffective (small correlation) in biasing the
decisions of a Board member.
Political Bias In Regulatory Agencies
As was indicated in the previous section, regulatory agencies are
quasi-judicial.

The filling of decision-making positions within these

agencies via less-than-lifetime political appointments creates exposure
to political bias in decisions rendered.

This section therefore

includes studies which address political bias in agencies as a group,
and the NLRB iv. particular.

Unlike most other regulatory agencies’’* the

authorizing statute of the National Labor Relations Board does not
require some bipartisan appointments.

The exposure to political bias in

Board decisions, therefore, is particularly threatening.

For example; Civil Aviation Board, Federal Communications
Commission, Federal Power Commission, Federal Trade Commission,
Interstate Commerce Commission and Securities and Exchange Commission.
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Historically, the Eisenhower Board was the first Board with a
Republican-appointed majority.

This condition triggered a number of

early analyses with parallel conclusions, by Wirtz,
Finley

54

, and Scher

55

52

Ratner

53

,

, the latter of which involves the most definitive

approach.
Seymour Scher posits that "independent" regulatory commissions are
not divorced from politics.

So-called "independent" agencies are

subjected to much of the same kinds of activities designed to affect
them as are those presumably "non-independent" executive agencies.

The

appointive process is seen as crucial to have the agency read the law as
the regulated parties themselves would.

Since who fills agency

positions formally involves the President and the Senate they logically
become the target of activity by clientele to influence those
selections.

Scher contends that Presidents fix their stamp on the

policies developed by the independent commissions by using the
appointment process with no reluctance to appoint "their" members, and
in the last analysis it is at this appointment stage that the vigor or
drift which will characterize these agencies is determined.

Scher uses

a case study of one agency, the National Labor Relations Board, during

52

W. Willard Wirtz, "Two Years of the New NLRB", American Bar
Association, Section of Labor Relations Law, Proceedings, 1955, pp.
4-15.
53

Mozart G. Ratner, "Policy-Making by the New 'Quasi-Judicial'
NLRB," University of Chicago Law Review XXIII, 12 (1955).
54

Joseph E. Finley, "Labor Act Upside Down - NLRB: Now an
Employer Agency?", Public Affairs Institute (Washington, 1958).
Seymour Scher, "Regulatory Agency Control Through Appointment:
The Case of the Eisenhower Administration and the NLRB," The Journal of
Politics, Vol. 23, No. 4 (November 1961), pp. 667-88.
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one presidential administration, that of President Eisenhower, to
support his position and contentions.

Scher's use of a case study

focuses on the dynamics of the appointment process and the attempts of
clientele to influence the process.

Hard evidence of affecting

decisions via the process is provided through illustrative post-1954
decisions by the "Eisenhower Board".
In 1977, Hugh Heclo"^ interviewed nearly two hundred individuals
who had served in various agencies.

These individuals had been

appointees of Presidents from Herbert Hoover through Jimmy Carter.
Heclo made no attempt to obtain a random statistical sample.

His aim

was "to weigh rather than to count opinions and to counterbalance
self-serving statements with responses from other participants whose
views could be expected to be self-serving in a contrary direction.
Thus I sought out Republican and Democratic appointees...Such as it was,
my sample was drawn by using the real scales by which people are weighed
in Washington - that is, their reputations."

Reliability of the

information collected is subject to the perceptions of the appointees,
and as Heclo states,"... how perceptively I have heard what was being
said.

The analysis is mine, not the interviewees'."
Heclo concludes that the performance of presidential appointees is

strongly affected by the policies of the administration, rather than
"personal motives, jockeying for position, and directionless power."
further concludes that appointees take their oaths of office seriously
and that vast numbers of them struggle hard to conduct the public's

56

Hugh Heclo, A Government of Strangers - Executive Politics in
Washington (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1977).
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business and are concerned about the substance of the policies with
which they have been entrusted.
William T. Gormley^ set out to test the "revolving door
hypothesis" through a study of nonunanimous votes cast by the seven
members of the Federal Communication Commission in 299 cases during a
two-year period from 1974 to 1976.

The revolving door phenomenon refers

to an exchange of commissioners/employees between a regulated industry
and its regulatory body.

The revolving door hypothesis, in effect,

states that a regulatory commissioner with previous or prospective ties
to a regulated industry is more likely to vote in support of the
regulated industry's interests.
hypothesis.

Gormley did find support for the

More striking, however, it was revealed that political

party identification of the appointing President did a much better job
of predicting voter behavior than the anticipated variable of prior
background of commissioners.

Gormley suggests from these results that

regulatory agencies could change dramatically as Presidents appoint
members of their party to regulatory agencies.
Gormley employed two analysis techniques widely used by students of
judicial behavior:

bloc analysis and Guttman scaling.

Bloc analysis

permits analysis of large bundles of votes for which the direction (e.g.
liberal vs. conservatism, pro-broadcasting vs. anti-broadcasting) need
not be determined.

It aided Gormley in showing which members were of

the same voting bloc.

Guttman scaling, on the other hand, requires that

the votes be characterized as having a particular direction, after which

William T. Gormley, Jr. "A Test of the Revolving Door Hypothesis
at the FCC", American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 23, No. 4
(November 1979) 665-683.
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dimensions (clusters of votes which lead to consistent voting responses)
may be indentified.

Gormley used Guttman scaling to compare the

behavior of commissioners with contrasting employment backgrounds and
political affiliations.

Thus bloc analysis revealed the extent to which

selected commissioners voted together, while the Guttman scaling
revealed the extent to which the commissioners supported particular
interests.
In a quantitative study of Unfair Labor Practice Cases, Roomkin

58

developed a regression model containing economic variables (e.g.
unemployment rates, number of strikes) and aspects of the Board's
administrative processes (e.g. extent of delay) in an attempt to explain
the filing behavior of individuals.

Among the eight independent

variables Roomkin used was the Political composition of the Board
represented by a dichotomous variable, when the majority of Board
members were appointed by Democratic or Republican administrators,
respectively.

Roomkin relies on "conventional wisdom" (Democrats more

prounion than Republicans) to hypothesize higher filing rates by unions
and lower filing rates by employers during periods of Democratic
control.

Using data over the fiscal year period 1952-1975, Roomkin's

results included the finding that the political affiliation of Labor
Board members is a statistically significant regressor for
union-initiated cases only.

No evidence emerged, however, that unions

actually won more cases under Democratically-dominated Boards.

58

Myron Roomkin, "A Quantitative Study of Unfair Labor Practice
Cases", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 34, No. 2 (January,
1980) pp. 245-56.
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One major study which is both recent and which applies quantitative
analysis is that of Cooke and Gautschi

59

.

The authors developed a model

which contained individual characteristics of the Board member;
characteristics of the alternatives, and environmental factors, a total
of ten factors.

Individual characteristics included five factors:

a

match between political affiliation of the member and the appointing
party (two factors, Democrat-Democratic and Republican- Republican),
prior employment in a management position; place of residence prior to
appointment (SMSA/non-SMSA), and age (at time of decision).

The former

four factors were valued in binary terms, whereas the latter was scaled
with actual age in years.

Three factors addressed case alternatives:

who initiated the unfair labor practice charge (Employer or Union) and
what was the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (support or
reject).

Although four combinations (two-by-two) are possible, the

authors excluded the cell of "initiated-by-union/supported by ALJ".
final two factors were environmental:

The

percentage of Senate that was

Democratic in year of decision, and year of decision (to reflect trend
influence). A sample of member decisions in novel cases was used for
the period 1954-1977.

Ten cases were used from each year of the period,

with a total sample size (member decisions) of 892.

Their data were

analyzed using McFadden's conditional logit technique.

Among the

factors of individual characteristics, political affiliation was
concluded to be a good predictor whereas age, prior management
employment and place of residence were not.

The factors concerning

59

William N. Cooke and Frederick H. Gautschi III, "Political Bias
in NLRB Unfair Labor Practices Decisions", Industrial and Labor
Relations Review 35 (July 1982) 539-49.

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

36

characteristics of the alternatives as well as the two environmental
factors were insignificant.
Twenty-nine decisions (made by the Board since it has been composed
of a majority of members appointed by President Reagan) which reverse
prior Board decisions, have been analyzed by former member of the NLRB,
Peter D. Walther.

60

Walther states that the present Board decisions are

not, in fact, anti-union and are not a deviation from historically
established Board principles.

In fact, Walther posits, it was the

liberal Board decisions of the late 1970's and early 1980's (i.e. the
Carter Board) which were reversed, that were deviations.

What can be

described as a more pro-management complextion is the result of the fact
that, as Walther puts it, "to get from left field back into center
field, one must move to the right."
The evaluation by Klotz^* parallels that of Walther.

Klotz

concludes that the Reagan Board has not changed the central concepts of
labor law, and protests by organized labor that decisions by
the Board are undermining the law are erroneous.

The Reagan Board, he

contends, is merely restoring a proper balance between labor and
management in a number of areas. Klotz bases his conclusions on an
analysis of selected (but unidentified) case decisions in which the
"Reagan Board has overruled some overly pro-union and unsound decisions
of the Carter NLRB or prior Boards.

It has also revised certain NLRB

doctrines that federal appellate courts rejected."

In support of his

^ Peter D. Walther, "The NLRB Today", Labor Law Journal, Vol. 36,
No. II (November 1985), pp. 803-817.

^ Gary W. Klotz, "The NLRB:
March 6, 1986, p. 8.

Balance is Restored", Detroit Times,
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"proper balance" evaluation, Klotz cites comparative statistics between
the Reagan and Carter Boards.

For example, the Carter Board decided

against employers eighty-five percent of the time, in 1979 and 1980,
compared to fifty-five percent of the time by the Reagan Board, in 1983
and 1984.

The "proper balance" of Klotz is equivalent to Walther's move

"back into center field".

Under the Reagan appointees, the author adds,

the Board is more pro-employer than in the past, but continues to
protect employee rights and to promote collective bargaining.

The

Carter Board, however, was decidedly pro-labor, and the Reagan Board’s
shift to "proper balance" does not warrant organized labor's
allegations.

Labor's allegations are characterized as partisan

exaggerations.
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Summary

Despite empirical ambiguities, coupled with theoretical
differences, two issues emerge.

First, a degree of dysfunctional

judicial behavior seems unavoidable.

These behaviors reportably include

ignoring or tailoring facts in a case to fit preconceived conclusions
and creating provisions which do not in fact exist in the Act.

Second,

these behaviors share some common correlates in background
characteristics cf members.
The contention of this study is that individuals bring to their
positions as Board Members certain beliefs, attitudes and values.

These

personal makeups in combination with the quasi-judicial role of members,
the ambiguity of the Act, and the intricacies of the labor management
dispute, give rise to varying interpretations of what each member views
as the facts of the case and the provisions and meanings of the

Act.

Each case to be decided is a separate cluster of these variables and
from each cluster flows an observable behavior - a vote.

Not all

members share the same backgrounds and ideologies, and they vote
differently, even when given the same set of facts and the same
criterion provided in the written act.

Because the votes differ,

allegations of bias, and of political bias specifically, abound among
both members of organized labor and of management.

This study examines

those intricacies to see if there is a link between the votes cast by
members and the political influences emanating from the appointing
authority that is sufficiently strong to justify the contentions of
bias, and explores the possibility that bias could be partially offset
or dampened by stability below the Board level (the recommendation of
Delaney, Lewin and Sockell previously noted in Chapter 1).
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Purposes of the Study

The purposes of this study were to assess the validity of (A) the
commonly reported belief that decisions at the Board Member level are
strongly affected by the union-management philosophies of political
parties in the U.S., and (B) the proposition that the effects of
political influence on the Board's decisions are partially offset by
stability below the Board level.
Some of the specific questions that were investigated are (1) Is
there a tendency for a member's decision tovary relative under
conditions of Board unanimity?
decision to vary with age?

(2) Is there a tendency for a member's

(3) Is there a tendency for a member's

decision to favor either management or the union when both the member
and appointing authority have the same political party affiliation?

(4)

If there is a tendency to favor either management or the union, does it
remain constant over time?

and (5) Does organizational stability below

Board Member level affect the tendency for a member's decision to vary?
The study design takes into account the process by which decisions
regarding unfair labor practice charges are made as well as the
individual Board members making decisions. Hypotheses are addressed

to

various factors affecting members' decisions.
The process by which ULP charges are decided is described in
Appendix C and the paths which are followed are illustrated in Appendix
J.

A list of Board members, including those who served during the

period of this study, is provided in Appendix E.
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Significance of the Study
The significance of this study lies in the ability to model the
political context in which Board decisions are made,
the utility of the variables selected, the innovation of the
investigation of the effects of stability below Board level, and the use
of logit.

Logit was used as a technique to overcome the shortcomings of

regression analysis, the quantitative methodology previously
predominating in studies involving dichotomous dependent variables.

62

Research concerning the National Labor Relations Board has begun to
depart markedly from the traditional attention on the evolution and
meaning of Board doctrines.

A new approach which is more behavioral is

gaining favor. Interest is shifting to objective ways of explaining
decisional phenomena in terms of operationally defined concepts and
empirically verifiable hypotheses concerning human behavior.

While not

ignoring Board doctrines entirely, research is tending to address the
development of mathematical models of Board voting in unfair labor
practice cases.
This emerging research promises to do much to revitalize an area of
labor relations which some observers considered as going stale.

Few

academicians or practitioners, however, would downplay the importance of
the NLRB in labor relations.

Many would agree that the question of

political bias in decisions made by the National Labor Relations Board
in Unfair labor practice cases will continue to exist under the
prevailing two-party system of government in the United States. Without

Discussion of logit and rationale for its selection as the
analysis technique is included in Chapter 3.
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objective study of the type conducted here, there will be little
movement toward gaining an answer to this question. Use of the appeals
procedure of decisions rendered by an administrative law judge will
continue at its high i^ate as long as the employer-union litigants
perceive the outcome to be more a matter of the pro-management or
pro-union propensities of Board members rather than a matter of the
facts of a cases and the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act.
Unduly long periods of time and unwarranted delay in case resolutions
will continue to pervade NLRB proceedings with their attendant inflated
costs and inefficiencies of use of both time and human resources.
Further, the analysis of voting behavior could be applied in other
judicial and quasi-judicial forums, such as arbitration, and in arenas
other than labor relations, such as civil matters and consumer affairs.
The methodology here is suitable for increased illumination of the
complexities in those other areas.
Practitioners in business tend to focus their concerns on what
decision-makers within their operating environments decide; academicians
focus on the how and the why of such decisions; and political scientists
tend to feel that the public has as much "right to know" what such
judicial and quasi-judicial decision-makers do, and why, as what their
elected officials (who create and fill these positions) do and why.
If National Labor Relations Board members view their decisions as
public property, then students of decision-making behavior may be
capable of testing hypotheses which are of practical value as well as
theoretical value.

Practical value will ensue when knowledge gained

flows to the appointing authorities which nominate and confirm Board
members; to NLRB administrators, and to the Board Members in their roles
as decision-makers.
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Chapter 3

PROCEDURES AND METHOD OF INVESTIGATION

This chapter begins with a brief description of the paths which
unfair labor practice (ULP) charges follow to reach Board level.
Familiarity with these paths enhances an understanding of the procedures
and method of investigation used in this study.
description, Chapter 3 includes:

Following this

(1) the hypotheses to be tested; (2)

methodology; (3) research data base; (4) data collection technique, and
(5) data analysis technique.
Procedure for Processing ULP Charges
The paths which ULP charges follow to reach board level may be
described briefly as follows:

63

Charge, Investigate, Complaint and Answer.

Unfair labor practice

charges are received by the agency's regional and sub-regional offices
and then are processed.
process.

A case may be closed at any stage of the

At each stage, a case which is not closed advances to the next

higher level.

As an initial step, charges (filed by an employer, an

employee, a labor organization or any person other than a board
employee) are heard by a field examiner of the General Counsel's office.
The field examiner decides which charges fall within the definition of
an ULP and within the jurisdiction of the NLRB.
The General Counsel's staff investigates qualified charges and
issues formal complaints as warranted on the basis of the findings of

These basic procedures are illustrated in Appendix C. Other
background information, such as, Organizational structure, office
locations, duties and function previously was provided in Chapter 1.

42

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

43

the investigations.

During a recent three-year period (fiscal 1980

through 1982) 119,491 cases dealing with unfair labor practices were
closed (at all stages).

These ULP cases represented nearly seventyf\A

eight percent of the 153,494 total cases closed.

Of these 119,491 ULP

cases, eighty-four percent were closed prior to the issuance of a formal
complaint. The number and percent of cases closed at each stage are
shown in Appendix D.
Hearings and Report.

Those ULP charges which advance and are subject to

the issuance of a formal complaint receive a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). During the same three-year period,
seventy five percent of the formal ULP complaints were settled at this
stage prior to issuance of a decision by one of the Board’s
approximately one hundred administrative law judges.
Board Review of Contested Cases.

The ALJ may decide either to dismiss

the charge or to issue a cease and desist order.

At the next stage,

a decision made by an ALJ may be appealed to the five-member Board.^
Historically, the appeal procedure has been pursued frequently in all
decisions issued by an ALJ.

Those cases which reach the stage of Board

level are assigned to a three-member panel.^

Which three members are

64

The remaining twenty-two percent of the cases closed were
concerned with representation.
^ In some cases, the parties
the making of findings of fact and
issuance of an ALJ's decision, and
directly to the Board for findings
order.

may waive a hearing before an ALJ,
conclusions of law by an ALJ and the
instead submit the proceedings
of fact, conclusions of law and an

^ The number of members on the Board was increased from three to
five by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, and Section 3(b) of
the LMRA provides that "The Board is authorized to delegate to any group
of three or more members any and all of the Powers which it may itself
exercise."
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included in the panel is determined on a random selection basis by the
Executive Secretary.

The full Board, however, meets only under special

circumstances, primarily when requested by the three-member panel or by
legal staff assistants.
Hypotheses
This section includes the hypotheses used to assess the
validity of (A) the commonly reported belief that decisions at the
Board-member level are strongly affected by the union-management
philosophies of political parties in the U.S., and (B) the proposition
that the effects of political influence on the Board's decisions are
partially offset by stability below the Board-level.
In the U.S., political party affiliation is either Democratic or
Republican.

67

Four combinations, therefore, are possible, as previously

described in Chapter 2.

Two of these four combinations are congruent;

that is, the political party of the appointing authority and the party
with which the member is affiliated are the same; namely,
Democratic-Democratic and Republican-Republican.

The remaining two

Other political parties do exist and have existed during the
period of this study. The Democratic and Republican parties, however,
are the only two parties with which the appointing authorities and the
members have been aligned. The political philosophy of the Democratic
party is defined as "pro-labor", whereas the political philosophy of the
Republican party is defined as "pro-management". The philosophical
classifications have been adopted from prior studies discussed in
Chapter 2. Political affiliation is defined as the political party of
which the Board Member or the appointing authority is a member. Don A.
Zimmerman's political party is indicated (in NLRB personnel data
records) as "Independent". Based on Mr. Zimmerman's generally-known
pro-labor philosophical orientation, however, his political affiliation
in this study has been coded as "Democrat". The President of the United
States is the appointing authority. Appointments are made, however, "by
and with the consent of the Senate", as discussed in Chapter 1.
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combinations are incongruent; that is, the political party alignments of
the appointing authority and the member are opposite; namely,
Democratic-Republican and Republican-Democratic.
It can be anticipated that in the two congruent combinations
reinforcing political philosophies would exist and that the vote of a
Board Member in an employer-union ULP case, would be either strongly
pro-union (in a Democratic-Democratic match) or strongly pro-management
(in a Republican-Republican match).

These anticipated outcomes are

consistent with the findings of DeLorme and Wood

68

and Cooke and

Gautschi^.
The hypotheses concerning the members' decision as a function of
the political party of the appointing authority and the members'
affiliation tested are:
Hypothesis 1:
Democratic members originally appointed by Democratic presidents
are more likely to make decisions favoring unions over employers
than are Democratic or Republican members originally appointed by
presidents of opposite parties or Republican members originally
appointed by Republican presidents.
Hypothesis 2:
Republican members originally appointed by Republican presidents
are less likely to make decisions favoring unions over employers
than are Democratic or Republican members appointed by presidents
of opposite parties or Democratic members originally appointed by
Democratic presidents.

C. Q

Delorme and Wood, "NLRB voting", pp. 223-29.
69

Cooke and Gautschi, "Political Bias", pp. 539-49.
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As discussed in Chapter 1, it has been noted by Delaney, Lewin and
Sockell^ that little if any attention in the fifty years of research of
the National Labor Relations Act has been given to the aspect of
stability below the Board level.

It is to be recalled that both Board

member and General Counsel are PAS positions (Presidential Appointment
with £enate confirmation), and are for limited terms of five and four
years, respectively, with re-appointment permissible.

The position of

Regional Director, however, is an "employment-type" position.

As such,

incumbency in the Regional Director position is surmised to follow a
typical career-type model.

This position is filled, for example, by

advancement from within the agency or by recruitment of qualified
individuals from without the agency.

It seems reasonable, therefore, to

speculate that political ideologies and pro-management/pro-union
philosophical orientations do not play a major role in the selection
process, and are subjugated to other personal specifications such as
managerial skills and organization abilities and experience.
Within the division of the duties and functions of the Board and
the General Counsel, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) plays a vital
role as a linking pin between the Board/General Counsel and the Regional
Director.

A unique insight to the ALJ is provided by former Chairman of

the NLRB, Edward B. Miller.^

The ALJ (formerly called trial examiners)

are first-line decision makers in ULP cases.

Unlike election cases

(which are handled by a staff member from within the Region Office), the

^

Delaney, Lewin & Sockell, "The NLRA at Fifty", p. 51.

^ Edward B. Miller, An Administrative Appraisal of the NLRB
(Philadelphia, PA, Industrial Research Unit, The Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvania, 1978) pp. 13-25.
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Administrative Law Judges are not organizational residents of a region
in which the ULP trial occurs.

Rather, the ALJ is a surrogate of the

decision-making side of the agency (i.e. the five-member Board in
Washington, D.C.).

Administrative Law Judges are headquartered in four

locations (Washington, D.C., New York City, Atlanta and San Francisco),
with each of these locations serving sections of the United States.
After conducting the trial (which is done in much the same fashion as
trials in a federal court, but with less adherence to strict rules of
evidence) the ALJ issues a written decision.

Miller candidly suggests,

however, that the ALJ is in a very real sense a "make-believe judge".
decision by an ALJ has no teeth and cannot be enforced until the Board
has reviewed and adopted it and it is taken to a court of appeals to
secure an enforceable order.
The metamorphosis of "trial examiner" to "judge" and "Intermediate
Report and Recommended Order" to "Judge's Decision" underscores the
change in expectations of the involved parties (i.e. union, employer)
from one of a mere administrative report to a judicial decision.
Miller summarizes the matter in this way:
Both the Board and the Bar now regard the hearing before the
administrative law judge in very much the same light as they would
regard, for example, a bench trial of a Title VII case by a
district court judge. It is before the administrative law judge
that the basic facts of the case will be established. It is by
this officer that credibility resolutions will be made, which are
rarely tampered with thereafter either by the Board or by a
reviewing court. In short, the case for the Board or for the
respondent will essentially be won or lost in this initial unfair
labor practice hearing. Thus the judges, although without so much
enforceable authority as even a justice of the peace, are
nevertheless regarded by the parties as performing a critical
judicial, not merely an administrative, function. Their role has,
no doubt, grown in importance over the years. They are more than
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hearing officers. They are the bencl^sitters and have probably
earned the right to be called judge.
Both the Board and its surrogate the ALJ may be viewed, so to
speak, as "outsiders".

Their involvement with cases within a region is

percipitated by what occurs in the region.
becomes a gatekeeper of a fashion.

The Regional Director

Career-oriented Regional Directors

should be motivated more by long-term objective processing of cases with
reliance chiefly on factual content.

As a result, Regional Directors

develop policies and practices to guide the affairs of their regions
accordingly.

The composition and the clarity of such policies are

enhanced by stability in the position of Regional Director, with such
stability serving an insulating function.

73

The ebb and flow of

politically inspired turnover (at the Board level) should be
sufficiently removed from the operating level.

Stability within the

region provides an insulating affect against politically biased Board
decisions.

One may conjecture, therefore, that in novel cases the

decisions of a Board Member will adhere more closely to case facts and
be less influenced by pro-union/pro-management biases in a stable region
than will such decisions in an unstable region.

Although the literature

is sparse to non-existent in this area (as Delaney, et al observed),

72

Miller, An Administrative Appraisal of the NLRB, p. 21.

73
The ALJ also could be a source of stability below Board level,
as has been conjectured of the Regional Director. Stability contributed
by the ALJ, however, has not been attempted for the sake of maintaining
a manageable scope of this study and because of the intractability of
the entry, movement and exit of hundreds of ALJ's throughout the
regional network over the twenty-two year time period.
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developmental information was obtained through personal interviews.

A

third hypothesis tested, therefore, is as follows:
Hypothesis 3 :
Members are more likely to make decisions favoring unions over
employers in unstable regions than in stable regions.
Stability is valued either as stable or as unstable.

A stable

region is one in which there was no turnover in the position of Regional
Director within the fiscal year (of the decision) or within the
preceding fiscal year.

An unstable region is one in which there was

turnover in the position of Regional Director within the fiscal year (of
the decision) or within the preceding fiscal year.

Under this

definition, the assigned value (stable or unstable) of some regions
remained constant over the entire period of this study whereas others
changed one or more times.

During the time period of this study,

several new regions were established.

The establishment of a new region

was treated in the same manner as turnover; that is, the region was
valued as unstable during the initial two years of its existence.
Region 30 (established at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, June, 1964), for
example, was coded as unstable for decisions made in fiscal years 1964
and 1965.

Interviews were held with personnel in the Regional Director's
office of Region 15, New Orleans (Fallon Bentz, Joseph Norton),
attorneys of law firms representing both employers and unions before the
NLRB (Samuel Lang, Joseph Vigurie, William Banta, John Ormond, Andrew
Partee), a labor union official (Charles Godfrey) actively involved in
Board cases statewide in Louisiana, and individuals with managerial
responsibilities for labor relations in companies.
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Irrespective of the role of stability, the ALJ could exert a bias
on the decision outcome.

A decision by a Board member may involve

deference to the decision of the ALJ which is under review.

In this

study, therefore, those decisions which affirmed the ALJ and those which
were in disagreement with the ALJ were examined to determine if any bias
could be suggested by this condition.
The literature has mentioned a number of personal characteristics
(e.g. age, memberships) and environmental factors (e.g. political
climate, trend) which it has been speculated as affecting members'
votes.

Investigations of these speculations (as reviewed in Chapter 2)

have yielded mixed results.

On the basis of my discussions in the

aforementioned personal interviews, it appeared that the effects of such
personal characteristics probably would be inconsequential compared to
political affiliations and stability; whereas certain environmental
factors may be important.

Several personal characteristics, therefore,

are included in the model (with a fourth hypothesis tested) as well as
trend, with two environmental factors (with a fifth hypothesis tested).
Hypothesis 4A:
Members' decisions will not be significantly impacted by age.
Hypothesis 4B:
Members' decisions will not be significantly impacted by the type
of degree they have been awarded.
Hypothesis 4C:
Members' decisions will not be significantly impacted by their
prior memberships in special interest organizations.
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Hypothesis 4D:
Members' decisions will not be significantly impacted by the type
of their occupation prior to Board appointment.
In hypothesis 4A, age is defined as the age of the member measured
in full years as of the year of the decision.

A member with a date of

birth in 1916, for example John H. Fanning (September 19, 1916), would
have a measured age of forty-six for decisions made in 1962.

The type

of degree possessed by a member, in Hypothesis 4B, is defined as the
undergraduate degree awarded to the member, with the types classified as
either business administration/economics or non-business
administration/economics (e.g. history, English, journalism).

One

member, Peter D. Walther, does not have an undergraduate degree.^

In

Hypothesis 4C, a member's special interest organizational membership is
defined as the primary type of organizations of which he or she was a
member (prior to appointment to the Board), classified as managementCiTxcTiticd end noTi“”T!i3ii32smsnt

0 Trl.sntiscl»

A msmlDSir*s occup3til.cn is dciinsd

in Hypothesis 4D as his or her principal type of occupation (prior to
appointment to the Board), with the same classifications as used in
organizational memberships (Hypothesis 4C).
Comments made by interviewees suggest that trends in the
labor-management environment may influence decisions.

Two observed

^ In a telephone interview, Member Walther explained that he
attended the University of Virginia in an undergraduate/law school
combined program in which the undergraduate degree is awarded during the
second year of law school, provided all other requirements are met.
Upon receiving the law degree (in 1952), however, he lacked a course
required for his program (in Biology) and was not awarded the
undergraduate degree. Based on the undergraduate curriculum, Member
Walther was classified as non-business.
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environmental factors, therefore, have been included in the model.

The

first, examined by Booker and Trafford, is the size of the union
population (measured as a percentage of the labor force). The second
factor used is the number of ULP charges filed, measured on a per-union
member basis.^
Hypothesis 5, and its two sub-hypotheses, were tested:
Hypothesis 5 :
Members' decisions will not respond to long-run time trend.
Hypothesis 5A:
Members are less likely to make decisions favoring unions over
employers as the size of the union population declines.
Hypothesis 5B:
Members are more likely to make decisions favoring unions over
employers as the rate of ULP charges filed by Unions increases.
In an early study by Asch^, the modification and distortion of
individual judgments resulting from group pressure were tested.
Focusing on the concept of group consensus, Asch concluded that
increasing group size leads to increased conformity, but only to the
point where three additional confederates join the decision-maker.

Cooke and Gautschi experimented with
their experimental measures were too narrow.
representation elections won by unions", for
"new" membership and representation issues.
that is more direct (vis-a-vis ULP decisions
deemed desirable.

several indices. Some of
Their "annual percent of
example, includes only
A broader measure and one
by Board members) was

^ S.E. Asch, "Effects of group pressure upon modification and
distortion of judgments." In H. Guetzkow (Ed.), Groups, leadership and
men. Pittsburg, PA. Carnegie Press, 1951.
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Conformity does not seem to increase with the addition of more than
three confederates.

More recently, Latane

78

has proposed a theory of

social impact specifying the effect on an individual (such as a single
member of a board or a panel) of other persons (such as co-members of a
board or a panel).

According to Latane's theory, when other people are

the source of impact and the individual is the target, impact should be
a multiplicative function of the strength (e.g. status, prior
relationships), the immediacy (e.g. closeness in space or time, and
absence of intervening barriers or filters), and the number of sources
present (i.e. the number of people present).
Decisions made by the Board (Full Board or Panel) either can be
unanimous or non-unanimous.

In non-unanimous instances the decision

outcome (i.e. who wins, employer or union) rests on the majority vote.
There could be some concern, therefore, regarding how the voting
procedure used by the Board may affect the outcome.

Some earlier

studies discussed in Chapter 2 (e.g. Nagel and Lubin) defined samples to
include only non-unanimous decisions.

A sample composed exclusively of

non-unanimous decisions, however, may introduce bias unnecessarily, with
no offsetting benefits of conceptual value.

Because the literature is

sparse to non-existent in this area also, developmental information

78

Bibb Latane, "The Psychology of Social Impact," American
Psychologist, Vol. 36 No. 4 (April 1981) pp. 343-356.
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again was obtained through personal interviews.

Members were

consistently characterized (by one another) as fiercely independent,
coupled with a decision-making process, which essentially is void of
face-to-face interaction and heavily reliant on written memoranda,
reducing the effect of group pressure to a minimum.
In the decision-making process, a "sub-panel" system is used,
within which each member chairs a three-member panel and serves as a
member of two other three-member panels (one which he or she does not
chair). Decisions are developed separately by each member (with the aid
of his or her staff personnel). Written drafts of these decisions are
circulated to the other two members of the sub-panel, with "courtesy of"
copies sent to the remaining members (i.e. those members not included in
a given sub-panel).

Any member not on a given sub-panel may request

(and summarily is granted) permission to participate in any decision.
Written decisions (including dissents) of all sub-panel members (and
participants) are assembled.

Decisions are made by the use of

"agendas", usually held twice monthly, and the results published.
It is conjectured, however, that members will not entirely be
insulated from group pressure by the heavy reliance on written
procedures in the formalized decision process.

In this study,

therefore, the sample includes both unanimous and non-unanimous
decisions, to test a sixth hypothesis as follows:

Telephone interviews were conducted with Messrs. John Truesdale
and Joseph Moore, Executive Secretary and Deputy Executive Secretary,
respectively (Mr. Truesdale also is a former Board Member) and a number
of former Board Members (included in Sources Consulted).
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Hypothesis 6:
Members* decisions, either favoring unions over employers or
favoring employers over unions, which are unanimous, will
differ from those decisions which are non-unanimous.
Cooke and Gautschi also found that Board members appear to give
more weight to ALT decisions involving employer complaints than to ALJ
decisions involving union complaints.

In dealing with union complaints,

however, they report that Board members to not appear to give any more
weight to those ULP charges supported by ALJ's than to those dismissed.
The following three hypotheses, therefore, were tested:
Hypothesis 7A:
Members are less likely to make decisions favoring unions over
employers in ULP charges initiated by employers and supported
by ALJ's, than in ULP charges initiated by unions
(irrespective of support or dismissal by ALJ's) or initiated
by employers and dismissed by ALJ's.
Hypothesis 7B:
Members are less likely to make decisions favoring unions over
employers in ULP charges initiated by employers and dismissed
by ALJ's, than in ULP charges initiated by unions
(irrespective of support or dismissal by ALJ's) or initiated
by employers and supported by ALJ's.
Hypothesis 7C:
Members are no more likely to make decisions favoring
employers over unions or favoring unions over employers in ULP
charges initiated by unions and dismissed by ALJ's, than in
ULP charges initiated by employers (irrespective of support or
dismissal by ALJ's) or initiated by unions and supported by
ALJ1s .
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Methodology
The project is a field study or ex post facto inquiry aimed at
discovering the relationship among variables in actual case decisions
made by Board members.
As described above, for the most part, only those ALJ decisions
which have been appealed reach Board level for resolution. The
hypotheses were tested against a sample of such Unfair Labor Practices
decisions made by the Board during the fiscal years 1962 through 1983.
Furthermore, there are several specific aspects of the processing of ULP
charges which bear directly on the sample developed.

These aspects are

identified here and the manner in which they were handled are covered in
the following sections.
Motivations for Appeals
In some cases appeals stem from the genuine belief of the losing
party that the facts were not properly interpreted by the ALJ or that
legal precedent was unclear.

In other cases the appeals may be

motivated by considerations of a strategic nature.

Examples of such

strategic motivations would be: 1) an attempt by a union (or by an
employer) to create an atmosphere (as it desires) in the climate of its
relationships with the employer (or with the union); or 2) a company or
union attempting to achieve a delay, notwithstanding clear legal
precedent and/or proper interpretation of facts by an ALJ.

The

decision-making process required of the Board, therefore, could vary
from a perfunctory level to a level of in-depth, systematic analysis and
evaluation.
Identifying how many, and which, appealed cases fall into
categories of genuine or ulterior motivations potentially could be
difficult.

Cooke and Gautschi suggest, however, that this problem can
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be circumvented by a sample delimitation.

Each year the NLRB

identifies and discusses in its annual report a selection of cases
brought before the Board that involved "novel questions or that set
precedents that may be of substantial importance in the future
administration of the Act."

81

Delimiting the sample to include only

such novel cases, therefore, minimizes the appeal-motivation problem and
assures that true decision making on the part of the Board member is
involved.

During the three year period (1980-82) cited earlier in the

Introduction, some 207 novel cases were identified in the annual
„ 82
reports.
Categories of Charging Parties
As previously indicated, charges may be filed not only by employers
and unions but also by employees or any persons other than NLRB
employees.

Because this study focuses on pro-union and pro-management

political bias in Board decisions, the sample additionally was delimited
to include only those cases in which the charging parties and the
respondents are employers and unions.

Of all ULP cases (119,491) and

all novel cases (207) closed during the three years 1980-1982, the
majority (fifty-three percent and seventy-one percent, respectively)
exclusively involved employers and unions as charging parties.

These

statistics are included in Appendices H and I.

80
81
82

Cooke and Gautschi, Political Bias, p. 542.
See, for example NLRB, Twenty-Second Annual Report, p. 62.
These statistics are shown in Appendix I.
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Court Reversals
Some cases which come before the Board are cases which have been
decided previously by a prior Board and are being heard again following
appeal through the courts.

As discussed earlier, Walther examined

twenty-nine such cases which, upon a second hearing, involved reversals
of decisions of prior Boards.

Of those twenty-nine cases identified by

Walther, all but two (Our Way, 268 NLRB 394 and American Navigation, 268
NLRB 426) were decided in second hearings during 1984 or later years.
Neither Our Way nor American Navigation, both of which were reversed in
1983, were included in the sample of cases included in this study (the
last year of which was 1983).

These twenty-nine reversals cited relate

to original decisions made during the late 1970's and early 1980's by
the Carter Board.

As indicated earlier, Walther describes the Carter

Board as having deviated from established principles.

Walther also

indicates that in the early 1960's (e.g. 1961, 1962) there was a similar
wave of reversals made by the Board of earlier decisions.

Those

reversals of the early 1960's predominantly involved decisions made by
the Board following appointments by President Kennedy.

As previously

discussed, Petro explained that President Kennedy, with large unions as
his principal supporters, quickly achieved a pro-union majority of
members via his appointments.

Walther does not list those reversals to

permit checking the study sample for their chance inclusion, nor was
there a method considered suitable to identify other comparable
reversals.

No special treatment, therefore, has been given to reversals

in this study.

If the Board in fact is motivated by a sense of

obligation to honor the courts' decisions, then this source of such
potential bias remains to be contemplated.
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Degree of Support by Board Members
In cases that reach Board level, a member may vote either in favor
of the charging party or against the charging party.

The cases used in

the sample for the study, as indicated above, are limited to those
involving ULP complaints which have been filed either by the employer or
the union.

Once filed, there are eight paths (2x2x2) which a complaint

ji this type may follow to culminate in a member vote; that is, filed by
employer or union, then supported or dismissed by the administrative law
judge, and finally affirmed or disaffirmed by the Board member.

83

Of

these eight outcomes, four are pro-union and four are pro-management.
The point of concern here is that in making a decision based on the
facts of the case, a Board member's support at the decision outcome
stage either can be (1) fully pro-union or pro-management or (2)
partially pro-union or pro-management.
primarily in two ways.

Partial support is reflected

First, by a case in which more than one ULP

charge has been alleged and the member rendered a "split decision"; that
is, did not vote exclusively one way, either pro-management or
pro-union, on all charges.

Additionally, partial support is reflected

by a member who imposes some restriction or limitation to mitigate the
scope of the order.
Because the dependent variable is a Member vote, and each member
must vote on each alleged ULP charge, the first situation (i.e. "split
decisions") poses no concern.

These paths and the eight decision outcomes are diagrammed in
Appendix J.
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The opportunity for partial agreement in a member's decision by
modifying the scope of the order of an ALJ however, does raise a
potential problem of measuring the degree of support or the level of the
pro-union or pro-management character of the decision.

An analysis of

Board members' actions relative to orders would necessitate an ability
to gauge the magnitude of potential pro-union or pro-management biases
which these display.

Within the constraints of realism and feasibility,

and because of the difficulty in achieving a suitable measure of degree
of support, this was not attempted.

When a member, therefore, decided

that the respondent (employer or union) committed an ULP, the member's
vote was classified as pro-charging party (union or employer),
irrespective of the order.
Research Data Base and Sample Size
Two sources of data are decisions included (1) the National Labor
Relations Board Annual Report and (2) Decisions and Orders of the
84
National Labor Relations Board.

The former document is required under

Section 3(c) of the National Labor Relations Act and the latter is a
companion document.
The time period covered by the study is the twenty-two fiscal year
period 1962 through 1983 (calendar period July 1, 1962 through September
30, 1983).

This twenty-two year period was chosen for several reasons.

First, this period includes all conditions (e.g. reappointments of
members, member carryovers, congruent and incongruent appointments).
Second, four distinct changes from an incumbent Republican to an
incumbent Democratic administration (i.e. from Eisenhower to

84

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
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Kennedy-Johnson and from Nixon-Ford to Carter) and from an incumbent
Democratic to an incumbent Republican administration (i.e. from
Kennedy-Johnson to Nixon-Ford and from Carter to Reagan) are included.
Finally, 1983 (as the end of the selected time period) is the most
current fiscal year for which the Annual Report (which includes the
identification of novel cases) and Decisions and Orders both have been
published.
The fiscal year period 1962-1983 includes the Twenty-Seventh
through the Forty-Eighth Annual Reports. Decisions and Orders covering
the period include Volumes Number 130 through 267.

Hearings covering

Board Members who served during the period of the study were used.
The Annual Report was the source of the sample selection of novel
ULP cases from each fiscal year.

Regional Directors tenure data and

personal background data of members were obtained from the National
Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.

The Decisions and Orders

provides the case variables as well as the votes of individual Board
members for each decision.

Where necessary, telephone interviews were

used to obtain any missing variables of the Board members (e.g. school
attended).
A sample of fifteen novel cases (novel cases were defined and the
rationale for their use discussed in the Methodology section) was
randomly selected from each of the fiscal years covered by this study.
The total number of cases selected was 330 (15 novel cases per fiscal
year x 22 fiscal years).

The term "case" includes, in some instances,,

combinations of one or more "filings" (case numbers) which have been
aggregated.

As discussed earlier (in Board Review of Contested Cases) a

case involves the decision by each member (either for or against the
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union or management) and that any given case may be decided by either
the Full Board (five members) or a Panel (three members).

Some cases

involved more than one alleged ULP charge, and each decision by the
member is the sampling unit.

The sample size, consequently, is 2147.

Data Collection Technique
Measures of the independent variables (member background, political
party of the oppointing authority; political affiliation of the Board
member, and

stability of tenure of the Regional Director) and of the

dependent variable (vote for management or vote for the union) were
collected on individual Board members using a data collection form.

The

data collection form is discussed below.
The data collection form includes a series of items which traces a
case from its initial filing at one of the regional or subregional
offices, through its stage-wise processing until it reaches Board level
for decision.

Recall, any case may follow eight unique paths

culminating in eight member decision outcomes.

Four of these decision

outcomes are pro-union and four are pro-management as illustrated in
Appendix J.
following:

The items on the form specifically record and code the
(1) Who the charging party was.

Only employer-union cases,

as indicated earlier, were included in the sample.
charging party as either the union or the employer.

Item No. 9 codes the
(2) Whether the

decision of the ALJ was to support or to dismiss individual allegations.
As indicated earlier, the sample was delimited to include only those
cases in which the hearing by an ALJ was not waived.
the decision by the ALJ.
Member.

Item No. 10 codes

(3) What the decision was of each Board

Item No. 13 codes the decision in terms of whether it was to

affirm or to disaffirm the decision of the ALJ, whereas item No. 19
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codes the decision in terms of its pro-union or pro-management
character.

Item No. 11 codes the total number of charges involved in

the case, while item No. 12 identifies the specific charge (from among
the total).

Item Nos. 14 and 15 tally the total number of votes

affirming and disaffirming the decision of the ALJ, respectively.

In

combination, item Nos. 11 through 15 permit analysis of individual
member voting relative to the majority vote.
case was decided.

(4) In which region the

Regions are coded in item No. 16, while the stability

of the region is coded in item No. 17.

(5) Item No. 1 identifies the

individual member, with item Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 8 recording the personal
characteristics of occupation, undergraduate degree, memberships and
age, respectively.

(6) Item No. 3 and Nos. 2, 18 and 20 record,

respectively, the political affiliations of members and presidents
(original appointing, incumbent and reappointing).

(7) Year of the

decision is coded in No. 8.
Data Analysis Technique
This study concerns a dichotomous dependent variable (i.e. a
pro-union or pro-management decision by a Board member) and independent
variables that, to a large degree, are categorical in nature (e.g.
political party membership, type of undergraduate degree).

The analysis

of criterion-predictor associative data of these types frequently is
accomplished by techniques (e.g. regression analysis and analysis of
variance) which are based on assumptions (e.g. that the dependent
variable is continuous or at least ordinal) which are not appropriate to
this study.
Alternatively, analysis of categorical data commonly has been
accomplished by chi-square analysis.

This technique, however, also has
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several shortcomings, particularly when more then two categorical
variables are considered simultaneously.

One of these shortcomings,

which Fienberg points out, is that the chi-square approach treats all
pairwise relationships among variables as though there were no other
variables to be considered.

85

Fienberg also states that chi-square

examines only one such reltaionship at a time.

Chi-square, therefore,

is not suitable for this study which involves multivariate relationship.
Another problem of chi-square, as indicated by Goodman, is the
requirement of large sample sizes to avoid empty cells and to maintain
adequate degrees of freedom and power.

86

Under chi-square, the necessary sample sizes tend to be much larger
than those required when using regression or analysis of variance.

As a

result, it is not uncommon to see these latter techniques substituted
for chi-square, even though they are not appropriate.
There is a technique available, however, that overcomes the
problems of the aforementioned methods:

logit.

Logit

87

is a nonlinear

probability model particularly suited to analyzing dichotomous

85

S.E. Fienberg, The Analysis of Cross-Classified Categorical
Data, 2nd Edition, Boston, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press,
1980.
86

L.A. Goodman, "The Analysis of Multidimensional Contingency
Tables: Stepwise Procedures and Direct Estimation Methods for Building
Models for Multiple Classifications", Techometrics, Vol. 13, 1971, pp.
33-61.
87

"Logit" stands for "logistical probability units", so named by
T. Berkson, "Applications of the logistical functions to bio-assay",
Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 39, 1944, pp.
351-365.
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variables.

88

In the expression Y * =
X

b X , + e., the dependent random
X XtC

X

variable (Y) is assumed to be binary, taking on only two values (e.g.
0,1).

The outcomes on Y are assumed to be mutually exclusive and

exhaustive.

Interest, then, focuses on the value of the parameter P^.

P is the probability that Y equals one, or P = p(Y=l).
depend on K observable variables X^ (k = l...k).

Y is assumed to

It is assumed that

these variables X^ account for the variation in P, which may be written
in probability terms P
independent variables.

= P(y |x ), where X denotes the set of K
This assumption is analogous to the standard OLS

regression model in which the independent variables account for the
variations in the mean or expected value of Y.
The next assumption of the OLS regression would

bethat the

dependent variable (Y) is linearly associated with the independent
variable'(X).

In logit, the relationship between the variables Y and X

is expressed as:
Exp

P<1 * 11» ' 1 4- EKp(ZbkXk)
The unknowns which remain are the parameters b^.

The parallel with

the OLS regression is that a particular form of the relationship
(between Y and X) is assumed, up to the unknown parameters b.

As in OLS

regression, it is assumed that the data are generated from a random
sample (size n), with a sample point denoted by i (i = 1...N).

This

assumption requires that the observations on Y statistically be
independent of each other to rule out serial correlation.

An assumption

88

John H. Aldrich and Forrest D. Nelson, Linear Probability, Logit
and Probit Models, Sage University Papers, Series: Quantitative
Applications in the Social Sciences, Number 07-045, Beverly Hills, Sage
Publications.
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analogous to homoscedasticity (constant variance) in OLS regression is
not needed in logit because it is implicit in the above equation.
Logit suffers the same problem of multicollinearity as does OLS
regression.

As in OLS, therefore, it is required that no exact or near

linear dependence exist among the

across k.

Logit parameters typically are estimated by a method called Maximum
Likelihood Estimation (MLE), rather than the method of Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) in the ordinary regression model.

The conceptual

difference between OLS and MLE is that, while OLS is concerned with
choosing parameter estimates that provide the smallest sum of squared
errors in the fit between the model and that data, MLE is concerned with
choosing parameter estimates that provide the highest probability (or
likelihood) of having obtained the observed sample Y.
The statistical inference from logit is the same as that of linear
regression.

Logit analysis measures the relationship between

independent variables, X, and the dependent variable, Y.

Estimated

coefficients (b^) are the (asymptotically unbiased and efficient) point
estimates of the relationship.

Estimated standard errors (S^) provide

the usual measure of the likely-variation in the estimated coefficients
that might be anticipated from sample to sample.

The t-stastistic

(bk/Sfc) is used (as in regression) to test the null hypothesis that a
coefficient (e.g. b^) is zero (i.e. that the variable X^ has no effect
on Y*).
In regression analysis, an F stastistic (with K-l and N-K degrees
of freedom) is used to test the joint hypothesis that all coefficients
(except the intercept) are zero.

In logit, a statistic c, that suits

the same purpose as the F-Statistic (but based on the likelihood ratio
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principle), is used.

The method produces the c-statistic which follows

(approximately) a chi-square distribution when the null hypothesis is
true.

The F-and c-statistic conceptually are identical.

The only

difference between these two statistics is their computational details.
In practice, the statistic c (divided by its degrees of freedom, K-l)
frequently is treated as an F-statistic (with K-l and N-K degrees of
freedom), particularly in smaller samples because it makes the test more
conservative (where it is dubbed the "asymptotic-F").
The likelihood ratio statistic is completed generally as:
OQ

c = -2(logLO - logLl),
where LI is the value of the likelihood function for the full model as
filled, and LO is the maximum value of the likelihood function if all
coefficients (except the intercept) are zero.

The computed chi-square

value tests the hypothesis that all coefficients (except the intercept)
are zero.

This is exactly the hypothesis that is tested in regression,

using the "overall" F-statistic.
In the regression model, the mean of the dependent variable, and
its variance, are separate parameters.

The proportion of the variance

in the dependent variable that is "explained" by the independent
variables, is of particular interpretive value in regression analysis.
The coefficient of determination statistic (R2), therefore, frequently
is calculated.

It is logical in regression to adjust the fitted mean

(which depends on the coefficients) to match the mean of the dependent
variable (as observed in the sample data), and then choosing as

Commercially available computer software packages vary somewhat
in terms of the statistics actually reported for this joint hypothesis
test. The SAS package used by Cooke and Gautschi, for example, denotes
it as "-2 x log - likelihood ratio".
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coefficient estimates those values which minimize variance in the fit.
Where the independent variables are qualitative, however, the mean
and the variance are not separable parameters.

In logit, therefore,

90
there is no statistic with an interpretation comparable to that of R2 .
In summary, logit analysis was used in this study because, in
general, OLS regression estimates with a dichotomous dependent variable
are not so-called "BLUE"— Best (in the sense of having the smallest
sampling variance) Linear (in Y^) Unbiased Estimator.
can, in fact, be misleading.

OLS estimates

Estimates of coefficient parameters would

have been constrained artificially in this study by the imposition of
the OLS assumptions (or their equivalent) where they, in fact, were not
warranted.

The assumptions which underlie logit (beyond that which

specifies the relation between Y and X) are quite similar to (and no
more restrictive than) the remaining assumptions in OLS regression.
Because of the large sample in this study (n = 2147), all properties of
OLS regression hold for logit.

The one shortcoming of logit is that

there is no ready equivalent to the coefficient of determination (R2)
available in OLS regression.

This shortcoming, however, was considered

a nominal trade-off for the advantages gained by logit.

90

A number of "pseudo R2" measures (e.g. C/N+C) have been
proposed, but none have been widely accepted, let alone used.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS OF THE STUDY
This chapter presents and analyzes the findings of the study and
includes the testing of the hypotheses concerning political bias in
decisions made by the National Labor Relations Board in unfair labor
practice cases.

First, descriptive results are presented.

These

descriptions are followed by the results of the logit analysis.
Discussion of the results follows in Chapter 5.
Descriptive Results
The sample includes 2147 decisions.

Descriptive statistics

concerning the sample are provided here in a series of tables.

These

tabular presentations of results are solely to provide an informational
foundation for the subsequent analyses of results, using the logit
technique, and the testing of the hypotheses. Because logit analysis was
performed, only two-way tables are presented here. Even though some of
these tables include variables (horizontal dimension) which are involved
in hypotheses, it must be made clear that these tables are not intended
to be (nor can they be) used to assess the hypotheses.
remains the task of the logit analysis which follows.

Assessment
Other tables do

not concern variables involved in hypotheses, but are included because of
their added information value to the study.

Tables 1 and 9 are examples

of this latter type of table.
Decisions by Individual Members
The 2147 decisions included in the sample were made by seventeen
members of the Board who served all or part of their terms

69
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TABLE 1
PRO-UNION AND PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS BY MEMBERS

MEMBER

NO. OF
YEARS

DECISIONS

YEARLY AVERAGE

PRO-■UNION

PRO-•MGMT

NO.

NO.

Z

Z

TOTAL

NUMBER

NO.

1. Rodgers

2

16

45.7

19

54.3

35

17.5

2. Leedom

4

41

56.9

31

43.1

72

18.0

3. Fanning

22

349

70.9

143

29.1

492

22.4

A. McCulloch

10

102

57.6

75

42.3

177

17.7

5. Brown

11

123

61.5

77

38.5

200

18.2

6. Jenkins

20

252

62.2

153

37.8

405

20.2

7. Zagoria

5

56

56.0

44

44.0

100

20.0

8. Miller

5

49

50.0

49

50.0

98

19.6

9. Kennedy

6

40

45.5

48

54.5

88

14.7

10. Penello

10

98

59.0

68

41.0

166

16.6

11. Murphy

6

65

75.6

21

24.4

86

14.3

12. Walther

2

11

44.0

14

56.0

25

12.5

13. Truesdale

3

43

78.2

12

21.2

55

18.3

14

2

17

50.0

17

50.0

34

17.0

15. Van de Water

7

19

73.1

7

26.9

26

13.0

16. Zimmerman

3

56

68.3

26

31.9

82

27.3

00.0

h

10.0

Hunter

17. Dotson

TOTAL DECISIONS
PERCENT

I

0

1337
62 .3

810
37 .7

f.

6.0

2147
100.0

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

71

during the twenty-two fiscal years 1962 through 1983.

91

Table 1

provides a breakdown of the number of decisions made by each member, as
well as the number of fiscal years in which each member participated
during the study period.
The number of years in which each member participated ranges from
a low of one year (Member Dotson, 1983) to a high of twenty-two years
by Member Fanning (all years of the study, 1962 through 1983).

Because

of their varying years of service, the total number of decisions by
members ranges from a low of six by Member Dotson (all decisions made
in the single year of service, 1983) to a high of 492 by Member Fanning
(over his twenty-two years of service). On an average-per-year-per
member basis, the median number of decisions was eighteen.

92

Nearly two-thirds (62.3 percent) of all decisions made were
pro-union, that is, were resolved by upholding the allegations of the
union against the employer or resolved by dismissing allegations by the

91

During the study time period (July 1, 1962 through September
30, 1983), nineteen Board members actually served. John Miller served
for approximately three months (December 1982-March 1983) and the term
of Patricia Diaz Dennis began late in the study period (May 1983).
These two members participated only in a few cases which were
identified as novel cases by the NLRB in its 1983 annual report, and
none of the cases randomly selected from 1983 for the sample included
members Miller or Dennis as participants.
92

This median is represented by Member McCulloch (ranked number
nine of the seventeen members). It also is noted that the
average-per-year-per member (eighteen, rounded) includes five of the
seventeen members, Truesdale (rank number six) through Rodgers (rank
number ten.)
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employer against the union.
were pro-management.

The remaining decisions (37.7 percent)

On an individual member basis, the pro-union

decision percentages of sixteen members ranged from a low of zero
percent (All of Member Dotson's six decisions included in the sample
were pro-management) to a high of slightly over seventy-eight percent
(Truesdale, 78.2 percent), and a median of fifty-eight percent
(McCulloch, 57.6 percent).
Decisions by Political Party of Original Appointing President
Decisions made by members who were originally appointed by
Democratic or Republican presidents were approximately equally
distributed as is shown in Table 2.

Of the 2147 decisions, 1019

decisions (47.5 percent) were made by members originally appointed by
Democratic presidents, and 1128 decisions (52.5 percent) were made by
members originally appointed by Republican presidents.
Of the seventeen members rendering these 2147 decisions, six
members were originally appointed by Democratic presidents and eleven
by Republican presidents.

The distribution of pro-labor and

pro-management decisions by members originally appointed by either
Democratic or Republican Presidents differ by 0.5 percentage points:
Democratic appointees, 62.0 percent pro-union decisions; Republican
appointees, 62.5 percent pro-union decisions.
Decisions by Political Party of Member
Table 3 shows that decisions made by Democratic members account
for somewhat more than one-half (54.5 percent) of the 2147 decisions.
Of those 1172 decisions made by Democratic members, however, nearly
two-thirds (65.8 percent) were pro-union, whereas of the 975 decisions
by Republican members, only 566 (58.1 percent) were pro-union.
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TABLE 2

y
PRO-UNION AND PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS

CLASSIFIED BY
POLITICAL PARTY OF ORIGINAL APPOINTING PRESIDENT

POLITICAL PARTY OF ORIGINAL
APPOINTING PRESIDENT

DECISIONSM

PRO-UNION
No.
%
DEMOCRATIC

REPUBLICAN(b)

TOTAL

PRO-MANAGEMENT
No.
Z

632
62.0
7. 47.3

387
38.0
% 47.8

No.

No.

7.

7.

705
62.5
7. 52.7

423
37.5
7. 52.2

No.

No.

7.

1337 62.3
7. 100.0

7.

810
37.7
Z 100.0

TOTAL
No.
Z
1019
100.0
7. 47.5
No.

Z

1128
100.0
Z 52.5

No.

Z

2147
100.0
7. 100.0

(a) Six Members: McCulloch, Brown, Jenkins, Zagoria, Truesdale, Zimmerman
(b) Eleven Members: Rodgers, Leedom, Fanning, Miller, Kennedy, Penello,
Murphy, Walther, Hunter, Van de Water, Dotson.
(c) Percentages below the number of decisions are column percentages.
Percentages to the right of the number of decisions are row percentages.
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TABLE 3
PRO-UNION AND PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
CLASSIFIED BY
POLITICAL PARTY OF MEMBER

POLITICAL PARTY OF MEMBER
PRO-UNION
No.
771

DEMOCRATIC(a)
MEMBERS
Z

REPUBLICAN(b)
MEMBERS

65.8

57..6
No.
Z
566

Z

TOTAL
Z

. .
DECISIONS
PRO'-MANAGEMENT
No.
X
401

Z

58.1

42..3

49.5
No.
409

z

TOTAL
No.

34.2

Z

1172

100.0

7.

54.5
No.

7.

41.9

975

100.0

Z

50.4

X

45.4

No.

*

No.

7.

No.

S

1337

62.3

810

37.7

2147

100.0

100.0

Z

100.0

Z 100.0

(a)

Six Members: Fanning, McCulloch, Brown, Penello, Truesdale,
Zimmerman.

(b)

Eleven Members:
Rodgers, Leedom, Jenkins, Zagoria, Miller,
Kennedy, Murphy, Walther, Hunter, Van de Water, Dotson,

(c)

Percentages below the number of decisions are column percentages.
Percentages to the right of the number of decisions are row percentages.

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission.

75

Decisions C l a ssified by Political Party of Incumbent President

During the period of the study, after the appointment of a member
by a president, that president making the appointment (either an
original appointment or a re-appointment) may have left office.
replacement in

His

some instances was by a president of the same

political party, and in other instances by a president of a different
political party.

A given member, therefore, could serve all or a

portion of his/her term or terms under one or more presidents of
different political parties.

At any given time, the appointing

president and the incumbent president could have been the same
individual.

Only the political party, not the individual, is

germaine.
Table 4 records the decisions under Democratic and Republican
incumbent presidents. A review of Table 4 indicates that pro-union
decisions made under incumbent presidents of the Democratic and
Republican parties are virtually identical, differing by 0.5
percentage points (62.0 percent vs. 62.5 percent).
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TABLE 4
PRO-UNION and PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
CLASSIFIED BY
POLITICAL PARTY OF INCUMBENT PRESIDENT

DECISIONS

PRO-UNION
No.
7.

POLITICAL PARTY OF
INCUMBENT PRESIDENT

No.

632

62.0

PRO-MANAGEMENT
No.
7.

387

38.0

TOTAL
No.
7.

1019

100.0

DEMOCRATIC
Z

No.

47.8

47.3

705

62.5

423

47.5

37.5

1128

100.0

REPUBLICAN
Z

52.7

No. 1337

52.2

62.3

810

52.5

37.7

2147

100.0

TOTAL
7.

100.0

100.0

100.0

Percentages below the number of decisions are column percentages.
Percentages to the right of the number of decisions are row percentages.

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

77

Decisions Classified by P o l i t i c a l Party of R e a p p o i n t i n g President

As explained in Chapter 3, the original appointment of a member
can be either for a full term (five years) or to complete the
unexpired time of a prior member's term.

In either situation, a

member is eligible for reappointment. The reappointment could be by a
president whose political party is the same or is different from that
of the original appointing president.

Table 5 classifies the

pro-union and pro-management decisions made by members under three
possible categories.

Two categories include decisions made by members

during the study period when they were serving under a re-appointment
status.

The third category includes those decisions made by members

when they were serving their original terms.

The decisions of a given

member, therefore, is categorized based on the status of that member
at the time of the decision.
Table 5 indicates that pro-union decisions made under
re-appointing presidents of the Democratic and Republican parties
differ by 1.1 percentage points (66.0 percent vs. 64.9 percent).
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TABLE 5
PRO-UNION and PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
CLASSIFIED BY
POLITICAL PARTY OF REAPPOINTING PRESIDENT

DECISIONS
PRO-UNION
No.
7.

POLITICAL PARTY OF
REAPPOINTING
PRESIDENT
No.

550

66.0

PRO-MANAGEMENT
No.
7.

283

44.0

TOTALS
No.
Z

833

100.0

DEMOCRATIC
7.

No.

34.9

41. L

227

64.9

123

38.8

35.1

350

100.0

REPUBLICAN
7

No.
NO REAPPOINTMENTS
INVOLVED
(ORIGINAL TERM
OF MEMBER)

%

No.

17.0

560

15.2

58.1

41.9

6?.. 3

810

964

37.7

2147

TOTAL
%

Note:

100.0

100.0

44.9

49.9

41.9

1337

404

16.3

100.0

100.0

Percentages below the number of decisions are column percentages.
Percentages to the right of the number of decisions are row percentages.
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Decisions Classified by Charging Party and D ecisions of the ALJ

In Chapter 3, the procedure for processing Unfair Labor Practice
Charges was described.

The decision paths of pro-union and

pro-management decision outcomes by Board members are included in
Appendix J.
Table 6 indicates that three-quarters of the 2147 decisions in the
sample had their origin in allegations initiated by the union against
the employer.

93

Of the 1623 decisions originating in allegations by

the union, 1168 (72.0 percent) were decided in favor of the union by
Board members.
Table 7A shows that seventy percent of all allegations filed by
charging parties were supported by Administrative Law Judges.

Of

those allegations receiving support of the ALJ, three-quarters were
decided in favor of the union by Board members.
Table 7B shows that 69.3 of all decisions made by members are in
agreement with the decisions made by the Administration Law Judges.
Of those decisions made which were in agreement with the ALJ, 68.8
percent were decided in favor of the union.

This percentage is similar to filing origins of cases included
in the three-year sample (1980-1982) of ULP cases closed during the
fiscal years (80.1 percent) and novel cases reviewed by the NLRB (83.0
percent) as shown in Appendices II and I, respectively.
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TABLE 6
PRO-UNION and PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
CLASSIFIED BY
CHARGING PARTY

DECISIONS
PRO-UNION
No.
Z

ALLEGED ULP
CHARGE FILED BY:
No.

1168

72.0

PRO-MANAGEMENT
No.
Z
455

28.0

TOTAL
No.
Z
1623

100.0

UNION
Z

No.

87.4

169

56.2

32.3

355

75.6

67.7

524

100.0

EMPLOYER
Z

12.6

No. 1337

43.8

62.3

810

24.4

37.7

2147

100.0

TOTAL
Z

Note:

100.0

100.0

100.0

Percentages below the number of decisions are column percentages.
Percentages to the right of the number of decisions are row percentages.
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TABLE 7 A
PRO-UNION and PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS BY MEMBER
CLASSIFIED BY
DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES

DECISIONS BY MEMBERS
PRO-UNION
No.
Z

DECISIONS BY
ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGES

No.
SUPPORT ULP
ALLEGATIONS

Z

No.
DISMISS ULP
ALLEGATIONS

u

No.

1012

66.8

75.7

325

503

33.2

62.1

51.4

24.3

1337

PRO-MANAGEMENT
No.
Z

307

810

1515

100.0

70.6

48.6

632

100.0

29.4

37.9

62.3

TOTAL
No.
Z

37.7

2147

100.0

TOTAL
7.

Note:

100.0

100.0

10 0.0

Percentages below the number of decisions are column percentages..
Percentages to the right o£ the number of decisions are row percentages.
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TABLE 7 B
PRO-UNION and PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS BY MEMBER
CLASSIFIED BY
AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT WITH ALJ

DECISIONS BY MEMBERS
PRO-UNION
No.
%

MEMBERS AGREED
OR DISAGREED
WITH THE ALJ

No.

1023

68.8

PRO-MANAGEMENT
No.
Z

464

31.2

TOTAL
No.
%

1487

100.0

AGREE
%

No.

76.5

314

69.3

57.3

47.6

346

52.4

660

100.0

DISAGREE
T

No.

23.5

1337

30.7

42.7

62.3

810

37.7

2147

100.0

TOTAL
100.0

Note:

100.0

100.0

Percentages below the number of decisions are column percentages.
Percentages to the right of the number of decisions are row percentages.
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Unanimous and Non-Unanimous Decisions
As explained in Chapter 3, cases coming before the Board are
heard by either the Full Board (five members) or by a panel (three
members).

9L

Each allegation is decided on a majority vote basis.

Majorities may be either unanimous
or to dismiss allegations.

or non-unanimous to either uphold

As indicated in footnote

94

, cases heard

by four-members which result in a tie vote on any allegation are not
concluded.

Fourteen vote combinations, therefore, are possible, of

which six are unanimous (i.e., 3-0, 4-0, or 5-0) and eight are
non-unanimous (2-1, 3-1, 4-1, 3-2).
Table 8 indicates that 1751 of the 2147 decisions, 81.6 percent,
were decided by unanimous votes.
sixty-five percent were pro-union.

Of those 1751 unanimous decisions,
Of the 396 decisions rendered by a

non-unanimous vote, the pro-union and pro-management percentages were
equally divided, 50.3 percent and 49.7 percent, respectively.

In some instances cases may be heard by four members. Such
instances may arise, for example, if five members for a full Board are
not available. Non-availability may result from existence of a
vacancy or due to the absence, for various reasons, of a member. In
other instances, a fourth member may be added to a three-member panel
(as explained in Chapter 3). If each and every ULP allegation in a
given case heard by four members cannot be resolved unanimously or by
a majority, the case is held in abeyance until a fifth member is
available, or if that fourth member participating by request
voluntarily withdraws.
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TABLE 8
PRO-UNION and PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
CLASSIFIED BY
UNANIMOUS AND NON-UNANIMOUS VOTING

DECISIONS
PRO-UNION
No.
Z

VOTING

No.

1138

65.0

PRO-MANAGEMENT
No.
Z

613

35.0

TOTAL
No.

%

1751

100.0

UNANIMOUS
7.

No.

85.1

199

75.7

50.3

197

81.6

49.7

396

100.0

NON-UNANIMOUS
7.

No.

1337

"

100.0

18.4

24.3

14.9

62.3

810

37.7

2147

100.0

TOTAL

Note:

100.0

100.0

Percentages below the number of decisions are column percentages.
Percentages to the right of the number of decisions are row percentages.

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urth er reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

85

Decisions Classi f i e d by Num b e r of ULP Charges A l l e g e d in Case

Table 9 shows that the most decisions are accounted for (46.9
percent) by cases involved two allegations of unfair labor practice
violations, and that fully sixty-five percent of decisions are
accounted for by cases involving no more than two alleged ULP
violations.^

These results closely parallel the ratios of the three-year
sample of cases included in Appendix K.
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TABLE 9
PRO-UNION and PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
CLASSIFIED BY
NUMBER OF ULP CHARGES ALLEGED IN CASES

DECISIONS*
PRO--UNION
No.
/o

NUMBER OF ULP
ALLEGED CHARGES
IN CASE

TOTAL
No. (100%)

188
14.1

48.3

201
24.8

51.7

/a

389
18.1

2

No.
%

645
48.2

64.1

361
44.6

35.9

1006
46.9

3

No.
7.

368
27.5

66.1

189
23.3

33.9

557
25.9

4

No.

93
7.0

61.2

59
7.3

38.8

/a

152
7.1

5

No.
%

15
100.0
1.1

-

0.0

15
0.7

6

No.
y

_

_

1

7

No.

PRO-MANAGEMENT
No.
7.

No.
V

TOTALS

No.

__

_

-

-

28
100.0
2.1

1337
100.0

62.3

-

-

0.0

28
1.3

810
100.0

37.7

2147
100.0

*
The number of decisions in a case is determined by Che number >'i alleeed L’LP
violations multiplied by the number of members deciding the case.
The
twenty-eight decisions in case size seven, for example, was a single case
containing seven allegations decided by four Board memDers.
Percentages below numbers of decisions are column percentages.
Percentages co right of number of decisions are row percentages.
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Decisions by Regions
As described in Chapter 1, administratively the NLRB is
structured on a regional basis.

Currently there are thirty-three

regions; the territorial boundaries of which are indicated on the map
in Appendix B.

In this study, every region was represented in the

sample of 2147 decisions.
The number of decisions varied from a low of three, in Regions 28
and 33,

96

to a high of 160, in region 20.

The percentages of

pro-union decisions ranged from a low of zero percent (Regions 28 and
33) to a high of ninety percent (Region 32), with a median of 64.2
percent (Region 15).

Region 28 is in an area comprised of states with low
population density and unionization (e.g., Arizona, Utah, New Mexico).
Region 33 was not established until 1978.
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TABLE 10
PRO-UNION AND PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
CLASSIFIED BY REGION

REGION
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

PRO-UNION
No.
Z
56
53.3
61
46.2
23
53.5
32
86.5
69
66.3
53
61.6
34
43.6
34
45.9
64
68.1
61
79.2
21
63.6
47
65.3
46
78.0
47
51.6
64.6
31
86
73.5
61
61.0
25
89.3
27
35.5
104
65.0
36
83.7
44
78.6
61
73.5
7
38.9
39.7
23
31.2
15
65.6
21
0
0.0
46
85.2
47
72.3
63.3
19
36
90.0
0
0.0
1337
62.3

DECISIONS
PRO-MANAGEMENT
7.
No.
46.7
49
71
53.8
20
46.5
5
13.5
33.7
35
38.4
33
44
56.4
54.1
40
30
31.9
16
20.8
36.4
12
25
34.7
22.0
13
44
48.4
17
35.4
31
26.5
59.0
39
3
10.7
49
64.5
56
35.0
7
16.3
21.4
12
22
26.5
11
61.1
35
60.3
68.8
33
11
34.4
3
100.0
8
14.8
18
27.7
11
3b.7
4
10.0
100.0
3
810
37.7

TOTAL
No.
195
132
43
37
104
86
78
74
94
77
33
72
59
91
48
117
100
28
76
160
43
56
83
18
58
48
32
3
54
65
30
40
3
2147
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Decisions in Stable and Unstable Regions
Nearly eighty-six percent (85.7 percent) of all decisions were
made in regions which were stable.

97

The percentage of pro-union

decisions in stable and unstable regions are 62.4 and 61.2 percent
respectively.

These percentages are shown in Table 11.

97

Definitions of Stable and Unstable Regions have been provided
in Chapter 3 with the discussion of Hypothesis 3.
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TABLE H
PRO-UNION AND PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
CLASSIFIED BY REGIONAL STABILITY

DECISIONS

REGIONAL
STABILITY

PRO-UNION
No.
1149

STABLE

7.

UNSTABLE
Z

TOTAL

1337

691
7,

61.2

14.1
7,
No.

7. 100.0

NOTE:

62.4

85.9
't
No.
188

PRO-MANAGIMENT
No.
1

62.3

7,

37.6

85.3
No.
“
119

7, 100.0

37.7

100.0

1840
I

23.8

14.7
No.
I
810

TOTAL
No.

85.
No.
307

'

100.0

14.,3
No.

2147

100.0

7. 100,.0

Percentages below the number of decisions are column percentages.
Percentages to the right of the number of decisions are row
percentages.
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D ecisions Cla s s i f i e d by Background Factors of Members

The pro-union and pro-management decisions of members have been
classified by three factors in the backgrounds of members prior to
their original appointments to the Board: 1) undergraduate degree, 2)
membership in special interest organizations, and 3) type of
occupation.
Undergraduate Degree
Of the seventeen members in the study, the undergraduate degrees
of three members were in the area of business or economics.

The

undergraduate degrees of the remaining fourteen members were in areas
other than business or economics (e.g., history, oriental studies,
journalism, political science). Table 12A shows that the pro-union and
pro-management decisions of the members with either type of
undergraduate degrees are similar.

The pro-union decisions of members

with business or economics degrees is 62.0 percent, whereas those
members with non-business or economic degrees is 62.3 percent.
Membership and Occupation
Prior to their original appointments, four of the seventeen
members of the Board had been members in one or more organizations
which were oriented to the special interests of management.

These

same four members were engaged in occupations oriented toward
management, such as positions in personnel, labor relations or with
law firms representing employers.

Tables 12 B and C show that the

pro-union decisions of members with membership/occupation backgrounds
oriented toward management are twelve percentage points below
non-management oriented members, (51.0 percent vs. 63.2 percent).
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TABLE I2A
PRO-UNION AND PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
CLASSIFIED BY
UNDERGRADUATE DEGREE OF MEMBER

DECISIONS (c)
PRO-UNION
7.
No.
158

BUSINESS/ECONOMICS
7,

"

TOTAL

62.0

88.2
No.
1337

97
*7

11.8
No.

1179

NON-BUSINESS/ECONOMICS(b)

PRO-MANAGEMENT
No.

62.3
7.
«7

62.3

7, 100.0

TOTAL
No.

38.0

255

7
100.0

12.0
No.

2

7. 11..9
7
No.

713

37.7

1892

100.0

88.0
7.
No.

7. 88,.1
No.

810

2147

% 100.0

37.7

.4

OF
MEM3ER

O
o

UNDERGRADUATE DEGREE

100.0
.0

(a) Three Members: Penello, Truesdale, Hunter
(b) Fourteen Members: Rodgers, Leedom, Fanning, McCulloch, Brown, Jenkins,
Zagoria, Miller, Kennedy, Murphy, Walther, Van de Water,
Zimmerman, Dotson
(c) Percentages between numbers of decisions are column percentages.
Percentages to the right of numbers of decisions are row percentages.
Note:

Democrats originally appointed by Democratic presidents were:
McCulloch, Brown, Truesdale, Jenkins.
Republicans originally appointed by Republican presidents were:
Rodgers, Leedom, Miller Kennedy, Murphy, Walther, Hunter, Van de Water,
Dotson.
Democrats originally appointed by Republican presidents were:
Fanning, Penello.
Republicans originally appointed by Democratic presidents were:
Jenkins• Zagoria.
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TABLE 12B
PRO-UNION AND PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
CLASSIFIED BY
TYPE OF ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIPS

.ORGANIZATIONAL

DECISIONS (c)

MEMBERSHIPS
PROUNION
No.
MANAGEMENT ORIENTED(a)

79
%

NON-MANAGEMENT ORIENTED(b5

7.

PRO-MANAGEMENT
No.
%

51.0

5..9
No.
7.

1258

%

63.2

7. 94..1
%
No.
TOTAL

76

1337

62.3

Z 100.,0

9.4
No.
7.
734

Z

49.0

36.8

TOTAL
No.
115
Z

7.
100.0
7.2

No.
1992

7.
100.0

90.6
No.
7,

Z 92.8
No.
Z

810

2147

Z 100.0

37.7

100.0

Z 100.0

(a) E. Miller, Walther, Van de Water, Dotson
(b) Fourteen Members: Rodgers, Leedom, Fanning, McCulloch, Brown, Jenkins,
Zagoria, Kennedy, Penello, Murphy, Truesdale, Hunter,
Zimmerman.
(c) Percentages between numbers of decisions are column percentages.
Percentages to the right of numbers of decisions are row percentages.
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TABLE 12C
PRO-UNION’ AND PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
CLASSIFIED BY
TYPE OF PRIOR OCCUPATION

PRIOR

DECISIONS

OCCUPATION
PRO-UNION
No.
MANAGEMENT ORIENTED(a)

79
;

Z

63.2

94.,1
No.

.0

49.0

9.4
No.
Z
734

Z

62.3

1337
44

TOTAL

76

51.0

1258
Z

PRO-MANAGEMENT
No.
7.

5.,9
No.

O
O

NON-MANAGEMENT O R I E N T E D ^

7

36.8

TOTAL
No.
115

7.
100.0

7.
7.2
No.
%
1992

100.0

90.6
No.
7.

7. 92.8
No.
7.

810

2147

Z 100.0

37.7

100.0

7. 100.0

(a) E. Miller, Walther, Van de Water, Dotson
(b) Members: Rodgers, Leedom, Fanning, McCulloch, Brown, Jenkins,
Zagoria, Kennedy, Penello, Murphy, Truesdale, Hunter,
Zimmerman.
(c) Percentages between numbers of decisions are column percentages.
Percentages to the right of numbers of decisions are row percentages.
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Decision by Age of Members
The ages of members at the time of their decisions ranged from a
low of forty-one (Member Zimmerman, 1981) to a high of seventy-two
(Member Penello, 1981).

The pro-union and pro-management decisions at

all ages (in five year brackets), as well as the number of members
making decisions at each age bracket, is provided in Table 13.
The percentage of pro-union decisions range from a high of 69.0
percent (age bracket 60 - 64) to a low of 56.4 percent (age bracket 45
- 49). In the median age bracket (55 - 59), 62.9 percent of the
decisions were pro-union.

The median percentage of pro-union

decisions (regardless of age bracket) also is 62.9 percent (occurring
in the "under 45" and "55 - 59" brackets.)
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TABLE 13
PRO-UNION AND PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
CLASSIFIED BY
AGE OF MEMBER DURING YEAR OF DECISION
AGc. OF
MEMBER

NO. OF
.
MEMBERS U '

Under 45

DECISIONS
PRO-■UNION

p r o -:MANAGEMENT

TOTAL

No.

Z

No.

*

5

73

62.9

43

37.1

116

N o.(100%)

45 -

49

18

190

56.4

147

43.6

337

50 -

54

26

290

57.4

215

-2.6

505

55 -

59

27

313

62.9

185

37.1

498

60 -

64

17

229

69.0

103

31.0

332

65 -

69

16

222

67.5

107

32.5

329

3

20

66.7

10

33.3

30

112

1337

62.3

810

37.7

2147

70 or over

TOTAL

(a)

The number of members is determined by summing the number of members at
each age in each year.
In che age category "70 or over", for example,
the number (3) is the sum of one member '.Penello) at ages 70, 71 and 72
(in years 1979-81).
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Decisions by Years
Over the twenty-two year period, the percentage of pro-union
decisions was 62.3 percent.

During the period, as shown in Table 14,

the percentage of pro-union decisions varied from a high of 83.6
percent in 1979 to a low of 39.5 percent in 1975.

The median

percentage of pro-union decisions is 63.6 percent, 62.9 (1962) - 64.4
(1983).
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TABLE 14
PRO-UNION AND PRO-MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
CLASSIFIED BE
YEAR OF DECISION
FISCAL
YEAR

PERCENT
.
UNIONIZED

CLP CASES
FILED1'

PRO-UNION
No.

1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

22.6
22.2
22.2
22.4
22.7
22.7
23.0
22.6
22.6
22.1
21.8
21.8
21.8
20.7
20.3
19.8
19.7
19.2
19.1
19.0
18.9
18.9

355.5
384.0
428.1
447.3
444.3
427.2
413.1
417.4
452.3
513.4
576.1
534,0
538.4
600.6
686.9
761.0
754.4
329.7
891.8
859.3
881.3
561.1

66
50
51
44
50
45
65
69
59
81
44
87
40
34
104
51
74
61
53
57
85
67
1337

62.9
50.5
61.4
51.8
49.0
40.9
60.7
73.4
75.6
64.8
45.8
70.7
50.6
39.5
78.2
60.7
71.8
83.6
77.9
65.5
69.1
64,4
62.3

3 EC ISIONS
PRO-MANAGEMENT
:.'o.
55
45
22
_1
21
65
-2
25
1■
-4
Z55
55
52
59
33
59
12
15
Z'J
38
3"
S 1.U

37.1
49.5
38.6
48.2
51. G
59.0
39.3
26.6
24.4
35.2
54.2
29.3
49.4
60.4
21.S
39.3
28.2
16.4
22.1
34.5
30.9
35.6
37.7

(a)

L'.S. union membership, as a percentage of Total 1.3. Labor Force
1See Appendix G ) .

(b)

CL? Cases received by NLRB during year, per million union members
(See Appendix G ) .

TOTAL
N o . (1003)
105
99
83
85
102
110
107
94
78
125
96
123
79
86
133
84
103
73
68
87
123
104
2147
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LOGIT RESULTS
As previously discussed in Chapter 3, logit provides insights,
where categorical data are involved, that are not available from more
commonly-used techniques for analyzing contingency tables.

The sample

data presented tabularly in the preceding section of this chapter were
analyzed using logit. The results are shown below in a series of
tables, with each table representing one of three separate
developmental models. Individual models are presented in alignment
with the literature review in Chapter 2.

The first model, Model 1

(with its sub-set sample size model, labeled 1A), is a benchmark
comparison to the seminal model of Cooke and Gautschi.

Model 2 is an

extension of Model 1 and incorporates the added dimension of
stability.

Stability is an issue raised by Delaney, Lewin and Sockell

regarding the Cooke and Gautschi study.

Model 3 is the full model de

veloped in this study and tests the hypotheses included in Chapter 3.

In identifying those variables which are significant sources of
bias, the t-ratio is important.

Kerlinger and Pedhazur explain that

the t-ratio, calculated by dividing the coefficient (b) by its
standard error, is assessed (with the appropriate degrees of freedom)
for significance (at a specified level).

98

In the table of each model,

therefore, the t-ratio of each variable is shown.

Those variables

with b values (coefficients) assessed as significant (at p = .05 and

98

Fred N. Kerlinger and Elazar J. Pedhazur, Multiple Regression
in Behavorial Research, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.,
1973.
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p = .01) have been indicated as

*

and **, respectively.

In the Data

Analysis Technique section of Chapter 3 it was pointed out that logit
parameters are estimated by a method called Maximum Likelihood
Estimations (MLE), rather than the method of Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) in the ordinary regression model.

It also was indicated that

the statistical inference from logit is the same as that of linear
regression.

Logit analysis measures the relationship between

independent variables, X, and the dependent variable, Y.

Estimated

coefficients (b^) are the (asymptotically unbiased and efficient)
point estimates of the relationship.

Because of the parallelism

between the logit and the ordinary regression techniques, the
magnitude of logit coefficients can be interpreted in the same manner
as coefficients derived using ordinary regression.
Each table is formated to provide the variables included (name
and identification symbol), the sample proportion or mean of the
variable, the coefficient of the variable and its t-ratio. The sample
size (n) and the intercept also are included, as well as a goodness of
fit statistic.
A summary comparison of all models is provided in Table 20. Table
20 shows the variables included in each model as well as a
cross-reference of the variables to the hypotheses tested.
To facilitate performing the logit analyses of each model, a new
set of variables was created.

Descriptions of the variables included

in these three models are provided in Table 15.

There are several

types or classes of variables included in Table 15, based on their
primary purpose or function.

First, there are those variables which
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TABLE 15
VARIABLES
VARIABLE

NAME

DEFINITION

DEMDEH(MOAP)

1 if Member is Democrat, originally appointed by
a Democratic president, 0 otherwise.

REPREP(MOAP)

1 if Member is Republican, originally appointed
by a Republican president, 0 otherwise.

STABLE

1 if Decision rendered in stable origin, 0
otherwise.

'10

AGE

Age of member at time of decision.

'11

TREND

Year of Decision.

13

14

15

16

17

MANG

1 if member was previously employed in a
management position or as a management
attorney, 0 otherwise.

UGDEGREE

1 if member earned undergraduate degree in
Business or Economics, 0 otherwise.

UNIONPOP

Percent of labor force unionized during year
of decision.

ULPRATE

Number of ULP cases filed (per million union
members) in year of decision.

UNANIMOUS

1 if all members decided the same way on ULP
charge, 0 otherwise.

EMPYES

1 if ULP was initiated by employer and
supported by A LJ, 0 otherwise.

EMPNO

I if ULP was initiated by employer and dismissed
by ALJ, 0 otherwise.

UNIONC

1 if ULP was initiatea bv union and dismissed by
ALJ, 0 otherwise.
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relate to the individual characteristics of the members (e.g., age,
political party) and to the selection process (e.g., political party
of originally appointing president).
variables

This classification includes

and X ( p o l i t i c a l party affiliation of member and

original appointing president), X^q (age of member at time of
decision), X ^
degree).

(prior occupation) and X ^

(type of undergraduate

The second group of variables are those which deal with the

process through which the allegations progress to be decided by the
members.

This classification includes variables, C,, C.,, and CD
0

/

o

(filing party of the ULP charge and decision by ALJ) and X ^
(unanimity of Board decision). Variables in this classification
hereinafter are referred to as "process" variables.

A third group of

variables related to environmental conditions, both internally (i.e.,
internal to the NLRB organizational structure in which cases are
processed and decided) as well as externally (i.e., the environment of
the work place in which labor-management relations has its being).
This third classification includes variables X^ (stability), X ^

(year

of decision), X,c (size of the union population) and X , , (rate of
IJ
io
filings of ULP charges).
In the discussion of the results at each table, references are
made to the sign of the coefficient (and of the t-value.)

The manner

in which the variables (in Table 15) were structured permits the signs
of the results in the tables to be uniformly interpreted as a
"pro-union" or "pro-management" effect, except in one instance. A
positive sign implies pro-union and a negative sign implies
pro-management in all results, except at Table 19 in the discussion of
the variable UNIONPOP and Hypothesis 5A.

In that instance, there is
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an inverse relationship

between the independent and dependent

variables, with a negative sign meaning pro-union.
Model 1A
As indicated above, Model 1A is a near-duplication of the model
tested by Cooke and Gautschi (CG). The CG model included ten
variables, eight of which are identical in Model 1A. The time period
for Model 1A is 1962 through 1977, coincidental with with the latter
sixteen years of the CG model, which covered 1954-1977.

The sample

size of Model 1A is 1589 (sixteen years) as compared to 852 for the CG
model (twenty-four years).
The results of Model 1A are presented in Table 16.

Model 1A

includes five variables addressed to Hypotheses 1 and 2, Hypotheses 4A
and 4D, and Hypothesis 5, as well as three of the previously described
control variables addressed to Hypotheses 7A, 7B and 7C.
Hypothesis 1 (stating that Democratic members originally
appointed by Democratic presidents are more likely to make decisions
favoring unions over employers than are Democratic or Republican
members originally appointed by Presidents of opposite parties or
Republican members originally appointed by Republican presidents) is
tested by the variable DEMDEM (MOAP).

In Model 1A, this variable has

a t-value of 0.355, which is not significant.
data fail to support Hypothesis 1.

In other words, the

The sign of the coefficient

(positive), however, is directionally consistent (pro-union) with
Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2 (stating that Republican members originally
appointed by Republican presidents are less likely to make decisions
favoring unions over employers than are Democratic or Republican
members originally appointed by presidents of opposite parties or

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

104

TABLE 16
ESTIMATION’ OF A DECISION MODEL OF
NLRB UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE DECISIONS
MODEL 1A

VARIABLE

SAMPLE PROPORTION OR MEAN

COEFFICIENT

t-values

Xj

DEMDEM(MOAF)

242

0.028

0.355

X,

REPREP(MOAP)

23%

-0.138

-1.678

X.

MANG

8%

-0.163

-1.291

54.9

-0.005

X,Q AGE

-0.687
kk

C.
0

EMPYES

18%

-1.194

-14.559
**

C?

EMPNO

8%

-0.398

-4.010
**

Cg

UNIONO

23%

-0.609

-8.653
**

0.038

4.435

Intercept

3.240

6.710

n

1589

Xn

TREND

69.6

Pearson Goodness-of--Fit Chi Square • 1585

DF - 1580

P = 0.459

Significant at or above .05
Significant at or above .01
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Democratic members appointed by Democratic presidents) is tested by the
variable REPREP (MOAP). In Model 1A, the sign of the coefficient
(negative) is directionally consistent with the hypothesis.

The t-value

(-1.678) here also is not significant, thereby providing no support for
Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 4A (stating that age does not significantly impact the
decisions of members) and Hypothesis 4D (stating that the type of
occupation prior to appointment to the Board does not significantly
impact the decisions of members) are both supported by the nonsignificant
t-values of AGE (t-value = 0.687) and MANG (t-value = -1.291),
respectively.
Hypothesis 5 (stating the Members' decisions will not respond to per
se passage of time is not supported (t-value 4.435, p = 0.01).

The

positive sign of the coefficient (0.038) indicates that members more
likely make decisions favoring unions over employers as time advances.
Hypotheses 7A and 7B, stating that members are less likely to make
decisions favoring unions over employers in ULP charges initiated by
employers when the ALJ supports the charge (Hypothesis 7A) and when the
ALJ dismisses the charge (Hypothesis 7B), than in ULP charges initiated
by unions (irrespective of support or dismissal by ALJ's) were supported.
An alleged ULP charge filed by an employer and upheld by an ALJ (EMPYES)
has a t-value of -14.559, which is significant (at p = 0.01).

An alleged

ULP charge filed by an employer, but dismissed by an ALJ (EMPNO) has a
t-value of -4.010, which is significant (at p = 0.01).
Hypothesis 7C (Stating that members are no more likely to make
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decisions favoring employers over unions or favoring unions over
employers in ULP charges initiated by unions and dismissed by ALJ's) is
not

supported. An alleged ULP charge filed by a union

and dismissed by an

ALJ

(UNIONO) has a t-value of -8.653, which is significant

(at p = 0.01).

The (negative) signs of the coefficients of EMPYES, EMPNO, and
UNIONO indicate that members are less likely to make decisions favoring
unions over employers in each of these three specific combinations of
charging party and decision of the ALJ. Why these three combinations,
EMPYES, EMPNO and UNIONO, might all have negative coefficients
(pro-management) is discussed in Chapter 5.
Model 1
Model 1 is the same as Model 1A, except that the full time period of
the

study (1962-1983) was used rather than 1962-1977. The

sample size of

Model 1, therefore, is 2147.
The results of Model 1 are presented in Table 17.

The results shown

in this table are, for the most part, the same as the results
in Table 16 (Model 1A).

There are differences, however, which are noted

below.
Hypothesis 1 again is not supported.
(MOAP) is not significant.

The t-value of variable DEMDEM

While the size of the coefficients and the

t-values of this variable are nearly identical in Models 1 and 1A, their
signs are reversed.

In Model 1A the sign was positive, whereas in Model

1 the sign is negative.

The sample proportion of DEMDEM (MOAP) remained

the same at twenty-four percent in both models
1A and 1.
Hypothesis 2 again is not supported. The t-value of variable
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TABLE 17
ESTIMATION OF A DECISION MODEL OF
NLRB UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE DECISIONS
MODEL 1

VARIABLE

SAMPLE PROPORTION OR MEAN

COEFFICIENT

t-values

X1

DEMDEM (MOAP)

24%

-0.054

-0.846

X,

REPREP(MOAP)

22%

-0.147

-1.932

77

-0.085

-0.765

0.007

1.680

X ^ MANG
“ 10 AGE
Cfi

EMPYES

56.0
16%

-16.787

-1.253
**

C.

EMPNO

97.

-0.734

-8.904
is*

Cg

UNIONO

21%

-10.367

-0.629
A*

Xj

TREND

72.5

0.016

3.670

Intercept

4.154

12.578

n

2147

Pearson Goodness--of-Fit Chi Square = 2134

DF = 2138

P = .520

Significant at or above .05
** Significant at or above .01
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REPREP (MOAP) is not significant.
remained negative, as in Model 1A.

The sign of this variable has
Here, too, the size of the

coefficents differ only slightly, -0.147 vs. -0.138, while the
t-values are -1.932 vs. -1.678.
Hypotheses 4A and 4D regarding age and prior occupations are both
supported in Model 1, as they were in Model 1A.

The variable AGE has

reversed signs, however, from negative to positive.

In addition to

the reversal of signs, the size of t-value has risen to (+) 1.680 from
(-) 0.687.

The positive sign of the variable AGE is associated with

making decisions favoring unions over employers.

In Model 1, with the

change in sample size from Model 1A, the mean age of members has
increased from 54.9 years to 56.0 years.
MANG has remained negative.

The sign of the variable

The size of its t-value has declined (in

absolute value) from -1.291 to 0.765.
Hypothesis 5 (stating the members' decisions will not respond to
per se passage of time) continues to lack support.

The sign of the

coefficients has remained positive, but has been reduced in size by
one-half, 0.016 compared to 0.038.
from 4.435.

The t-value has dropped to 3.670

Members remain more likely to make decisions favoring

unions over employers as time advances, but with lessening likelihood.
Recall that Model 1 includes additional more-current years, with the
mean of TREND advanced from 69.6 to 72.5.
Hypotheses 7A and 7B regarding ULP charges initiated by employers
again is supported while Hypothesis 7C regarding ULP charges filed by
unions and dismissed by ALJ's again is not supported.
Each of the three process variables (EMPYES, EMPNO, and UNIONO)
has retained its negative sign, has remained significant, has a larger
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TABLE IB
ESTIMATION OF A DECISION KC3EL OF
NLRB UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE DECISIONS
MODEL 2

VARIABLE

X2

SAMPLE PROPORTION OR MEAN

COEFFICIENT

t-values

DEMDEM(MOAP)

241

-3.053

-0.832

REPREP(MOAP)

2 2 .:

-0.148

-1.950

-0.080

-0.725

Xj3 MANG
x io AGE

56.0

1.577

0.006
**

C fi

EMPYES

16-.

-1.257

-16.809
**

C7

EMPNO

9:

-8.899

-0.733
**

Cg

UNIONO

-0.629

21:

-10.358
**

Xu

TRENT)

72.5

0.017

3.881

Xg

STABLE

86:

0.112

1.543

2.997

11.551

Intercept

2147

n
Pearson Goodness--of-Fit Chi Square “ 2138

DF 3 2137

? = 0.491

Significant at or above .05
Significant at or above .01
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coefficient, and a larger t-value.
At this stage, Model 1 covering the full time period (1962-1983)
and with sample size (n = 2147) becomes the benchmark model (in lieu
of Model 1A) for comparisons of the extended models (Model 2 and 3).
Model 2
Model 2 is the same as Model 1, except that the variable for
regional stability (STABLE) has been added.
time period, 1962-1983, (n = 2147).

Model 2 includes the full

The results of Model 2 are

presented in Table 18.
Model 2 includes variables addressed to Hypotheses 1 and 2,
Hypotheses 4A and 4D, and Hypothesis 5, as well as three control
variables (as in Model 1) addressed to Hypotheses 7A, 7B, and 7C, plus
the new variable STABLE.

STABLE addresses Hypothesis 3.

Again there is lack of support for Hypothesis 1 (concerning
greater likelihood of pro-union decisions under Democratic congruency
between members and original appointing presidents, compared to all
other member-president combinations) in Model 2.

In Model 2,

directionality remains the same (negative sign).
Hypothesis 2 (concerning lesser likelihood of pro-union decisions
under Republican congruency, compared to all other political
combinations) again is not supported.

Here again the results mirror

those of Model 1: the sign remains negative, with the size of the
coefficient and the absolute values of t-values changing only at the
second decimal position or beyond -0.148 vs. -0.147, and -1.950 vs.
-1.932, respectively).

At a t-value of -1.950, REPREP (MOAP)

approaches significance (p = 0.0512).
Hypothesis 3 states that members are more likely to make
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decisions favoring unions over employers in unstable regions than in
stable regions. In Model 2, the results of STABLE (coefficient -0.112,
t-value 1.543) do not support the hypothesis.
Hypotheses 4A and 4D regarding the anticipated lack of effect of
age or prior occupation on decisions, respectively, are supported in
Model 2.

The t-value of AGE is 1.577 and of MANG is -0.725.

Both of

these t-values are of smaller size than in Model 1 (1.680 and -0.765
respectively).
Hypothesis 5 (Members' decisions will not respond to per se
passage of time) continues to lack support in Model 2. Members
decisions do, in fact, respond to passage of time.
(positive) remains unchanged.

The sign

The difference in the size of the

coefficient and the t-value increased slightly (0.017 vs. 0.016, and
3.881 vs. 3.401, respectively).
Each of the three process variables (EMPYES, EMPNO, and UNIONO)
has retained its negative sign, has remained significant, and has
retained approximately the same size coefficient (larger only at the
third decimal position) and t-value (larger only at the first decimal
position or beyond).

Support of Hypotheses 7A and 7B, and non-support

of Hypothesis 7C, therefore, again are the same as in Model 1.
At this point, Model 2 covering the full period (1962-1983) with
full sample size (n = 2147), and with the inclusion of the variable
STABLE, now becomes the benchmark Model (in lieu of Model 1).

The

results of Model 3, which is the final extension of Model 2, are
discussed in the next section.
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Model 3

The final model, Model 3, is presented in Table 19.

Model 3 was

developed from the literature review and addresses the hypotheses
promulgated and presented in Chapter 3.

Model 3 covers the full time

period (1962-1983) and is an extension of the previously presented
Model 2.

99

It includes the nine variables of Model 2 (DEMDEM, REPREP,

STABLE, AGE, TREND, MANG, EMPYES, EMPNO, UNIONO) plus the four
additional variables UGDEGREE, UNIONPOP, ULPRATE and UNANIMOUS.

99

Model 3 was derived via several paths of examination, each
originating at Model 2. Each path resulted from various sequencing of
the introduction of variables. This network approach facilitated an
examination of the impact of each modification to Model 2. The
variables involved in the process included redefined variables ,
substitute variables , and new variables. Variables excluded from
Model 3 were selected on the criterion of the availability of a more
poignant measure (e.g., the substitution of UNIONPOP and ULPRATE for
TREND as a better measure of the atmosphere of iabor-management
relations) coupled with attaining greater model elegance. Variables
added or retained were selected on the criterion of significance
obtained (e.g., in a prior study) coupled with improved specification
based on theoretical consideration. In Model 3, TREND specifically
was retained (in addition to UNIONPOP and ULPRATE) because it may
capture some unobserved function or functions that over time may be
affecting decisions but have been overlooked.
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TABLE 19
ESTIMATION OF A DECISION MODEL OF NLRB
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE DECISIONS
MODEL 3

SAMPLE PROPORTION OR MEAN

COEFFICIENT

DEMDEM (MOAP)

242

-0.057

-0.886

REPREP (MOAP)

n 'if

-0.176

-2.221

STABLE

36 7.

0.098

1.349

AGE

56.0

0.008

1.973

TREND

72.5

0.019

1.262

HANG

72

-0.069

-0.601

I’G DEGREE

127

-0.176

-2.098*

UNIONPOP

21.22

-0.187

-1.920

-0.001

-1.330

VARIABLES

X1
X2
X3

t-values

*

*
X 10
X 11
X 13
X 14
X 15
X 16

ULP RATE

589.7

**
X 17

UNANIMOUS

822

0.188

2.936

EKPYES

162

-1.236

-16.376

EMPNO

92

-0.731

- 8.823

**
C6

**
C7
C8

UNIONO

-0.609

INTERCEPT

3.481

n

2147

PEARSON GOODNESS -OF- FIT CHI SQUARE

= 2145

DF = 2133

**
- 9.957

3.567

P = 0.424

Significant at or above .05
Significant at or above .01
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DEMDEM (MOAP) shows a t-value (-0.886) which is nonsignificant;
There is no support, therefore, for Hypothesis 1, that Democratic
members originally appointed by Democratic presidents are more likely
to make decisions favoring unions over employers than are Democratic
or Republican members originally appointed by presidents of opposite
parties, or Republican members originally appointed by Republican
presidents.

Indeed, even the negative sign of the coefficient runs

contrary to the anticipated directionality (positive, pro-union) of
Hypothesis 1.
REPREP (MOAP) has a t-value of -2.221 which is significant at the
0.05 level.

This result provides support for Hypothesis 2.

Republican members originally appointed by Republican presidents are
less likely to make decisions favoring unions over employers than
Democratic or Republican members appointed by presidents of opposite
parties, or Democratic members originally appointed by Democratic
presidents.
Hypothesis 3 stating that members are more likely to make
decisions favoring unions over employers in unstable regions than in
stable regions is not supported. The t-value of STABLE (1.458) is not
significant (p = 0.16).
The t-value of AGE (1.973) is significant (at p = 0.05).
Hypothesis 4A, therefore, is not supported. Data suggest that members
are more likely to make decisions favoring unions over employers as
they advance in age.

Hypothesis 4B states that members' decisions

will not be significantly impacted by the type of undergraduate degree
they have been awarded.

This hypothesis is not supported.

UGDEGREE,

t-value = -2.098, which is significant (at p = 0.05) indicates that
members who have been awarded undergraduate degrees in
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Business/Economics are less likely to make decisions favoring unions
over employers than are members who have been awarded
non-Business/Economic undergraduate degrees.

Hypothesis 4C stated

that members' decisions will not be significantly affected by their
prior memberships in special interest organizations.

The discussion

at Tables 12B and C pointed out that the four members who were engaged
in management-oriented occupations prior to appointment were the same
four members who had held memberships (prior to appointment) in
management-oriented organizations.

In Chapter 3 (Data Analysis

Technique) it was indicated that logit suffers the same problem of
multicollinearity as does OLS regression.

As in OLS, therefore, it is

required that in logit no exact or near-linear dependence exist among
the X

across k.

MSHIP.

Such was the case with the variables MANG and

MSHIP was dropped and MANG retained.

MANG was retained on the

basis of preserving greater comparability with the Cooke and Gautschi
model. With the removal of MSHIP, the task of showing support or lack
of support for Hypothesis 4C has been relegated to the discussion in
Chapter 5.

The t-value of MANG (-0.601) is not significant.

Hypothesis 4D, therefore, is supported.

Decisions by members are not

significantly affected by the type of occupation prior to Board
appointment.
Hypothesis 5 stated that members' decisions will not respond to
per se passage of time. The t-value of TREND is 1.262 which is not
significant (p = 0.33) and therefore supports this hypothesis of no
difference over time. The positive sign indicates that the
directionality is that of favoring unions over employers, as time
advances. Hypothesis 5A stated that members are less likely to make
decisions favoring unions over employers as the size of the union
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population decreases.

This hypothesis does not receive support.

t-value of UNIONPOP (-1.920) is not significant.

The

In this instance a

negative sign is interpreted to mean "pro-union" as explained earlier
in this chapter. The directionality of the results, therefore, is not
as was anticipated by Hypothesis 5A. Hypothesis 5B stated that members
are more likely to make decisions favoring unions over employers as
the rate of ULP charges filed by unions increases.
does not receive support.
significant.

This hypothesis

The t-value of ULPRATE (-1.330) is not

The directionality of results (negative, pro-management)

is contrary to the expectation of the hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6 (stating that members' decisions, either favoring
unions over employers or favoring employers over unions, which are
unanimous will differ from those which are non-unanimous) is
supported.
0.01.

The t-value of UNANIMOUS (t= 2.936) is significant at p =

The positive sign of the coefficient (0.188) indicates that

unanimous decisions of members are more likely to favor unions over
employers than are non-unanimous decisions.
Each of the process variables (EMPYES, EMPNO and UNIONO) are
significant (at p = 0.01) and carry negative signs.
support Hypothesis 7A.

These results

Members are less likely to make decisions

favoring unions over employers in ULP charges initiated by employers
and supported by ALJ's (EMPYES, t-value = -16.376), than in ULP
charges initiated by unions (irrespective of support or dismissal by
ALJ's) or initiated by employers and dismissed by ALJ's.
7B also is supported.

Hypothesis

Members are less likely to make decisions

favoring unions over employers in ULP charges initiated by employers
and dismissed by ALJ's (EMPNO, t-value = -8.823) than in ULP charges
initiated by unions
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(irrespective of support or dismissal by ALJ's) or initiated by
employers and supported by ALJ's.

Hypothesis 7C is not supported.

The significant results (at p = 0.01) of variable UNIONO (t-value =
-9.957) suggests that, contrary to what was hypothesized, members are
less likely to favor unions over employers in ULP charges initiated by
unions and dismissed by ALJ's than in ULP charges initiated by unions
and supported by ALJ's or initiated by employers (irrespective of
support or dismissal by ALJ's).
Summary and Comparison of Models
In the foregoing sections of this Chapter, Models 1A, 1, 2 and 3
were individually presented in Tables 16, 17, 18 and 19, respectively,
with commentary accompanying each of these Tables. In this section,
these models are summarized and are compared, using the Pearson
Goodness-of-Fit Chi Square statistic.

These data on the models are

presented in Table 20.
Model 3 is the full model developed from the literature review
and addresses each of the Hypotheses promulgated in Chapter 3.

As

shown in Table 20, the model is well-specified, including three
classifications of variables as discussed previously at Table 15: (1)
those variables relating to individual characteristics of members
(e.g., political party) and to the selection process (i.e., political
party of the original appointing president), DEMDEM (MOAP), REPREP
(MOAP), AGE, MANG and UGDEGREE; (2) those variables concerned with the
process through which the allegations progress to be decided by the
members, EMPYES, EMPNO, UNIONO, and UNANIMOUS, and (3) those variables
related to internal and external environmental conditions, TREND,
UNIONPOP, ULPRATE and STABLE.

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

118

TABLE 20
SUMMARY OF MODELS
HYPOTHESIS
NUMBERU '

1

VARIABLE
NUMBER

X1

2
X2

3

4A

4B

AD

5

5A

5B

6

7A

7B

7C

X3

MODEL 3
Coefficient
(t-value)
DEMDEM(MOAP)
-0.057
(-0.886)
REPREP(MOAP)
*
-0.176
(-2.221)
STABLE
C.098
(1.135)

X 10

X 14

X 13

X 11

X 15

X L6

X 17

C6

C7

C8

Pearson Goodness-o£- fit
Chi Square
D.F.
?-Value
r.

^For

AGE *
0.008
(1.973)
L'GDEGREE
-0.176"
(-2.098)
MANG
-0.069
(-0.601)
TREND
0.019
(1.262)
UXIONFOP
-0.187
(-1.920)
ULPRATE
-0.001
(-1.330)
UNANIMOyg
0.188
(2.936)
EMPYES
-1.236
(-16.376)
EMPNO **
-0.731
(-8.823)
UNIONO**
-0.609
(-9.957)

2145
2133
0.424
2147

Hypotheses, see Chapter 3

significant at or above .05

MODELS AND INCLUDED VARIABLES ' 1
MODEL 2
MODEL 1
Coefficient
Coefficient
(t-value)
(t-value)
DEMDEM(MOAP)
-0.053
(-0.832)
REPREP(MOAP)

DEMDEM(MOAP)
-0.054
(-0.846)
REPREP(MOAP)

-0.148
(-1.950)
STABLE
0.112
(1.543)
AGE
0.006
(1.577)
----

-0.147
(-1.932)

MANG
-0.080
(-0.725)
TREND **
0.017
(3.881)
----

--

EMPYES**
-1.257
(-16.809)
EMPNO **
-0.733
(-8.899)
UNIONO. .
-0.629
(-10.358)

2138
2137
0.491
2147

MODEL 1A
Coefficient
(t-value)
DEMDEM(MOAP)
0.028
(0.355)
REPREP(MOAP)
-0.138
(-1.678)

AGE
0.007
(1.680)
----

AGE
-0.005
(-0.687)
----

MANG
-0.085
(0.765)
TREND**
0.016
(3.670)
----

MANG
-0.168
(-1.291)
TREND**
0.038
(4.435)
----

----

----

EMPYES*
-1.253"
(-16.787)
EMPNO ,*
-0.734
7-8.904)
UNIONO**
-0.r.9
(10.3c71

Illill 8
0.520
21-7

EMPYES**
-1.194
(-14.559)
EMPNO **
-0.398
(-4.010)
UNIONO.
.
X*
-0.609
(-8.653)

1.-. >9

(b)For Descriptions of Variables, see Table 15
significant at or above .01
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Model 3 contains four variables (UGDEGREE, UNIONPOP, ULPRATE and
UNANIMOUS) which were not included in Model 2.

Prior models were

included to present the developmental sequence culminating with Model
3.

Model 1 (and its

subset model 1A) was the benchmark replication of

the Cooke and Gautschi model, while Model

2 incorporated the

additional element of regional stability (STABLE) suggested by
Delaney, Lewin and Sockell.
Model 3 includes four variables which are significant at P =
0.01; UNANIMOUS (coefficient 0.188, t-value 2.936), EMPYES
(coefficient -1.236, t-value -16.376), EMPNO (coefficient -0.731,
t-value -8.823) and UNIONO (coefficient -0.609, t-value -9.957) as
well as three variables which are significant at p=0.05: REPREP (MOAP)
(coefficient -0.176,

t-value -2.221), AGE (coefficient 0.008,t-value

1.973), and UGDEGREE

(coefficient -0.176, t-value -2.098).

Of these aforementioned seven variables in Model 3 which are
significant (at either p= 0.01 or p= 0.05), two were included in one
or more of the developmental models.

Variables REPREP(MOAP) and AGE

both were included in each of the developmental models 1A, 1 and 2.
Neither of these two variables, which were significant in Model 3,
were significant in any of these prior models.

REPREP(MOAP) did,

however, approach significance in Model 2 (t-value -1.950) and Model 1
(t-value -1.932).
Variables UGDEGREE and UNANIMOUS included in Model 3, and
significant, were not included in any of the prior models.

The

variable TREND (included in Model 3, but not significant) was included
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in all prior models.

In those prior models, TREND was significant.

Why TREND lacks significance in Model 3, while it was significant in
prior models, is discussed in Chapter 5.
Variable DEMDEM (MOAP), included in Model 3 and not significant,
was included and not significant in all prior models as well.

STABLE,

included in Model 3 and not significant, was also included in Model 2
and not significant.

Variables UNIONPOP and ULPRATE, included in

Model 3 and not significant, were not included in any of the prior
models.
Chapter

UNIONPOP and ULPRATE play a role in the discussion (in
5) of why TREND was not significant in Model 3, whereas it was

in all prior models.
As

indicated earlier, the dependent variable in this study is the

decision by a member in an unfair labor practice case.

This decision

may be either pro-union or pro-management, depending upon the specific
combination of charging party (employer or union), the decision of the
ALJ (to support or to dismiss the allegation) and the decision of the
member (to agree or to disagree with the ALJ).
were illustrated in Appendix J.

These decisions also

A measure of the ability of a model

to predict the decision is the Pearson Goodness-of-Fit Chi Square
statistic.

This Chi Square statistic, with its appropriate degrees of

freedom (DF), is provided for each model in Table 20.

As the table

indicates, Model 3 (Chi Square 2145, DF 2133, p= 0.424) is the
superior model in terms of predictability of decisions of members.

A

model with a p-value of 0.424 generally would not be regarded as a
relatively good predictor.

Recall, however, that the purpose of this

study was not to develop a model for its overall predictive
capability.

The purpose rather was to develop a well-specified model
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of the process through which ULP charges are alleged by charging
parties are decided by administrative law judges and, if subjected to
review by the Board, are resolved by decisions of members.

This model

then was tested to evaluate suspected political bias in those
decisions made by Board members. Individual variables within the model
as sources of potential bias was the focal point rather than the model
as an integrated whole.

As indicated in the opening paragraphs of the

Logit Results section of this chapter, the t-ratio is of prime
importance in this task.

The synergism of the variables and the

model's ability to predict (and therefore the Chi Square statistic) is
of peripheral interest only.
In summary, Model 3, as indicated in Table 20, contains a greater
number of significant variables than either of the two developmental
models of Delaney, Lewin and Sockell (Model 2) or Cooke and Gautschi
(Model 1A/1).

Additionally, Model 3 has somewhat greater predictive

capability (albeit of peripheral import and of limited strength) than
either of Model 2 or 1A/1.
An in-depth discussion of the results of Model 3 follows in
Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

In the preceding chapter, the results of the logit analysis of
Model 3 were presented. The results for each variable were reported as
those results provided support, or failed to provide support, to the
hypotheses set forth in Chapter 3.

The focus of this chapter,

therefore, is to discuss those previously presented results within a
framework of integration and interpretation.
Discussion
In examining the decisions rendered by members, this study centered
around several sets of hypotheses involving influences on the decisions
made by members of the National Labor Relations Board in unfair labor
practice cases.

The hypotheses included several areas: political party

affiliations, regional stability, personal factors, long-term time
trend, the atmosphere of the labor-management relations environment,
Board unanimity, and the process through which ULP charges progress to
be decided by the Board.
In each of these areas, the following was hypothesized:
1. Political party affiliations of the member and the president
will impact the decision. There will be differences in decisions
made by Democratic members and Republicans members who
originally are appointed by presidents of the same party.
Under congruent Democratic party affiliations there will be more
pro-union decisions, whereas under congruent Republican party
affiliation will be more pro-management decisions.
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2. Stability within regions at the Regional Director level, will
impact the decisions. Members are more likely to make
decisions favoring unions over employers in unstable regions
than in stable regions.

3. Personal factors of age, type of undergraduate degree
(classified as Business/Economics and non-Business/Economics),
and prior occupations and organizational memberships
(classified as business-oriented and non-business oriented)
will not impact the decisions of members.

4. Long term time trend, the size of the union population
(measured as a percent of the labor force) and the rate of ULP
charges filed (measured as a ratio per million union members)
will affect the decision.

A decrease in union population will

have a pro-management effect on decisions, while an increase
in the rate of ULP charges filed will have a pro-union effect.

5. Pressures for unanimity among the members of the Board will
result in decisions (either favoring unions over employers or
favoring employers over unions) which, when unanimous, differ
from those decisions which are non-unanimous.

6. The processing procedure will influence decisions of members.
Members are more likely to make decisions favoring employers
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over unions w h e n the ULP charge is initiated by employers

(irrespective of the decisions of the ALJ) or when the charge is
initiated by the union and dismissed by the ALJ.
Against the backdrop of the hypotheses in these areas, the
findings are summarized into three sections:

1) Evidence of political

bias; 2) Evidence of procedural bias, and 3) Evidence of other biases.
The findings in each of these sections are presented below.
Evidence of Political Bias
The first set of hypotheses considered in this research involved
political party affiliation:
Political party affiliation of the member and
the president will impact the decision.
There will be differences in decisions made
by Democratic members and Republican members
who originally are appointed by presidents of
the same party. Under congruent Democratic
party affiliations there will be more
pro-union decisions, whereas under congruent
Republican party affiliations will be more
pro-management decisions.
As previously indicated at Table 19, the t-values for the condition
of Democratic members originally appointed by Democratic presidents does
not support the contention (Hypothesis 1) that under such congruency of
political party affiliations (DEMDEM) members are more likely to make
decisions favoring unions over employers than are Democratic or
Republican members originally appointed by presidents of opposite
parties or Republican members originally appointed by Republican
presidents.

Indeed, even the directionality (negative, pro-management)

is contrary to that anticipated by Hypothesis 1.
At the same time, the results, reported at Table 19, support
Hypothesis 2.

In Table 19, REPREP (coefficient -0.176, t-value -2.221)
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is interpreted to mean that Republican members originally appointed by
Republican presidents are less likely to make decisions favoring
unions over employers than are Democratic or Republican members
appointed by presidents of opposite parties or Democratic members
originally appointed by Democratic presidents.
The results at Table 19 supporting Hypothesis 2 but, at the same
time, not supporting Hypothesis 1 is a surprising finding.

The Cooke

and Gautschi results found support for both of these hypotheses and
their discussion implied that the two essentially were "polar" in
nature; that is, that one occurs automatically with the other.
In an attempt to determine why a "unilateral" effect was occurring
in this study and to determine whether something was acting to confound
the results, further investigation was undertaken. Cooke and Gautschi
(discussed in Chapter 2 and at Tables 16 and 17 of Chapter 3)
interpreted their results as providing strong support for their central
hypotheses (i.e., that the presidential appointment process directly
affects ULP decisions made by the Board).

Significant t-values for

their variables DEMDEM and REPREP they found provided support for both
sides of the political congruency issue.

Furthermore, the sign of their

DEMDEM variable was positive (pro-union) and of REPREP, negative
(pro-management).
How, then can the seemingly "one-sided" result of this study be
explained?

It is possible that a plausible answer to this question is

rooted in several issues. First, it is possible to speculate that the
age of DEMDEM members was greater than that of the REPREP members.
so, perhaps these older members had become more conservative (with
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"conservative" as a euphemism for "pro-management") than their younger
REPREP counterparts.

Upon inspection, it was found that the average

age of the DEMDEM members (four members) over the tenures of their
Board service was 55.7 years.

In comparison, an average age of 51.5

years was found for the REPREP members (nine members).

Perhaps, an

element of greater conservatism would partially explain the negative
sign (pro-management) of the coefficient (-0.062) of DEMDEM, in this
study.
To explore the possibility that age was interacting with party
affiliation the data were analyzed as a 2 X 2 X 5 factorial design:
political party of the original appointing president (Democrat,
Republican) and political party of the member (Democrat, Republican),
with age as a blocking factor.

Age was grouped into five classes

(under 50; 50 through 54; 55 through 59; 60 through 64, and 65 or
older).
As shown in Table 21, the main effects were significant for both
political natty of member and age of member, with value of P = 0.005
and 0.007, respectively.

These results are as were expected and are

consistent with the logit results.
Of particular interest was the results of the two-way
interactions.

The two-way interaction between political party of

member and age of member was significant, at p = 0.002.

From an

examination of the means for member party and age (Table 22) it
appears that the liberalism (pro-union) of Democratic members remains
fairly stable across all ages.

In contrast, Republican members appear

to get less conservative (more pro-union) as

they get older.
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TABLE 21
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS
POLITICAL PARTY (MEMBER, PRESIDENT) AND AGE OF MEMBER

SOURCE OF VARIATION

SS

DF

MS

F

SIGNIFICANCE

0.000

1.774
0.815

4.544
0.001
7.742
3.558

9
1
4
4

0.980
0.005
1.246
0.996

4.275
0.021
5.435
4.345

0.000
0.88b
0.000
0.002

1.643

3

0.548

2.390

0.067

1.643

3

0.548

2.390

0.067

16.709

18

0.928

4.050

0.000

RESIDUAL

487.701

2128

0.229

TOTAL

504.411

2146

0.235

1.774
3.262

6
I
1
4

TWO-WAY INTERACTIONS
Pres. Party/Member Party
Pres. Party/Member Age
Member Party/Member Age

8.817
0.005
4.983
3.983

THREE-WAY INTERACTION
Pres. Party/Member Party/
Member Age

MAIN EFFECTS
Partv or President
Partv of Member
Age of Member

EXPLAINED

6.249

0.000

1.042

0.000
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TABLE 22
MEAN VALUE OF DECISIONS FOR MEMBERS AND AGE

POLITICAL PARTY OF MEMBER
AGE OF MEMBER

DEMOCRAT

REPUBLICAN

1.36a

1.47

(205)b

(248)

50 through 54

1.40
(222)

1.45
(233)

55 through 59

1.30
(261)

1.45
(237)

60 through 64

1.31
(230)

1.30
(202)

65 or older

1.35
(232)

1.28
(127)

1150

997

Under 50

TOTAL NUMBER

NOTES:

a) Pro-Union Decision *> 1

Pro-Management Decision » 2

b) Bracketed Values indicates number in cell.
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The overall trend, therefore, is for Democratic members (DEM) to
become more liberal with age (more pro-union), while the logit analysis
indicated that Democratic members appointed by Democratic presidents
(DEMDEM) were evenhanded in their decisions.

Since these DEMDEM members

are included in the DEM classification, this finding concerning age of
the members lends credence to the idea that DEMDEM members play by the
rules.

Their playing by the rules is occuring in spite of what is

happening in the age of the member.
The overall trend, on the other hand, is for Republican members
(REP) to become more liberal with age (less conservative), while the
logit analysis indicated that Republican members appointed by
Republican presidents (REPREP) were adherent to the party line of
conservatism (i.e., pro-management).

Since these REPREP members are

included in REP classification, this finding concerning age of the
members lends credence to the idea that the REPREP phenomenon is
genuine, and not of a spurious nature.

Apparently, the REPREP

phenomenon is occurring in spite of what is happening in the age of
the member.
Second, it is possible also to speculate that the expected
political bias under congruency of political party (between member and
original appointing president) need not be "two-sided". Perhaps there
are factors that exist among REPREP members that are not replicated
among DEMDEM members.

If this were to be the case, such may also

contribute to provide a plausible answer to the question posed earlier.
A search for other possible differences (beyond those of political
party affiliations and average age) between the two groups was
undertaken. In this vein, a previously reviewed finding of Cook is
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particularly germaine.

Cook concluded from a study of judges that

associations with policy - specific groups (e.g., a member of the
management team) biases decisions in the direction of the commitment or
philosophy of that group.
Cook additionally indicated that Republican judges were less
flexible in the type of sentences they rendered than were Democratic
judges.

This finding by Cook is reinforced by the results of the study

of commissioners of seven federal agencies conducted by Smith.
found that conservatives tended to follow the "party line".

Smith

Liberals,

on the other hand, tended to be more objective and showed a greater
readiness to dissent.
A review of backgrounds of members revealed the following
associations. Four members were included in the DEMDEM classification,
whereas the REPREP classification included nine members.

The remaining

four members were equally divided in the two classifications
of incongruency (i.e., two members each in REPDEM and DEMREP).

In the

DEMDEM classification, the backgrounds of two of the four members
included stints of short duration in the managerial hierarchy of their
organizations, McCulloch with a university and Truesdale with the
National Academy of Sciences.

In the REPREP classification, only two of

the nine members had been engaged in occupations which were
management-oriented, Van de Water as president of a management
consulting firm (1949-1981) and Dotson as labor counsel for several
firms (e.g., Westinghouse, Western Electric and Wheeling-Pittsburg
Steel).
Prior association with a management-specific group exerts a
pro-management force (negative sign), whereas prior association with a
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union-specific group exerts a pro-union force (positive sign).
Occupations which are neither management-specific nor union-specific, or
"neutral", would not be expected to produce either a positive (pro-union)
or a negative (pro-management) force on the sign of the DEMDEM and REPREP
variable.
As discussed above, the composition of both of these groups in
this study are, by in large, neutral. With so few members in
management-oriented occupations (and none of those Democrats) and no
members in union-oriented occupations empty cells in ANOVA precluded
the running of interactions.

On the basis of cell means as shown in

Table 23, however, it seems reasonable to speculate that there would
be no important differences among Democratic members.
While the results reported at Table 19 (supporting Hypothesis 2,
but not supporting Hypothesis 1) are surprising, the preceding
discussion provides insights into why such unexpected results may have
occurred. The results in this study indicate an alternative
interpretation to that of a "polar" situation. The results at Table 19
suggest quite plausibly that even though they become more "liberal",
Republican members originally appointed by Republican presidents are
staunch "party-liners".

REPREP members, in fact, are less likely to

make decisions favoring unions over employers than are Democratic or
Republican members appointed by presidents of opposingparties or
Democratic members appointed by Democratic presidents.
On the other hand, the results also plausibly show that Democratic
members originally appointed by Democratic presidents appear (to their
credit) to "play by the rules".

With an apparent greater willingness to

dissent and to show flexibility in their perspectives, they seem tomake
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TABLE 23
MEAN VALUE OF DECISIONS FOR MEMBERS AND PRIOR OCCUPATION

POLITICAL PARTY OF MEMBER
DEMOCRAT

REPUBLICAN

Union

0.00
(0)

0.00
(0)

Management

0.00
(0)

1.49
(156)

1.34
(1150)

1.40
(841)

1150

f
tftl
JJ t

ORIENTATION OF PRIOR
OCCUPATION OF MEMBER

Neither Union
nor Management

TOTAL
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decisions in an evenhanded fashion.

DEMDEM members in this study are

not more likely to make decisions favoring unions over employers than
are Democratic or Republican members originally appointed by
presidents of opposite parties or Republican members appointed by
Republican presidents.
A final caveat is important.
significant (t = -2.221).

In Model 3, the variable REPREP was

In the three developmental models ( Model

2, 1 and 1A) this variable was not significant, even though in Models
2 and 1 significance was approached (t-values -1.950 and - 1.952,
respectively; p value = .06). There is some concern, accordingly, that
significance of this variable may be of a spurious rather than
substantive nature.

This concern exists notwithstanding the evidence

of the genuineness of the REPREP phenomenon presented earlier at the
discussion of age.
Evidence of Procedural Bias
In Chapter 2 hypotheses 7A, 7B, and 7C were fashioned to address
issues of possible bias in the process through which allegation of ULP
charges are filed and progress in stage-wise fashion for decision by
Board members.

The functions and the roles played by the Regional

Directors and by the Administrative Law Judges in the process were
discussed.

In Chapter 3 (Logit Results section), a group of variables

(labeled as "process" variables) were described and defined (in Table
15). The results included in Table 19 concerning process variables are
extremely interesting and are discussed below.
In the study sample, fifty-five percent of the ULP charges were
initiated by unions and supported by the Administrative Law Judges;
whereas twenty-one percent of the charges were initiated by unions,
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but dismissed by the ALJs.

The latter of these two components is

reported in the variable UNIONO.

Sixteen percent of the ULP charges

were initiated by employers and supported by ALJs (variable EMPYES)
and nine percent of the charges were initiated by employers but
dismissed by ALJs (variable EMPNO). These four combinations of filing
parties and ALJ decisions are illustrated in Appendix J.
Irrespective of whether the allegation of the charging party was
supported or was dismissed by the ALJ, the results in Table 19 indicated
that Board members are more likely to decide in favor of the charging
party rather than the respondent (e.g., EMPYES, t = -16.376 and EMPNO,
t = -8.823).

These findings support Hypotheses 7A and 7B as well as

those of Cooke and Gautschi. It may be intimated from these results that
the Regional Director (in the "gate keeper" role discussed in Chapter 2,
at Hypothesis 3) could impact the proportion of pro-union and
pro-management decisions.

This impact could be achieved through the

style of management of NLRB personnel in regional offices. Directives,
for example, could be issued by the Regional Director to region staff
personnel to give greater emphasis or attention to either complaints of
unions or to complaints of employers and therefore skew the number of
complaints (union or employer) which reach the level of ALJ.

A similar

result could be achieved through more subtle, but equally effective,
techniques, such as informal and non-written communication.
Board members appear to have given no more weight to those charges
dismissed by the ALJs which were initiated by the unions than those
dismissed by the ALJs which were initiated by the employers suggests that
they may be doing their job properly, in an impartial manner. Cooke
and Gautschi interpreted their results of UNIONO as infering that the
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Board generally treated ALJ decisions about union complaints
differently than ALJ decisions about employer complaints.

In their

study, however, the sample proportions for EMPNO and UNIONO were
fifteen percent and eleven percent respectively.

In contrast, the

sample proportions in Model 3 were nine percent (EMPNO) and twenty-one
percent (UNIONO), roughly the reverse of Cooke and Gautschi. This
finding is particularly striking when viewed in terms of REPREP bias
discussed earlier. This is evidenced

by the significant results of

EMPNO (t = -8.823) and UNIONO (t = -9.957).

It further

can be

inferred that the members generally have treated ALJs' dismissals of
charges differently than they have treated ALJs' affirmations of
charges (EMPYES, coefficient -1.236, t = -16.376 vs. EMPNO,
coefficient -0.731, t = -8.823).
As indicated in Table 1, most decisions by members are pro-union
(62.3 percent).

It is also possible to speculate that (below the level

of Board member) the organizational structure and the procedure through
which charges are processed to be decided by members (i.e., the levels of
Regional Director and ALJ) is pervaded by liberalism.

If such were to be

the case, members may, over the years of their service react to a
wear-down or capitulation process and "go with the system".

Such a

reaction would be more noticeable in

Republican Members (REP) than in

Democratic Members (DEM), the latter

characteristically already being

liberal (pro-union).
The preceding discussion of the significant results of the process,
variables sheds a new light on the concern for potential bias in ULP
decisions by Board members.

The magnitude of the impact of political

party affiliation bias transmitted through the appointment process
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begins to pale in the light of these results concerning the process
variables.

A much greater potential bias appears to reside within the

NLRB organizational structure and its procedural process below the level
of Board member.

The Regional Director is located at a critical nexus

in the process. In the prior-described gatekeeper role, Regional
Directors are able to "adjust" the gate settings to influence the
process flow.

The role of ALJs, in the next stage of the process,

imparts an additional impact which is manifested in the members'
decisions.

This impact of the ALJ was greatest when a decision

involved an allegation of an ULP filed by the union.
Evidence of Other Biases
The remaining sets of hypotheses are discussed here.

The third

hypothesis considered in this research involved stability within the
region in which the decision by the members were made:
Stability within regions at the Regional
Director level. Members are more likely to
make decisions favoring unions over employers
in unstable regions than in stable regions.
In the opening section of Chapter 3 the procedure for processing ULP
Charges was described with a supporting illustration provided in Appendix
C.

This process, it was explained, takes place within a network of

regions which subdivide the task of covering the fifty States and
Puerto Rico.

A map showing the areas included within the

jurisdiction of each region is provided in Appendix B.

The roles of

the Regional Director and the ALJs also were previously reported.
The impact of the roles of these positions was discussed in the prior
section of this Chapter.
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The issue of stability within regions at the level of the
Regional Director raises the question as to the what happens if that
role is interrupted as the result of a change in the incumbent in the
position. The hypothesis encompasses the idea that a change puts the
role into a hiatus.

The "gatekeeping" function of the Regional

Director will be immobilized until the new Regional Director can put
into place and communicate to the Regional staff personnel his or her
"style of managing" the function.

During this transition period of

time (defined as instability, in Table 15) the impact of the Regional
Director is removed or at least lessened.

Any potential impact

resulting from political bias (at the member level) therefore, can be
more fully transmitted during the period of regional instability.
The results are contrary to expectation.

The variable STABLE

(coefficient 0.098, t-value = 1.135) is not significant.

What could

explain these unexpected results? There is a plausible explanation.
In the previous section, the results of the process variables
were shown to be significant.

Pro-management decisions of members

were shown to be strongly associated with charges in which

the

employer was the initiating party, regardless of the decision by the
ALJ to support or to dismiss the allegations (EMPYES, t-value =
-16.376 and EMPNO, t-value = -8.823).

During periods of instability,

the ALJ's (as surrogates of the Board and as

"outsiders" independent

of the regions in which they render their decisions) continue to
function normally in their roles.

Regional Directors are positioned

between the filing parties and the ALJs. Which cases are referred to
the ALJ's may be skewed by the policies of the Regional Director.
Periods of turnover in the position of Regional Director (i.e.,
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unstable) disrupt the flow pattern. Indeed, the nature of charges
heard by ALJ's during instability may change.

A determination of

whether or not the nature of charges heard do change with changes of
gatekeepers, however, was beyond the scope of this study. During such
periods, the significant influence of the employer as filing party,
regardless of the ALJ decision (EMPYES and EMPNO), and the
significant influence of the dismissals by the ALJ's of charges filed
by unions (UNIONO), however, appears to be sufficiently forceful to
impede the influence of political party affiliation at the member
level.

This strength of the impedance to avoid being succumbed by

political bias is suggested by the lack of significance of STABLE
(t-value = 1.135).
The findings in the preceding section concerning the NLRB
processing procedures, coupled with the findings in this section
concerning the issue of stability at the level of Regional Director,
illuminate the robustness of the system. The functions and
responsibilities of the position of Regional Director, indeed are
important.

Execution of these functions and responsibilities,

however, do not come to a halt during periods of a vacancy or other
indisposition of a Regional Director.

Continuity during changes (or

during temporary caretaking by acting Directors) is an attribute of
the system structure.

Changeovers are no more perceptible than

perhaps the flicker associated with a changeover of the electrical
power of a hospital from its primary source to an emergency auxiliary
source.
From the foregoing discussion we are able to shed still more new
light on the concern for potential political bias in decisions by the
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Board members.

Some political bias does exist, as indicated earlier

at the discussion of the variable REPREP.

The importance of such

political bias, however, must be relegated to a lesser position than
the concern for biases residing within the process itself.

The

unexpected results of the variable STABLE contributes an important
thread to the fabric of this evidence.
The third set of hypotheses considered in this research involved
personal factors of members:
Personal factors of Age, type of
undergraduate degree (classified as
Business/Economics and
non-Business/Economics), and prior
occupations and organizational membership
(classified as business-oriented and
non-business oriented) will not affect
the decisions of members.
Four separate hypotheses were fashioned in Chapter 3 each addressed
to one of the individual factors of age, type of undergraduate degree,
prior occupation, and organizational memberships.

These four hypotheses,

identified as 4A through 4D respectively, anticipated that none of these
personal factors would affect the decisions of members.

Contrary to what

was anticipated, the factors of age and type of undergraduate degree were
significant.
The significant results for age in this study support the findings
by Nagel that the age of judges was one of the factors which contributed
to the type of decisions they rendered in both criminal cases and civil
cases involving economic issues.

The results of this study indicated

that age is significant, with older Board members displaying a pro-union
bias in their decisions, as revealed by the positive sign of the

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

140

coefficient of variable AGE and its t-value in Table 19.

Booker and

Trafford, on the other hand, indicated in their study that younger
members appeared to display a pro-union bias.

Some differences between

the Booker and Trafford study and this study could account for these
opposing findings.

The Booker and Trafford study, for example, covered

decisions in an earlier time period in the history of the NLRB, 1937
-1963,

Eleven of the twenty-six years of that period preceded a 1947

amendment (i.e., Taft-Hartley amendment) to the Act; whereas, this study
covered a time period (1962-1983) which was fully after the 1947
Amendment.) The Taft-Hartley Amendment enumerated and prohibited union
unfair labor practices in the same way that the employer practices had
been, prior to the Amendment.

As in the case of unfair employer labor

practices prior to 1947, interpretative difficulties marked the post-1947
treatment'of some of the newly included provisions.
The anticipated lack of significance of age in this study
(Hypothesis 4A) was founded primarily on the Cooke and Gautschi results.
The results of this study, as previously discussed, indicates that age is
significant and supports the results of Nagel.

The positive sign of the

coefficient of AGE is indicative of a pro-union bias, which is contrary
to the Booker and Trafford findings.

Older individuals, however,

generally display characteristics of greater security-mindedness than do
younger individuals.

Decisions by members in this study (mean age 56

years) therefore may reflect more empathy with union security precepts.
The mean age of members in the Booker and Trafford study perhaps could be
reconstructed, but such a task was not within the scope of this study.
The significant results for the variable UGDEGREE reported in Table
19 was unexpected.

It can be speculated, however, that the curriculum
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followed in one's undergraduate education creates philosophical ties to a
profession (e.g., business management) not unlike the emotional ties to
one's "alma mater".

The strength of such ties frequently is manifest,

for example, by athletic coaches being drawn to their ultimate ambition
in returning to coach at "their school".
In cases where issues involving ULP allegations are not clearcut,
members with degrees in business/economics could be swayed to decide in
favor of employers over unions.

The sample in this study, recall,

included only those cases which involved novel questions or that set
precedents that may be of substantial importance in the future
interpretations of the Act.

Cases fitting this requirement were

identified as such in the annual reports of the NLRB.

The possession of

a business/economics degree, therefore, could represent a possible
confound with Republican party affiliation.
Earlier, the results of an examination of the prior occupational
backgrounds of members in the DEMDEM and REPREP classification was
discussed. A similar examination was made of the educational background
of members in these two groups to determine if undergraduate degrees
represented a confound.

The results show the following.

None of the

four members in the DEMDEM group had undergraduate degrees in business
administration.

Of che nine members in the REPREP group, the

undergraduate degree of only one member (Hunter) was in business. The
threat of a confound, therefore, was minimal to nonexistent.
The personal factor of prior occupation was not significant, as
reported in Table 19.

These results support the findings of Cooke and

Gautschi as well as those of Gormley.

Even though the results in this

study were not significant, the directionality of the variable is worth
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noting.

A negative sign (coefficient -0.078, t-value -0.677) indicates a

pro-management direction.
It was explained in Chapter 4 at the discussion of Hypothesis 4C,
that the variable MSHIP (defined in Table 15) was dropped because of a
problem of multicollinearity.

With the dropping of this variable, no

direct evidence was available to test the hypothesis that prior
membership in policy-specific organizations affect decisions.
The final set of hypotheses considered in this research involved
temporal trend and trends in the general environment in which the NLRB
functions:
Long term time trend, the size of the
union population (measured as a percent
of the labor force) and the rate of ULP
charges filed (measured as a ratio per
million union members) will affect the
decision. A decrease in union population
will have a pro-management effect on
decisions, while an increase in the rate
of ULP charges filed will have a
pro-union effect.
During the twenty- two year period covered by this study
(1962-1983), the size of the unionized segment of the labor force in the
United States has steadily declined, from 22.6 percent to 18.9 percent. It
was hypothesized (Hypothesis 5A) that as the union population declined,
members would be less likely to make decisions favoring unions over
employers.

The results in Table 19 do not support this hypothesis

(UNIONPOP, t-value = -1.702).

The lack of significance is surprising.

What is even more surprising is that the directionality of the results is
opposite of what was anticipated in Hypothesis 5A.

The negative sign of

UNIONPOP, as explained at the outset of Chapter 4, and reiterated
Table 19, is interpreted as "pro-union".

at

Why would there be a pro-union
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directionality as the size of the union population decreased? Several
directions of speculation provide plausible explanations.

One explanation

lies in the speculation that the strength of unions is waning and they may
be perceived less as a threat (i.e., to the prerogatives of management)
than in earlier years. Under such changing perceptions and increased
frequency of deciding for unions over employers may not carry as high
stakes as before.

Another speculation is the often-cited notion of the

Americans pulling for the "underdog". As the size of the union population
declines, unions may begin being perceived as the underdogs in the
labor-management relationship and the administration of the National Labor
Relations Act.

This posturing of unionism would provide another plausible

explanation for the surprising pro-union directionality of UNIONPOP. Still
again, perhaps unions (for whatever motivation) simply are violating the
law more frequently than in the past and the NLRB merely isperforming

its

function in the manner it's supposed to be.
Although the size of the union population was declining over the
time period of the study, the rate at which ULP cases were filed by
unions more than doubled, as indicated in Table 14.

Hypothesis 5B states

that as the rate of ULP charges filed by unions increased, members will
more likely make decisions favoring unions over employers.
nypotnesxs also was net supported, as zndiCaCcu in Taule 19.

This
here, as> x»»

Hypothesis 5A, the directionality of results, again is contrary to
expectations.
pro-management.

As filings have increased, the direction is
What is happening here may be explained plausibly by the

same speculations as in union populations.

In this instance, union are

cognizant of their strength being perceived (by management) as declining.
As a response, perhaps partially out of a sense of frustration and
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partially out of a strategy of showing strength, the rate of filings of
ULP charges is stepped up.

As the rate of filings is stepped up, the

perception of strength of one party in an adversarial relationship is
perceived by the other party.

The status of underdog, accordingly is

diminished (along with the diminishing ability to elicit sympathy). It
may also be plausible that unions simply are filing more-frivolous
charges.
What we have as a result are two forces acting upon each other
in essentially opposite directions.

The outcome of these

countervailing forces is somewhat akin to a tug-of-war between two
closely matched, but unequal, teams.
(UNIONPOP) has a pro-union pull, and

In this instance, one team
the other (ULPRATE) has a

pro-management pull. The pro-management pull of ULPRATE is consistent
with the findings of Freeman and Medoff.

Their findings showed that

the rate of union filings of ULP charges against employers had a
significant depressant effect on union success rates in organization of
new workers in NLRB elections.

ULPRATE was used by Freeman and Medoff in

context and setting different than that of Model 3.

The directionality

of results, however, are similar- as the union filing rate increases, the
effect is pro-management (NLRB elections/NLRB cases won by employers.
Because they are unequal, there as a residual movement.

Because they are

closely matched, however, the residual movement is not significant.
To explore the possibility that

the sizeof the union population was

interacting with party affiliations,

the data were analyzed as a 2 X2 X 4

Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do?, (New
York. Basic Books, Inc., 1984) pp. 232-239.
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factorial design: political party of the original appointing president
(Democrat, Republican) and political party of the member (Democrat,
Republican) with the size of the union population as a blocking factor.
Size of the union population (measured as a percent of the labor force)
was grouped into four classes sized to include approximately an equal
number of decisions in each class (under 19.8 percent; 19.8 through 21.7
percent; 21.8 through 22.1 percent, and 22=2 percent or more).
As shown in Table 24, the size of the union population is
significant in and of itself (p = 0.000) but does not interact with
political party of the member (p = 0.393) nor with political party of the
president ( p = 0.063).

The absence of interaction with political party

of either the member or the original appointing president suggests that
as the size of the union population changes, the decisions of members do
not change differentially.
In a similar manner, the possibility that the rate at which unions
file unfair labor practice charges was interacting with party affiliation,
the data were again analyzed as a 2 X 2 X 4 factorial design: political
party of the original appointing president (Democrat, Republican) and
political party of the member (Democrat, Republican) with the rate of
filings of ULP charges by unions as a blocking factor.
filings

of

The rate of

ULP charges by union (per million union members) was grouped

into four classes sized to include approximately an equal number of
decisions in each class (430.0 or less; 430.1 through 570.7; 570.8
through 768.0, and 768.1 or more).
As shown in Table 25, the rate of filings of ULP charges by unions
is significant in and of itself (p = 0.000) but does not interact with
political party of the member ( p = 0.891) nor with political party of
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TABLE 24
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS
POLITICAL PARTY (MEMBER, PRESIDENT) AND SIZE OF UNION POPULATION

SOURCE OF VARIATION

SS

DF

MS

F

SIGNIFICANCE

0.000

MAIN EFFECTS
Party of President
Party of Menber
Size of Union Population

9.608
0.146
3.187
6.621

5
1
1
3

1.922
0.146
3.187
2.207

8.331
0.633
13.817
9.568

TWO-WAY INTERACTIONS
Pres. Party/Member Party
Pres. Party/Union Pop.
Member Party/Union Pop.

2.928
0.798
0.408
0.691

7
1
3
3

0.418
0.798
0.136
0.230

1.813
3.461
0.590
0.998

0.080
0.063
0.622
0.393

THREE-WAY INTERACTION
Pres. Party/Member Party/
Union Population

0.100

2

0.050

0.216

0.805

0.100

2

0.050

0.216

0.805

12.636

14

0.903

3.913

0.000

RESIDUAL

491.775

2132

0.231

TOTAL

504.411

2146

0.235

EXPLAINED

0.426

0.000
0.000
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TABLE 25
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS
POLITICAL PARTY (MEMBER, PRESIDENT) AND FILING RATE OF ULP CHARGES
SOURCE OF VARIATION

SS

DF

MS

F

SIGNIFICANCE

6.689
0.125
12.804

0 .0 0 0

1

1.551
0.029
2.969

4.767

3

1.589

6.854

0.0 00

TWO-WAY INTERACTIONS
Pres. Party/Member Party
Pres. Partv/UL? File Rat e
Member Party/UL? File Ra te

2.236
1.188
0.485
0.145

7
1
3
3

0.319
1.188
0.162
0.048

1.378
5.122
0.698
0.208

0.210
0.024
0.553
0.891

THREE-WAY INTERACTION
Pres. Party/Member Partv 1
ULP Filing Rate

0.373

3

0.124

0.536

0.658

0.373

3

0.124

0.536

0.658

10.362

15

0.691

2.980

0.000

RESIDUAL

494.048

2131

0.232

TOTAL

504.411

2146

0.235

MAIN EFFECTS
Party of President
Partv of Member
Filine Rate of L'LF
Charges

7.745
0.029
2.969

5
I

EXPLAINED

0.724

0.000
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the original appointing president (p = 0.553).

The absence of

interaction with political party of either the member or the original
appointing president suggests that as the rate of filings of ULP charges
by unions changes, the decisions of members do not change differentially.
There is nothing inherently associated with the per se passage
of time, that would affect members' decisions.
embodied in Hypothesis 5.

This concept is

The results provided in Table 19 support

this hypothesis and support the findings of Cooke and Gautschi.

As

explained in Chapter 4,however, the retention of the variable TREND in
the model serves a definitive purpose.

It is not an infrequent

occurrance for things in the environment to be changing and yet to go
unnoticed, or to be noticed much later than should be.
trend is an early-warning device.

Inclusion of

If it takes on significance, where

there should be none logically, this could be a bellwether of other
changes that have gone unnoticed. The sources of such changes, therefore,
should be explored.
As suspected, the per se passage of time, as measured by the
variable TREND, is not significant (t-value = 1.032). The study has
isolated two important variables which are homogenized within the
passage of time; namely, the changing size of the union population and
the rate at which unions are filing ULP charges against employers.
Admittedly, both of these variables over the selected time period of
this study are not significant as shown in Table 19.

Of the two,

however, variable UNIONPOP does approach significance (t = -1.920;

p =

0.06) and the directionality of both as discussed earlier is plausible.
One final issue must be discussed.

A concern for any possible

meaning that might be associated with unanimity of decisions by Board
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members was raised in Chapter 3.

Concerning this issue, Hypothesis 6 was

formulated as follows:
Members1 decisions, either favoring
unions over employers or favoring
employers over unions, which are
unanimous, will differ from those which
are non-unanimous.
As previously indicated at Table 19, the t-value of UNANIMOUS (t =
2.936) is significant (at p = 0.01).

The positive sign of the

coefficient (0.188) indicates that unanimous decision of members are more
likely to favor unions over employers than are non-unanimous decisions.
Significance can perhaps be interpreted as evidence that the members
are not (as they self-evaluated themselves) "fiercely-independent". The
NLRB decision process, which relies heavily on non-personal contacts, may
provide insulation from direct peer pressure. The insulation, however, may
not be impervious to pressures which exist in less formal contacts as are
certain to occur in the normal course of interpersonal relationships
within the performance of duties of the position.

At the same time,

however, these results could imply that the issues in these cases were
seen in the same perspective by all members and the provisions of the Act
uniformly applied.

This latter speculation would suggest that the Board

was functioning in accordance with its stated role.
Conclusions
This study was designed to examine political bias in the
decisions made by members of the National Labor Relations Board in
unfair labor practice cases.

Personal factors of age, education and

prior occupation and membership in policy-specific organizations
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prior to appointment also were examined as sources of bias, along with
the effects resulting from the procedures through which ULP charges are
processed for decision by the Board.

How decisions are affected by

passage of time, changes in the size of the union population and the rate
at which unions are filing unfair labor practice charges, and stability
at the level of Regional Director were investigated.
One set of hypotheses was partially supported in this study.
Results suggest that for this sample of decisions, Republican members
originally appointed by Republican presidents were staunch
party-liners who were less likely to decide in favor of unions over
employers than members of all other congruent and incongruent
political affiliations. While there was evidence that this phenomenon is
genuine, there were some indications that significance may only be
spurious.

On balance, this finding is guardedly accepted. Results also

suggest that Democratic members originally appointed by Democratic
presidents are no more likely to decide in favor of employers or unions,
but play by the rules and render decisions in an evenhanded manner.
Results further suggest that age and the type of degree which a
member possesses affect decisions.

Older members appear more likely

to decide in favor of unions over employers, while members with
undergraduate degrees in business/economics are more likely to decide in
favor of employers over unions. There was little evidence that decisions
by members are influenced by the type of prior occupations or memberships
in policy-specific occupations.
Another set of results suggests that decisions of members are
influenced by the employer as filing party (regardless of whether the
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charges were upheld or dismissed by the ALJ's) and by ALJs' dismissals of
allegations which were initiated by unions.
Members appear to be affected by peer pressure of their co-members.
There was evidence that a relationship existing between unanimity and
decisions by members.

The hypothesis that regional instability

(resulting from turnover at the Regional Director level) would affect
decisions found no support in the evidence.

Pro-union decisions made in

unstable regions were not significantly different from those made in
stable regions.

This lack of significant difference was speculated to be

the result in part of the role of the Regional Director being played by
the ALJ during the period of instability and in the robustness of the
organizational system in assuring continuity of policies and procedures
during staffing changes.
A final set of hypotheses concerning time and environmental
trends received mixed support.

Evidence supported the hypothesis

that there is nothing inherently associated with the per se passage
of time that would affect members' decisions.

The evidence did not

support either of the two hypotheses that declining union population
and an increasing rate of ULP charges filed by unions would affect
members' decisions.
Implications
There are several implications of the findings in this study as they
relate to the presence or absence of political bias in decisions made by
NLRB members in ULP cases.

The presence of politically biased decisions

should, sine qua non, be avoided.

The findings are that Democratic

members originally appointed by Democratic presidents appear to play by
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the rules and make decisions in an evenhanded manner. On the other hand,
the finding (tentative though it may be) is that Republican members
originally appointed by Republican presidents appear to be staunch
party-liners who make decisions which are influenced by political party
philosophy. This latter finding supports that of Cooke and Gautschi.

The

former finding of this study, however, does not support their reported
political bias in decisions made under Democratic congruency between
member and appointing president.
As discussed, the National Labor Relations Act delineates unfair
labor practices of both unions and employers, and is aimed at achieving
regulation coupled with neutrality.

Decisions rendered by non-neutrals

undermines the central purposes of the Act.

Republican presidents should

be cautioned, therefore, to be particularly selective in their choices of
nominees.

The Senate, likewise, is well advised to submit nominees to

close scrutiny.

The Senate's responsibility in the confirmation process

should not be permitted to take on a perfunctory character.

A "rubber

stamp" posture by the Senate would be tantamount to abdication of its
responsibility under the Act.

Also, as indicated in Chapter 2, unlike

other major regulatory agencies ( e.g., Civil Aviation Board, Federal
Communications Commission, Federal Power Commission, Federal Trade
Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission and Securities and Exchange
Commission) the authorizing statute of the NLRB does not require some
bipartisan appointments.

The exposure to political bias in Board

decisions, consequently, is particularly threathening.

Notwithstanding

the lack of evidence of political bias in decisions, an added safeguard
would be an amendment to the act to require bipartisan appointments.
Success of the Act hinges on maintaining an atmosphere of goodfaith
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by both employers and unions in resolving their differences.

Differences

between unions and employers which are resolved through a decision
process laced with inconsistencies and ambiguities flies in the face of
goodfaith dealings.

As a result both unions and employers may be

discouraged in their desires and attempts to uphold their sides of the
goodfaith obligation.
Both employers and unions look to the NLRA for swift, fair and
economical resolutions of differences.

Again, inconsistencies and

ambiguities in interpretations of facts in accordance with the terms
and guidelines of the Act, may foster a greater incidence of appeals to
the Board to review decisions by ALJ's.

Unduly long periods of time and

unwarranted delays in case resolutions may become the norm.
Such a norm results in inflated costs and inefficiencies of use of both
time and human resources.
It was found that when an unstable condition exists within a
region (as the product of turnover in the position of Regional
Director), the decision by members is not affected.

A significant

effect on decisions appears to be warded off because the ALJ fills in the
void during the transition period.

The implication here underscores the

importance of the ALJ's in achieving fairness in decisions. The quality
of the results achieved under the Act go tongue and groove with the
quality (vis a vis evenhandedness) of the ALJ.

The NLRB, therefore, must

be particularly attentive to all facets of the staffing process, from job
description/job specifications through recruiting, screening, selection
and evaluation.
Limitations of the Study
There are two kinds of limitations related to this study.
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First, there are general limitations common to all studies of the type
conducted.

Second, there are limitations relative to this study in

particular.

Limitations of each kind are indicated here.

As an ex post facto study, there are inherent limitations
because there is no control over independent variables.

Any

inferences made must be done without an ability on the part of the
researcher to intervene.

In addition to this inability to manipulate

independent variables, there is no ability to randomize which carries with
it the risk of bias.

As a field study, the variation of many of the

variables is large particularly when compared to variables in laboratory
experiments or even field experiments.

On the other hand, as a

field study, it is strong in realism and significance.^^
The specific limitations relative to this study in particular
are concerned with sample selection and the difficulty of dealing
with confounds.

The NLRB will conclude its fifty-second year in

September of this year.
fifty-two years.

This study includes only twenty-two of those

As indicated in Chapter 3, however, this choice of

years included members in all political combinations (congruent and
incongruent) as well as four periods of alternating
Democratic-Republican administrations.

Additionally, twenty-two

years is sufficiently long to permit treatment of trends.
Dealing with confounds is always a difficult task.
was no exception.

This study

Those situations in which potential confounds were

involved, however, were investigated and resolved plausibly through the
use of ANOVA.

Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behaviorial Research Second
Edition, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc. 1973, p.390.
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Recommendations for Future Research
While the findings in this study upheld some prior research,
there were a number of findings that were contrary to other prior
research. These findings also provided indications for further work
needed along previously unexplored avenues.
In broad terms, the results of this study lead to the belief that
decisions of members are heavily impacted by the workings of the system.
While the position of Board member certainly is far more than perfunctory
or titular, there is much going on below the member level.
therefore, to examine these lower levels more thoroughly.

There is need,
Such an

examination should include the same type of issues, such as turnover,
political affiliation, prior occupation and education, but at the level of
Administrative Law Judge and Regional Director.
In more specific terms recommendations include matters relating to
periodic updating of data, a search for new and better measures of
stability, and the use of trend as an early warning device for hidden
variables.
This study was for a specific time period. From time to time, the
data base should ba extended.

Members may be reappointed to additional

five year terms. Historically, however, of the seventeen most recent
members whose service on the Board commenced subsequent to 1963, only one
member (Penello) served more than five years. This number seventeen
includes the current five members (Cracraft, Stephens, Babson, Johansen
and Dotson), all of whom have thus far served less than five years, plus
those twelve members commencing with Zagoria (4/65 - 12/69) and extending
through Dennis (5/83 - 8/86). If the data base is extended at five-year
intervals, therefore, it is likely that an all-new group of members will

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

156

be involved.

As the sample size increases, better generalization is

possible.
The enormity of the role of the ALJ's was indicated in this
study.

The difficulty of tractability of ALJ's was indicated in the

discussion.

If a manageable technique can be devised to collect data

(e.g., political affiliation and other personal characteristics) on
the ALJ's, a study similar to this one could yield some interesting
results and provide further insights in the decisions concerning ULP
cases.
This was the first-known study concerning stability at the level
of the Regional Director.
findings.

As such, it has developed some baseline

Other measures of stability (i.e., other than turnover)

should be explored. Such measures may include changes in funding levels.
The issue'of stability still holds promise as a possible source of added
understanding of the decision process
One final recommendation concerns trend.

This study has

isolated two important variables within the labor-management relations
arena: union population size and rate of ULP charges filed by unions.
Neither UNIONPOP nor ULPRATE individually were significant. These two in
combination and with something else, however, synergistically resulted in
TREND being significant.

Decomposing time series data in a manner such

as this is an important step toward a more meaningful understanding of
the likelihood of a member to make a certain decision (i.e., pro-union or
pro-management) in one year as compared to another year. It is important
that alertness be maintained to detect newly developing factors.
Candidates here may include changes in the rate of incidences of
concession bargaining, of decertification elections, and of inclusion of
two-tier compensation provisions in agreements.
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APPENDIX A

DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

The National Labor Relations Board
is an independent agency created by
the National Labor delations Act of
1935 (Wagner A ct), as amended by
the acts of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act),
1959 (Landrum-Griffin A ct), and
1974.
The act affirms the right o f employ
ees to self-organization and to bargain
collectively through representatives of
their own choosing or to refrain from
such activities. The act prohibits cer
tain unfair labor practices by employ
ers and labor organizations or their
agents and authorizes the Board to
designate appropriate units fo r collec
tive bargaining and to conduct secret
ballot elections to determine whether
employees desire representation by a
labor organization.
As of July 1, 1971, the Postal Reor
ganization A ct (84 Stat. 719; 39
U.S.G. Prec. 101 note) conferred
jurisdiction upon the Board over un
fa ir labor practice charges and repre
sentation elections affecting U.S.
Postal Service employees. As of Au
gust 25, 1974, jurisdiction over all p ri
vately operated health care institu
tions was conferred on the NLRB by
an amendment to the act (29 U.S.C.
152 et seq.).
FU N CTIO N S A N D * A C n \T n E S

The Board has two principal functions
under the act: preventing and remedy
ing unfair labor practices by employers
and labor organizations or their agents,
and conducting secret ballot elections
among employees in appropriate col
lective-bargaining units to determine
whether or not they desire to be rep
resented by a labor organization. The
Board also conducts secret ballot elec

Source:

tions among employees who have been
covered by a union-shop agreement to
determine whether or not they wish to
revoke their union’s authority to make
such agreements; in jurisdictional dis
putes. decides and determines which
competing group of workers is entitled
to perform the work involved; and con
ducts secret ballot elections among em
ployees concerning employers’ final
settlement offers in national emergency
labor disputes.
The General Counsel in unfair labor
practice cases has final authority to in
vestigate charges, issue complaints, and
proicm ie such complaints before the
Board. The General Counsel, on behalf
of the Board, prosecutes injunction
proceedings: handles courts of appeal'
proceedings to enforce or review Boa id
orders: participates m miscellaneous
court litigation; and obtains com
pliance w ith Board orders and court
judgments. The General Counsel is
responsible for the processing by field
personnel of the several tvpes o f em
ployee elections referred to above.
Under general supervision of the
Oenoinl Counsel. 32 regional dirertors
and their staffs process representation,
unfair labor practice, and jurisdic
tional dispute cases. (Some regions
'nave subregional or resident offices.;
They issue complaints in unfair labor
ptactice cases; seek settlement of un
fair labor practice charges: obtain
compliance with Board orders and
court judgments: and petition district
courts fur injunction-, to prevent or
remedy unfair labor practices. The re
gional dirertors also direct hearings in
representation cases; conduct elections
pursuant to agreement or the decision
making authority delegated to them bv

die Board, o r pursuant to Board direc
tions; and issue certifications o f rep
resentatives when unions w in or certify
the results when unions lose employee
elections. They process petitions for
bargaining u n it clarification, for
amendment o f certification, and for
rescission o f a labor organization’s au
thority to make a union-shop agree
ment. They also conduct national
emergency employee referendums. .
The Board can act only when it is
form ally requested to do so. Ind ivid
uals, employers, o r unions may initiate
cases by filing charges o f unfair labor
practices or petitions fo r employee rep
resentation elections w ith the Board
field offices serving the area where the
case arises.
In the event a regional director de
clines to proceed on a representation
petition, the party filing the petition
may appeal to the Board. Where a
regional director declines to proceed
on an unfair labor praclire charge, the
fiiine party may appeal to the General
Counsel. For details concerning filing
such appeals with those Washington,
IXC.. offices, parties may communicate
w ith the field office most convenient
to them. Field office addresses and tele
phone numbers are listed on page 597.
Adm inistrative law judges conduct
hearings in unfair labor practice cases,
make findings,
and
recommend
remedies for violations found. Their
decisions arc revicwablc by the Board
if exceptions to the decision arc filed.

Excerpt from United States Government Manual, 1978/79)
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APPENDIX B

National Labor Relations Board
Map Showing Boundaries ol Regions, Subregions, and Resident Offices
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Source: Twomey, David P . : Labor Law and Legislation, Seventh Edition, South-Western Publishing Co., Cincinnati,
Ohio, 1985. p . 549.
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APPENDIX C

BASIC PROCEDURES IN CASES INVOLVING
CHARGES OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
CHARGE
F iled w ith N LR B R egion al D ire c to r;
a lle g e s u n fa ir lab o r p ra c tic e
by re s p o n d e n t.

IN JU N C T IO N
R eg io n al D ire c to r m u st a s k D is tric t
C ou rt lo r te m p o ra ry re s tra in in g
o rd e r in u n la w fu l Jpoycott an d
s trik e c a s e s .

IN JU N C T IO N
R egion al D irecto r m a y a s k D istrict
C ou rt fo r te m p o ra ry re s tra in in g
o rd er a fte r c o m p la in t is issu ed in
a ll cases o f an u n fa ir la b o r p ractice.

|
i
!
i
1
1
1

j
f-< --

j
i
!

IN VESTIG A TIO N
R eg io n al D ire c to r d ete rm in e s
w h e th e r fo rm a l actio n sh o u ld be
ta k e n .

C O M P L A IN T ANO A N S W E R
R eg io n al D ire c to r issues c o m p la in t
and n o tice o f hearin g . R esp o n d en t
files a n s w e r in 10 days.

W IT H D R A W A L - R E F U S A L TO
IS S U E C O M PLA IN T - S E T T L E M E N T
— I
C h a rg e m a y be w ith d ra w n b efo re
o r a fte r co m p la in t is issued.
R e g io n a l D irecto r m a y re fu s e to
is s u e a c o m p lain t; h is or h er refu sal
(d is m is s a l o f ch a rg e ) m a y be
a p p e a le d to G enera! C oun sel.
S e ttle m e n t o f cas e m a y o c c u r a t
this p o in t or a t la te r s ta g e s (in 
fo rm a l ag re e m e n t su b je c t to
a p p ro v a l ot R e g io n a l D irecto r:
fo rm a l se ttle m e n t a g re e m e n t
ex e c u te d s im u lta n e o u s ly w ith or
a fte r is s u a n c e ot c o m p la in t, sub ject
to a p p ro v a l o f B o ard ).

i
i

H E A R IN G AND REPORT
A d m in is tra tiv e L a w Judge co n d u cts
h e a rin g an d file s report re c o m m e n d in g
e ith e r (1 ) o rd e r to cease ano o e s is t
from u n fa ir la b o r p ra c tic e o r (2)
d is m is s a l o f co m p la in t.

D IS M IS S A L
N LRB fin d s re s p o n d en t n o t g u ilty
of u n fa ir la b o r p ra c tic e and
d ism isses case.

COURT R EVIEW
D ism issal o rd e r m a y be a p p e a le d to
the C irc u it C o urt o t A p p e a ts and
from th e re to the U .S . S u p re m e
C ou rt.

C EASE A ND DESIST
N LRB fin d s respo nd en t g u ilty o f
u n fa ir la b o r p ra c tic e an d o rd e rs
him to c e a s e and desist.

D IS M IS S A L BY
A D M IN IS T R A T IV E L A W JUDGE
A d m in is tra tiv e L a w Ju d g e m a y
g ra n t m o tio n to d is m is s co m p la in t.
If so. a p p e a l m a y b e ta k e n to
N LRB.

OTHER DISPO SITIO N
N LRB sen ds cas e b ack to R eg io nal
D ire c to r for fu rth e r a c tio n .

CO UR T ENFO R CEM ENT
A N D REVIEW
C irc u it C o u rt ol A p p eals en fo rc e s
N LRB o rd e r or rev ie w s a p p e a l by
a g g rie v e d p a rty U.S. S u p re m e
C o u rt re v ie w s a p p eals fro m CC A.

Source: Twomey, David P.: Labor Law and Legislation, Seventh Edition,
South-Western Publishing Co., Cincinnati, Ohio, 1985. p. 550.
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APPENDIX D
Disposition by Stage of Unfair Labor Practice Cases Closed During Fiscal Year
Column:
Line

1.

? ,

3.

/..
5.

6.
7.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

1

Cases

1980

2
3
FISCAL YEAR
1981
1982

4
THREE YEARS
COMBINED

Cases
Cases Closed during Fiscal Year

55, 537

52,804

45,103

153,494

ULP Cases
Cases Closed during Fiscal Year
As a percent of Line 1

42, 047
75 .62

41,020
77.7%

36,424
80.8%

119,491
77.8%

35, 543
84 .52

34,357
83.82

30,328
83.3%

100,228
83,9%

6, 504

6,663

6,096

19 263

4, 719
72 .62

5,080
76.2%

4,703
77.1%

14,502
75.3%

1, 885

1,583

1,393

4,861

46

53

201

300

1, 839

1,530

1,192

4,561

219
930
526
p
1C8

266
902
308
54
-

405
472
300
15
-

890
2,354
1,134
75
108

1, 393

1,530

1,192

4,561

Stage of Disposition: ULP Cases
Cases Closed prior to issuance of formal
complaint
As a percent of Line 2
Cases remaining to be processed
(Line 2 less Line 3)
Cases closed after issuance of complaint,
but before issuance of decision by ALJ
As a percent of Line 4
Cases remaining to be processed
(Line 4 less Line 5)
Cases closed after issuance of ALJ decision »
but before decision by Board
Cases remaining to be processed
(Line 6 less Line 7)

Cases closed after Board decision
Adopted ALJ recommendation absence of exception
Before Circuit Court decrees
After Circuit Court decree, before Supreme Court
After Supreme Court
Adjustment (See author's note, below)

TOTAL

N ote: This adjustment made to equal total on Line 8. Errata appear in various issues of
the Annual Report to correct tables in reports of prior years.
It Is anticipated
that such an eratum to correct correct Table No. 5 (1980) will appear in an Annual
Report of a year subsequent to 1982.
Source:

National Labor Relations Board Annual Report, Fiscal Years 1980, 1981 and 1962
Line 1 (Table No. 1) Lines 2,3,6,7,9-12 (Table Na. S).
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APPENDIX E

N a tio n a l L ab o r R e la tio n s B o a rd
M em b ers off th e B o ard

Edwin S. S m ith .........................................
* J. W arren M adden...................................
John M . C a rm o d y ...................................
Donald W akefield S m ith .........................
W illiam M. Leiserson...............................
* H a rry A. M illis .........................................
G erard D. R e illy .......................................
John M. H o u s to n .....................................
* Paul M. Herzog .......................................
James J. Reynolds, J r..............................
Abe M u rd o c k ...........................................
J. Copeland G ray ...................................
Paul L. S ty le s ...........................................
Ivar H. P eterson.......................................
* G uy Farmer .............................................
Philip Ray Rodgers...................................
A lbert C. B e e so n .....................................
* Boyd S. Leedom .....................................
Steo'nen S. Bean .....................................
Joseph A lton Jenkins .............................
* John H. Fanning .....................................
A rth u r A. Kimball ...................................
* Frank W. M cC olloch. {■Sic.’).....
G erald A. B r o w n .....................................
H ow ard Jenkins, J r..................................
Sam Zagoria .:.........................................
* Edward B. M iller .....................................
Ralph E. K e n n e d y ...................................
John A. P e n e llo .......................................
* Betty Southard M u r p h y ........................
Peter D. W a lth e r .....................................
John C. T ru e sd a le ...................................
Don A. Zim m erm an.................................
Robert P. H u n te r .....................................
* John R. Van de W a t e r ...........................
* John C. M ille r...........................................
* Donald L. Dotson ...................................
Patricia Diaz D e n n is ...............................

............. July 1935
............. Aug. 1935

............. Nov. 1940
............. O ct. 1941
.............
.............
.............
.............
.............
............
............

July 1945
Aug. 1946
Aug. 1947
Aug. 1947
Feb. 1950
Mar. 1952
July 1953

............. Mar. 1954
.............
............
.............

Dec. 1955
Mar. 1957
Dec. 1957

............. Mar. 1961
............. Aug. 1963
............
............
.............
.............
..............
..............
...............
...............

June 1970
Dec. 1970
F e b .1972
Feb. 1975
Nov. 1975
O ct. 1977
Aug. 1980
Aug. 1981

..............
..............
..............

Dec. 1982
Mar. 1983
May 1983

Aug.
Aug.
Aug.
(day
Feb.
July
Aug.
Aug.
June
Dec.
Dec.
Dec.
Aug.
Aug.
Aug.
Aug.
Dec.
Dec.
Aug.
Mar.
Dec.
Mar.
Aug.
Aug.
Aug.
Dec.
Dec.
July
Jan.
Dec.
Aug.
Jan.
Dec.

1941
1940
1936
1939
1943
1945
1946
1953
1953
1951
1957
1949
1953
1956
1955
1S63
1954
1964
1960
1961
1982
1961
1970
1971
1983
1969
1974
1975
1981
1979
1977
1981
1984

Dec. 1982
Mar. 1983

* Chairman

Source: National Labor Relations Board, A Commemorative Publication, (pages
unnumbered).
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A P P E N D IX F

N atio n al L ab o r R elatio n s B oard
G e n e ra l C o u n se ls

Charles Fahy ..................................... ..................... Sept. 1935

Sept. 1940

Robert B. W a tts .................................

Jan. 1944

Alvin J. R o c k w e ll...............................

Sept. 1945

David A. M o r s e .................................

June 1946

Gerhard P. Van A rk e l.......................

July 1947

Robert N. Denham ...........................

Sept. 1950

George J. B o t t ...................................

Dec. 1954

Theophil C. K a m m h o lz ....................

Jan. 1957

* Kenneth M c G u in e s s ......................... ..................
Jerome D. F e n to n .............................

Jan. 1957

Mar. 1957

..................

Mar. 1957

June 1959

..................

May 1963

June 1971

Stuart R o th m a n .................................
A rnold O r d m a n .................................

May 1963

* Eugene G. G o s le e .............................

Aug. 1971

Peter G. Nash ...................................

Aug. 1975

* John C. M ille r.....................................

..................

Aug. 1975

Nov. 1975

John S. Irv in g .....................................

..................

Dec. 1975

O ct. 1979

* N orton J. C o m e .................................

..................

O ct. 1979

Dec. 1979

W illiam A. L u b b e rs ...........................

April 1984

..................

Dec. 1979

* W ilford W . Johansen......................... ..................

A pril 1984

Rosemary M. Collyer ....................... ..................

O ct. 1984

O ct. 1984
•

* Acting General Counsel

Source:

National Labor Relations Board, A Commemorative Publication, (pages
unnumbered).
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APPENDIX G
UNION MEMBERSHIP AND ULP CASES FILED

YEAR

UNION U.S.

LABOR

MEMBERSHIP

FORCE

PERCENT
UNIONIZATION

(000 omitted)
(2)

(1)

16,586
16,524
16,841
17,299
17,940
18,367
18,916
19,036
19,381
19,211
19,435
19,851
20,199
19,611
19.634

(3)

19,695
20,246*
20,475*
20,705*
20,935*
21,165*
21,395

73,442
74,571
75,830
77,178
78,893
80,793
82,272
84,240
85,903
86,929
88,991
91,040
93,240
94,793
96,917
99,534
102,537
106,559
108,544
110,315
111,872
113,286

FILED BY
UNION

(4)
(2)

1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977 TQ
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

ULP CASES RECEIVED DURING YEA!

v

ULP PER MIL.
UNION MEMBERSHIP

(5)
(5)

(3)

22.6
22.2
22.2
22.4
22.3
22.3
23.0
22.6
22.6
22.1
21.8
21.8
21.8
20.7
20.3
19.8
I11.7VC*
19-2**
19. Oj.
18-9**
18.9

(6)

5897
6346
7209
7737
7771
7846
7814
7946
8766
9862
11,197
10,601
10,876
11,778
13,487
3241
14,988
15,273
16,988
18,464
17,989
18,653
18,424

t

(2)

355.5
384.0
428.1
447.3
444.3
427.2
413.1
417.4
452.3
513.4
576 .1
534.0
538.4
600.6
686.9
—

761.0

829-7**
891-8**
859.3**
88!.3**
861.1

SOURCES: Handbook of Labor Statistics, U.S . Depc. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Studies,
Washington D.C., 1980, Table 165, p. ^12.
N.L.R ,B. Annual Repurcs,
Fiscal Years, 1962-1983.
*

**
Estimates

(a )

Imputed using estimated union memberships

Transitional Quarter (i.e., change oi fiscal year end dace from June
September 30.

JO to

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

173

APPENDIX H
UL? Cases Classified by Charging Parties

Line

Cases Identified by Complainant or Petitioner
Closed During Fiscal Year

1980

FISCAL YEARS
1981
1982

Combined
1980-1982

1.

Total Cases Closed During Fiscal Year

55,587

52,804

45,103

153,494

2.

Total ULP Cases Closed During Fiscal Year

42,047

41,020

36,424

119,491

3.

ULP Cases
Filed by Employers

5,082

4,126

3,400

12,608

4.

Line 3 as a percent of Line 2

12.1%

10.1%

9.3%

10.6%

5.

Filed by Unions

17,207

16,709

16,731

50,647

6.

Line 5 as a percent of Line 2

40.9%

40.7%

45.9%

42.4%

7.

Subtotal Lines 3 and 5

22,289

20,835

20,131

63,255

8.

Line 7 as a percent of Line 2

53.0%

50.8%

55.3%

52.9%

9.

Filed by Individuals

19,758

20,185

16,293

56,236

47.0%

49.2%

44.7%

47.1%

10.

Line 9 as a percent of Line 2

11.

Total Lines 3, 5 and 9

42,047

41,020

36,424

119,491

12.

Line 11 as a percent of Line 2

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

p.240

p.173

p.260

__

Source:

NLRB Annual Report (Fiscal Year), Table 1

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

174

APPENDIX I
Novel Cases Reviewed by NLRB

Line

Novel Cases Reviewed that were
Closed During Fiscal Year

1980

FISCAL YEARS_____ Combined
1981
1982
1980-1982

1.

Total Novel Cases Reviewed with Decisions

86

52

69

207

2.

Cases Reviewed involving Unanimous Decisions

60

42

5_1

153

9

5

;

16

3.

Filed by Employers

4.

Filed by Unions

30

27

32

89

5.

Filed by Individuals

21

10

17

48

26

10

18

54

3

3

9
33

6.

Cases Reviewed involving Non-Unanimous Decisions

7.

Filed by Employers

3

8.

Filed by Unions

17

4

12

9.

Filed by Individuals

6

3

3

Source:

12

NLRB Annual Report (Fiscal Year)
Compilation Primary.
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APPENDIX J
Decision Paths of Pro-Union and Pro-Management
Decision Outcomes by Board Members
Charge

Hearing & Report

ALJ:

Board Vote

Decision Outcome*

Member:
Pro Union
Affirms ALJ

Supports Charge

Disaffirms ALJ

Pro Management

Filed by Union
Against Employer
Pro Management
Rejects Chargevs s£C£riIjS ;.lj

Disaffirms ALJ

Pro Union

Pro Management
Affirms ALJ
Filed by Employer
against Union

Supports Charge
Disaffirms ALJ

Affirms ALJ

Pro Union

Pro Union

Rejects Charge

Disaffirms ALJ
P ro M a na g e m en t

*In making a decision a Board Member's support can be either:
(1) Fully pro-union or pro-management or (2) Partially pro-union or
pro-management.
Treatment of partial support is discussed in Chapter III.
Source:

Primary

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

176

APPENDIX K
Number of Charges in Cases Filed under Sections 8(a) and 8(b)

Line

Number of Cases Showing Specific
Allegations Received During the Fiscal Year

1980

Fiscal Year_____
1982
1981

Combined
1980-1982

CHARGES FILED AGAINST EnFLOYERS UNDER SEC 8(,a)
1.

Total Cases

31,281

31,273

27,749

90,303

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Cases Alleging Violation of Section:
8(a)(1)
8(a)(2)
8(a)(3)
8(a)(4)
8(a)(5)
Total of Lines 2 through 6
Ratio of Line 7 to Line 1

31,281
979
18,315
1,321
9,866
61,762
1.974

31,273
869
17,571
1,409
9,815
60,937
1.949

27,749
858
14,732
1,147
10,898
55,384
1.996

90,303
2,706
50,618
3,877
30,579
173,083
1.972

Total Cases

12,563

11,882

10,230

34,675

Cases Alleging Violations of Section:
8(b)(1)
8(b)(2)
8(b)(3)
8(b)(4)
8(b)(5)
8(b)(6)
8(b)(7)
Total of Lines 10 chrough 16
Ratio of Line 17 to Line 9

8,206
1,690
913
2,987
46
42
600
14,484
1.153

8,382
1,513
945
2,392
37
40
4 54
13,763
1.153

7,354
1,514
778
1,911
37
29
375
11,998
1.173

23,942
4,717
2,636
7,290
120
111
1,429
L0,245
1.161

NLRB Annual Reports, Various Fiscal Years

p.243

p. 176

p.263

—

CHARGES FILED AGAINST UNIONS UNDER SEC 8(b)
9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Source:
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